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Abstract 
 
Studies of the minimum wage, particularly of its impact on the labour market, have raised 
interesting but contentious questions among researchers and policymakers alike. There 
have been a number of studies which examine the impact of the National Minimum Wage 
on the UK labour market, but little has been done to examine the effects of the minimum 
wage on non-wage benefits. There is also a paucity of studies that examine the effects of 
the minimum wage on migrant workers. This study aims to fill this gap by examining the 
effects of the minimum wage on the non-wage benefits of migrant workers. Therefore 
three important and interrelated issues are examined in theoretical and empirical contexts: 
(i) the effects of the minimum wage on a wide range of non-wage benefits, (ii) the effects 
of the minimum wage on migration, and (iii) the effects of the minimum wage on the non-
wage benefits of migrant workers. It is argued that to some extent the minimum wage has 
had adverse effects on both non-wage benefits and migrant workers.  
 
Primary and secondary research has been conducted by applying mainly positivist 
quantitative methodology, complemented by a qualitative approach (i.e. a number of 
interviews) to examine the effects of the minimum wage on the non-wage benefits of 
migrant workers. The secondary data has been collected from three major labour surveys in 
the UK: the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), the Workplace Employee 
Relations Survey (WERS), and the Labour Force Survey (LFS). The primary data has been 
collected through a face-to-face questionnaire survey of 200 London-based migrants who 
have low-paid, low-skilled jobs. The secondary data is analysed using Difference-in-
Difference (DID) analysis, while the primary data is analysed through regression analysis, 
the Pearson’s Chi-squared coefficient, descriptive statistics and qualitative analysis. 
 
It is shown through regression that the minimum wage is likely to create adverse effects in 
the UK labour market, particularly for migrant workers. It was found that the minimum 
wage has significant negative influences on migrants’ access to numerous valuable non-
wage benefits, such as training, holiday pay, paid sick leave and pension schemes. 
Accommodation/housing, which is a non-wage benefit pertinent to the minimum wage, 
was also found to be an excuse for not paying statutory wages. Migrants who work in the 
minimum wage sectors are also less likely to receive health/life insurance. Nevertheless, 
11 
 
DID analysis overall shows no evidence that the minimum wage reduces the provision of 
non-wage benefits.  
 
The thesis conclusion addresses the implications of these findings for National Minimum 
Wage policy, in particular to encourage policymakers to consider the minimum wage’s 
adverse effects on the UK labour market. The thesis makes some recommendations for 
National Minimum Wage policy in relation to both non-wage benefits and migrant 
workers. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Many employers described the extra benefits they were able to offer their workers, 
such as travel, meals, free access to the trade that they worked in (such as 
construction work being carried out at cost), or the fact that they were giving 
people with no skills and experience the training to potentially get a job elsewhere. 
Indeed, many employers thought that were they to be inspected by a NMW 
[National Minimum Wage] enforcement officer then the financial impact of these 
additional perks would be taken into account. 
(Ipsos MORI and Community Links, 2012: 3–4) 
 
This short excerpt from a research study might serve as an introductory note about the 
focus of this thesis. It shows that the National Minimum Wage may affect the provision of 
non-wage benefits. Since the National Minimum Wage came into force in 1999, numerous 
studies have been conducted to investigate its impact in the UK. However, few of these 
studies have discussed its impact on the wide range non-wage benefits.  
 
Ever since the minimum wage was first introduced in the United States in 1938, its impact 
has been a contested issue. The opponents of the minimum wage argue that it has some 
negative effects, including on employment, working hours and non-wage benefits. This 
thesis explores the impact of the minimum wage in the UK. This is an under-researched 
topic that constitutes a gap in the British literature. 
 
This thesis aims to relate minimum wage studies with migration studies, specifically in 
order to understand how the minimum wage affects migrant workers in the UK labour 
market. The focus of this thesis is thus on investigating the minimum wage policy, its 
effects on non-wage benefits, and how it differently affects migrants.
1
 Very few studies 
have been done on the minimum wage’s effects on migrant workers; indeed, this study 
                                               
1
 This thesis defines migrants as those who were born outside the UK and to non-British 
parents. These include migrants who have gained permanent residency in the UK. I prefer 
to use the term ‘migrants’ rather than ‘immigrants’, since the latter term obscures the 
significance of migration as such. 
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may be the first to investigate the effects of the minimum wage on the non-wage benefits 
of migrants. 
 
While this thesis aims to investigate the relationship between the minimum wage and 
migrant workers, there has long been an interesting and heated debate on how to deal with 
migration. In the UK, immigration policy has created many controversies for governments 
of every political stripe. British immigration policy has never been static, particularly in 
relation to the labour market.
2
 The recent New Labour initiative to reshape approaches to 
immigration is one clear examples of this.
3
 
 
The proportion of non-UK-born workers has been increasing significantly for more than a 
decade. Non-UK-born workers accounted for 14% of the working-age population in late 
2009, a significant increase from just 8% in 1995 (Wadsworth, 2010a). In London, non-
UK-born workers accounted for 39% of the working-age population in 2009 (Wadsworth, 
2010a). The proportion of non-UK-born workers has increased rapidly in relatively low-
skilled sectors and occupations.
4
 This thesis will therefore particularly focus on the 
                                               
2
 There has been a shift in immigration policy, particularly under the current coalition 
government. During the last decade, immigration policy has favoured migration in order to 
fill the labour shortage, in line with the open labour market and following the accession of 
several new countries to the EU in 2004. Under the current coalition government, however, 
immigration is seen as a zero-sum game: (im)migration is seen as a threat to the UK labour 
market. 
 
3
 See Ed Miliband’s New Labour approach to immigration policy (Miliband, 2012). 
 
4
 The proportion of non-UK-born workers among the total workforce has seen the largest 
increase in the food, beverage and manufacturing industries, from 8.1% in 2002 to 21.4% 
in 2008 (Ruhs and Anderson, 2010). Ruhs and Anderson (2010) also show that migrants 
are concentrated at the lowest- and highest-paid ends of occupational distribution. Male 
migrants are particularly concentrated in the two lowest-paid occupations, namely 
elementary workers (cleaners, kitchen assistants and catering assistants) and processing 
operators (transport drivers and food, drink and tobacco process operators), as well as in 
the highest-paid (managerial and professional) occupations (Rienzo, 2012). 
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minimum wage’s effects on low-paid, low-skilled jobs (i.e. secondary jobs, according to 
dual labour market theory). 
 
This thesis presents three main arguments as the foundation of the study: 
a. On the basis of earlier studies and research, this work intends first to explore 
whether, despite the advantages of the minimum wage for increasing the standard 
of living of workers at the bottom end of pay distribution, it also has some negative 
effects. It is expected that any increase in the minimum wage will lead to a 
reduction of (the costs of) non-wage benefits, i.e. compensation other than wages 
that is provided to employees. Such compensation may include the provision of 
training, holiday pay, paid sick leave, pension schemes or bonuses. Cost reductions 
may also consist of reductions in working hours. It is also expected that the 
minimum wage may have adverse effects on working arrangements, which may 
create disadvantages for workers at the bottom end of pay distribution.  
 
b. Second, the study will explore whether the minimum wage affects migrant workers, 
and if so, whether the effect is differentiated. It is expected that certain factors, such 
as human capital, union membership and ethnicity, will determine why some 
migrants earn the minimum wage or below while others are able to earn above it. It 
is also expected that the minimum wage has negative effects on migrants, in 
particular on their non-wage benefits. Migrants who earn the minimum wage or 
below are expected to be the group who derive the least advantage from any rise in 
the minimum wage. They may not get the statutory wage according to minimum 
wage policy; even worse, they may receive fewer non-wage benefits.  
 
c. Third, this study will examine whether the introduction of the minimum wage 
triggers the proliferation of jobs in the second tier of the market. It is expected that 
minimum-wage workers, and particularly those who earn less than the minimum, 
will be the hardest hit.  
 
1.1. Theoretical Perspective 
This thesis’ theoretical perspective is mainly derived from migration and minimum wage 
studies. The debate on migrants’ performance on the labour market has been prolonged – 
and is likely to continue, given that the mobility of workers is so difficult to control. This 
18 
 
thesis starts by reviewing the literature on how migrant workers perform in the labour 
market. The debate starts with the argument that an influx of migrants will create 
competition with non-migrants in the labour market, and therefore that migrants will place 
non-migrants’ jobs at risk and lower non-migrants’ wages. However, Chiswick (1978, 
2000) argues that there are human capital factors that place migrants to be outperformed in 
the labour market. Chiswick’s argument is driven by human capital theory, which suggests 
that any investment in human capital, such as education or training, will increase workers’ 
performance and hence their earnings (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974). Building from 
migrants’ performance in the labour market, this thesis will examine some of the factors 
that affect migrants’ wage levels in order to understand the aspects of low-paid, low-skilled 
jobs that lead to some (migrants) earning the minimum wage (or below) while others earn 
above it. 
 
Migrants in the UK labour market display some interesting phenomena. Studies suggest 
that migrants in the UK have become younger and more educated (Manacorda et al., 2006; 
Dustmann et al., 2007; Wadsworth, 2010a). However, although migrants have become 
more educated, this does not mean that they are getting better jobs. Dustmann et al. (2007) 
suggest that migrants in the UK have been ‘downgraded’ into low-skilled and low-paid 
jobs. Recent migrants – predominantly those who have been in the UK for two years or 
less – are more concentrated at the lower end of pay distribution (Dustmann et al., 2007). It 
is argued that this downgrading might occur because migrants fail to apply their human 
capital immediately they enter the host country (Dustmann et al., 2007). This thesis will 
investigate whether this downgrading occurs; if so, whether human capital can or cannot 
explain it; and whether there are any factors other than human capital which might explain 
why skilled migrants still earn the minimum. 
 
Piore’s (1979) concept of labour market segmentation, which links migration with the 
duality of the labour market, will be valuable for exploring empirical data. Migrants are 
indeed positioned to become segmented labour and to accept secondary jobs more often. 
Secondary jobs, as opposed to primary jobs, are low paid, temporary and less stable (and 
thus have high flexibility), and have fewer non-wage benefits, inferior working conditions 
and/or environments, and a lower degree of formality. Both primary and secondary jobs
5
 
                                               
5
 The term ‘secondary’ is taken to describe a labour market with flat returns to human 
capital but potentially subject to institutional regulation.  
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may sometimes be offered by the same employers.
6
  Migrant workers are more likely to fill 
secondary jobs.  
 
Building from Piore’s concept, this study supports Anderson’s (2010) claim that weak 
control over labour standards to some extent benefits employers by enabling them to create 
a segmented labour force to their own advantage. Thus the tendency of the presence of 
migrants to confirm the duality of the labour market can also be ascribed to the effects of 
the weak regulation of employment standards, while the weak enforcement of the 
minimum wage is seen as one of the reasons why migrants are employed in secondary 
jobs. 
 
As in migration studies, studies of the minimum wage also discuss controversial issues, 
particularly the minimum wage’s possible adverse effects. Classical labour economics 
suggests that an increase in wages may cause a reduction in employment and working 
hours, because it might create an increase in the labour supply but a drop in labour 
demand. Few employers are willing to pay higher wages, resulting in a cut in employment 
or working hours.  
 
Classical economics also suggests that an increase in labour costs should be compensated 
by an increase in worker productivity. Thus if an increase in the minimum wage is not 
followed by any such increase in worker productivity, employers will take the necessary 
action to reduce labour costs elsewhere, such as by reducing staff, working hours or non-
wage benefits. Since employers may not be able easily or immediately to reduce 
employment or working hours (for instance, because of the terms of employment 
contracts), the more feasible option to offset the minimum wage increase may be to reduce 
non-wage benefits. Non-wage benefits are simply forms of compensation other than 
wages, and they constitute a significant proportion of labour costs. They may include 
training, holiday pay, paid sick leave, pension schemes, bonuses, meals or accommodation. 
Non-wage benefits are less regulated than wages, and employers therefore have more 
                                               
6
 For example, in restaurants there are front-stage jobs, which are constituted as primary 
jobs, and backstage jobs, constituted as secondary jobs. Or some parts of a single 
company’s operations, such as cleaning, may be subcontracted, and agency/subcontracting 
jobs are likely to be secondary jobs.  
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flexibility to change their provision. This thesis follows previous studies by Wessels 
(1980), Leighton and Mincer (1981), Hashimoto (1982), Royalty (2000) and Simon and 
Kaestner (2004) on the impact of the minimum wage on non-wage benefits. Particular 
attention will be addressed to the study by Wessels (1980) on the adverse effects of the 
minimum wage on working arrangements and worker utilisation, according to which the 
minimum wage to some extent drives the further creation of secondary jobs. 
 
This thesis aims to investigate the effects of the minimum wage on the non-wage benefits 
of migrant workers. Thus labour economics, minimum wage and migration studies will all 
be drawn on in order to answer this study’s research questions.  
 
1.2. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Three main research questions form the basis of the study: 
 
1. What are the minimum wage’s effects on non-wage benefits, working hours and 
working arrangements in the UK labour market? 
The minimum wage’s effects on non-wage benefits, working hours and working 
arrangements will be investigated. This study is interested in exploring which non-
wage benefits in particular are significantly affected by the minimum wage, and in 
establishing the direction of the effect (i.e. negative or positive). The null 
hypothesis claims that the minimum wage has adverse effects on non-wage 
benefits, working hours and working arrangements. It is expected that the minimum 
wage reduces both working hours and non-wage benefits, and that it causes damage 
to working arrangements.  
 
2. What are the differentiated effects of the minimum wage on migrant workers in 
terms of their wages and non-wage benefits? 
2a. Why are some migrants in low-skilled, low-paid sectors earning above the 
minimum wage, while other migrants in the same sectors earn the minimum wage 
or below? What are the factors that affect the wage levels of migrant workers? 
2b. What are the minimum wage’s effects on the non-wage benefits of migrants? 
The null hypothesis is that the minimum wage is a predictor of migrants’ non-wage 
benefits. It is expected that migrants who earn the minimum wage or below are less 
likely to receive non-wage benefits than migrants who earn above the minimum 
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wage. The research will explore the variations in non-wage benefits in low-paid, 
low-skilled jobs. The research findings are expected to make original contributions 
to existing knowledge on the topic. 
2c. Do migrants in the low-skilled and low-paid sectors display interesting 
phenomena? Does the phenomenon of downgrading suggested by Dustmann et al. 
(2007) exist? Does it confirm Piore’s (1979) argument that the presence of migrants 
increasingly confirms the duality of the labour market?  
 
3. What are the implications of the research findings for the National Minimum 
Wage?  
The empirical evidence collected while answering these research questions will 
provide evidence for policy recommendations. It is expected that the National 
Minimum Wage has some adverse effects on the UK labour market in term of non-
wage benefits, working hours and working arrangements, and particularly on 
workers at the low end of pay distribution. The study is expected to produce 
evidence-based recommendations for possible improvements to the National 
Minimum Wage policy. 
 
1.3. Methods of Investigation 
To address these research questions, this thesis use positivist and quantitative methodology 
in the design of both its primary and secondary research. The purpose of the secondary 
research is to investigate the first research question, i.e. to examine the minimum wage’s 
effects on non-wage benefits, working hours and working arrangements, and to identify the 
non-wage benefits that are particularly affected by the minimum wage. The quantitative 
methodology used in the secondary research rests on the analysis of secondary data from 
three major surveys in the UK: the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), the 
Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS) and the Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
These surveys have been chosen on the basis of their wide coverage of earnings, non-wage 
benefits, working hours and working arrangements. The quantitative analytical technique 
employed is Difference-in-Difference (DID) – a widely known econometric technique in 
minimum wage studies to analyse the effects of the minimum wage (see previous studies 
by Card and Krueger, 1994; Stewart, 2003, 2004; Arulampalam et al., 2004; Dickerson, 
2007). DID detects the effects of the minimum wage at different time periods; thus the 
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variables of earnings and outcomes (effects), i.e. non-wage benefits, working hours and 
working arrangements, are essential to the DID analysis. 
 
Alongside the secondary research, this study has also conducted primary research to 
capture the realities of migrants in low-paid, low-skilled jobs that rarely appear in public 
information or surveys. The quantitative method used to collect the primary data was face-
to-face interviews (based on questionnaires) with migrant workers in London who work in 
the low-paid, low-skilled sectors, including retail, catering, domestic, cleaning, care, 
construction and factory work. The primary research was designed to investigate the 
second research question on the minimum wage’s effects in relation to migration.  
 
First, in order to examine the factors that affect migrants’ minimum wage, regression 
analysis is used to investigate any cause-and-effect relationships. Variables such as human 
capital, working hours, migration-related factors and demographics are set as explanatory 
variables that might affect whether migrants earn the minimum wage or below (the 
dependent variable). Second, the primary research also uses regression analysis to examine 
the minimum wage’s effects on migrant workers’ non-wage benefits. In the construction of 
the regression, the level of the wage (minimum wage or below, and above minimum wage) 
is the explanatory variable, while non-wage benefits are the dependent variables. The 
primary research also uses a number of qualitative interviews to examine the minimum 
wage’s relationship to migration – in particular its relationship with non-wage benefits and 
working arrangements, as suggested by Wessels (1980) – and to address the segmentation 
of labour market, as suggested by Piore (1979). Third, the primary research uses Pearson’s 
Chi-square coefficient and simple descriptive statistics to analyse whether the phenomenon 
of downgrading suggested by Dustmann et al. (2007) exists, and to determine migrants’ 
characteristics in relation to the minimum wage. 
 
The results of both the secondary and primary research are expected to lead to implications 
for the National Minimum Wage policy. 
 
1.4. Scope and Limitations 
This thesis focuses its investigation on the National Minimum Wage in the UK. It focuses 
in particular on the minimum wage’s effects on non-wage benefits. It is understood that the 
minimum wage may have effects on many factors; this thesis therefore limits the scope of 
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its investigation to the minimum wage’s effects on non-wage benefits, working hours and 
working arrangements, which include temporary and flexible work. Flexibility here refers 
only to numerical flexibility, i.e. adjustments in the labour market in terms of the number 
of workers and the hours of work, which are mainly caused by the minimisation of costs.  
 
The thesis discusses the minimum wage’s relationship with migration, but the discussion 
of migration is limited to the scope of the second research question, i.e. the factors 
affecting migrants’ minimum wage, the minimum wage’s effects on migrants’ non-wage 
benefits, and the characteristics of migrants in low-paid, low-skilled jobs. The thesis does 
not discuss any other effects of the minimum wage beyond these aspects. 
 
The methodology is limited by its quantitative and positivist approach. In particular, the 
quantitative analysis of secondary data through the DID method may cover the minimum 
wage’s effects during only two time periods. However, the analysis combines three 
datasets for various years, covering both the short term (recent data) and the long term, in 
order to overcome this limitation. The limitation on the primary research is that it only 
produces cross-sectional data; thus the minimum wage’s effects may be revealed only at a 
certain point in time. Other than in the regression analysis, the primary data can only 
produce the minimum wage’s associations, rather than its impact (causality). The primary 
data also only provides limited insights from in-depth analysis, as it only uses a number of 
qualitative interviews. This study does not capture employers’ responses. Most of the data 
collected provides only individual workers’ responses.  
 
The target group of the primary research is migrant workers in London who work in low-
paid, low-skilled sectors, including retail, catering, domestic, cleaning, care, construction 
and factory work. The samples to some extent are purposive rather than representative. In 
order to accommodate this limitation, the samples are stratified by sector, gender, wage 
level (the minimum wage or below, and above minimum wage) and skills (less skilled and 
skilled workers). 
 
1.5. Chapter Outline 
This research is a broadly cross-disciplinary study of the minimum wage and migration. Its 
focus is on the national minimum wage in the UK and its effects on non-wage benefits, 
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particularly on the non-wage benefits of migrant workers. The thesis is organised into six 
chapters. 
 
Chapter 1 presents the introduction to the thesis, highlighting its aims, research questions, 
scope and limitations, and broadly outlining the other five chapters of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature that provides the foundation of the thesis’ hypotheses. The 
literature review starts by presenting the debate over migration’s impact on the labour 
market. This literature review mainly covers the economics of labour migration, with a 
particular focus on human capital and labour market segmentation. The chapter goes on to 
address the debate in minimum wage studies. Labour economics, with its foundation in 
neoclassical and institutional economics, has been most influential on the minimum wage 
debate. The literature review covers both theoretical concepts and empirical evidence, 
including recent evidence from the British literature. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the methodological approach to the research. The chapter presents both 
primary and secondary research, to which positivist and quantitative methods are applied. 
The chapter starts by explaining the primary and secondary research processes, including 
how the data was collected. The secondary data was collected from three major labour 
surveys in the UK, while the primary data was collected from a questionnaire survey of 
migrant workers in London. The chapter then explores the methods of analysis used for the 
primary and secondary research. The chapter states that each primary and secondary 
research had its own method of analysis, and explains how each method was able to 
answer the research questions. The secondary research, for instance, was analysed using 
the DID method, while the primary research was approached through regression analysis 
and Pearson’s Chi-square coefficient. The purpose of the DID analysis was to detect the 
impact of the minimum wage at two different time periods, while the regression analysis 
aimed to detect the effect of the minimum wage only at a certain time period. Pearson’s 
Chi-square coefficient, on the other hand, presents only an association between two 
variables. The primary research also involved a number of qualitative analysis. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the analyses of the secondary research. It starts by discussing the results 
of the DID test, which analyses the minimum wage’s effects on a wide range of non-wage 
benefits. The DID results show which non-wage benefits are significantly affected by the 
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minimum wage, and the direction (positive or negative) of the effects. The secondary 
research analysis also considers the minimum wage’s effects on working hours and 
working arrangements. Chapter 4 is mainly devoted to research question one and part of 
research question two. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the analyses of the primary research, which are designed to address 
research question two on the minimum wage’s effects on migration. It starts with 
descriptive statistics from its primary data. Through descriptive statistics and Pearson’s 
Chi-square coefficient, the primary research analysis explores the characteristics of 
migrants in minimum-wage jobs and examines whether the phenomenon of downgrading 
exists. Through regression analysis, this chapter also explores the minimum wage’s effect 
on the likelihood of migrants receiving non-wage benefits. It discusses a wide range of the 
non-wage benefits that are provided to migrant workers in low-paid, low-skilled jobs. A 
number of qualitative interviews are also discussed in order to explore the minimum 
wage’s link with migrant workers.  
 
The last chapter, on Conclusions and Recommendations, recaps the findings and evidence 
from the previous two chapters and draws out their policy implications. This chapter in 
particular is devoted to the third research question, and suggests how the evidence 
collected might have implications for the National Minimum Wage policy. The 
recommendations will address potential improvements that might be considered by 
policymakers involved in the National Minimum Wage. 
 
1.6. Contributions 
This thesis contributes to the field of knowledge by making an original contribution that 
addresses a gap in the minimum-wage literature. First, although there are plenty of studies 
that discuss the national minimum wage’s effects on the UK labour market, there is a 
paucity of literature that discusses its effects on non-wage benefits. This thesis may indeed 
be the first to examine the minimum wage’s relationship with certain non-wage benefits, 
which may have not been tested before. 
 
Second, this thesis also fills a gap in the UK literature on the minimum wage’s effects on 
migration. In particular, to the best of my knowledge, no previous study has been devoted 
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to the effects of the minimum wage on migrants’ non-wage benefits. This study thus makes 
an original contribution in this respect.  
 
Lastly, this study will draw on its findings to make some evidence-based recommendations 
to improve the National Minimum Wage policy in the UK. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
Any insightful analysis that addresses the relationship between immigration and the 
minimum wage needs to look at those parts of the wage distribution where the 
minimum wage is located. We demonstrate that there is a substantial skill 
downgrading of new immigrant groups. It is therefore unclear ex ante where in the 
skill distribution immigrants may put pressure on native wages and where they may 
lead to wage increases, due to complementarities. 
 (Dustmann et al., 2007: 7) 
 
Although this study does not attempt to answer whether any competition between migrants 
and non-migrants exists in minimum-wage jobs, its focus on the relationship between the 
minimum wage and migration means that it must examine not only the economics of 
labour, but also the economics of migration, in which migrants’ performance is linked with 
such competition. 
 
This chapter in particular reviews the literature on which this study is founded, namely the 
minimum-wage and migration literature. In relation to the minimum-wage literature, the 
context of this study is framed by the neoclassical labour economics that drives minimum-
wage research; in the migration literature, on the other hand, the context is framed by the 
economics of migration. 
 
The quote from Dustmann et al. (2007) above is the starting point for my discussion of the 
relationship between wages and migrant workers. The link between migrants’ performance 
and competition in the labour market has always been a contested topic. In the UK this 
heated debate has been taking place alongside the economic downturn and the consequent 
focus on UK unemployment figures. In other words, the impact of migration on the labour 
market, and particularly the question of whether there is any competition between migrants 
and non-migrants in the labour market, have been gaining centre stage. 
 
The literature review starts with a thorough review of the evidence and debates about 
migrants’ performance in the labour market, and particularly of recent evidence in the UK. 
The demographic profile of migrants in the UK reveals some interesting phenomena. 
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Recent migrants to the UK are younger and more educated than non-migrants, and indeed 
than previous migrants. However, they are more likely to be downgraded, undertaking less 
skilled and lower-paid jobs, at least in the initial period of their stay in the host country. 
(This study adopts the term ‘downgraded’, which emerged from the study by Dustmann et 
al. (2007) quoted above.) Recent migrants to the UK are thus far from being perfect 
substitutes for either natives or previous migrants in terms of their skill-age profile. The 
literature suggests that the impact of migration, to some extent, is more significant on 
previous migrants than on natives (Manacorda et al., 2006, 2012). In other words, previous 
migrants are the group that is hardest hit by the presence of recent migrants. To sum up, 
the evidence shows that the main impact of migration is on migrants themselves (i.e. 
previous migrants), rather than on natives.  
 
The literature review will go on to investigate the downgrading of migrants in order to 
establish why this phenomenon exists. Can the concept of human capital explain why 
skilled migrants work in low-skilled, low-paid jobs? If, as human capital theory suggests, 
investment in education and language proficiency may lead to higher wages, is this a sign 
that recent migrants are unable to apply their human capital immediately upon arrival? Or 
is there some other factor which might explain the phenomenon of downgrading? Why are 
migrants concentrated in the lower level of occupational distribution? Why might 
migration be relevant to explain the duality in labour market, i.e. the concentration of 
migrants in secondary jobs according to Piore (1979)’s definition of labour market 
segmentation? 
 
Focusing on rates of pay, this thesis will seek to establish whether the minimum wage 
applies to secondary jobs, and to assess the impact of the minimum wage on the labour 
market. The literature review will therefore go on to discuss the minimum wage debate. It 
will start with the theoretical concept of the minimum wage, focussing on the possible 
impacts of the minimum wage on employment and non-wage benefits. A further review is 
then conducted on the importance of non-wage benefits and the reasons for the minimum 
wage’s adverse effects on non-wage benefits. In low-paid, low-skilled jobs in particular, 
what might the minimum wage’s effect be on non-wage benefits? 
 
The literature review then turns to the topic of the minimum wage and migration. There is 
indeed a gap in the UK literature here, as there have only been a few studies that explore 
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the issue of the minimum wage through the prism of migration; there is a particular 
absence of studies that discuss the minimum wage’s impact on migration. Since the 
introduction of the National Minimum Wage policy in 1999, there has been plenty of 
research on the impact of the minimum wage. However, only a few such studies discuss 
the minimum wage’s impact on non-wage benefits, and the gap is particularly profound in 
literature on the minimum wage’s impact on the non-wage benefits of migrant workers. In 
the UK literature to date, only a few studies appear to link the effects of the minimum 
wage with migration: Dustmann et al. (2007) and French and Möhrke (2007) are among 
the very few to do so. None of these studies, however, focuses on the non-wage benefits of 
migrant workers, and in particular none analyses the causality between the minimum wage 
and migrants’ non-wage benefits. This thesis therefore attempts to fill the gap in the 
literature by making an original contribution to minimum wage studies in the UK. 
 
2.1. Migrants’ Performance in the Labour Market 
This literature review starts with the literature on migration, particularly on migrants’1 
performance in the labour market. This topic concerns how migration affects the (host 
country’s) labour market. The neoclassical theory of labour supply and demand (Marshall, 
1890; Hicks, 1932) suggests that the influx of labour has an impact on wages.  
 
The neoclassical approach has become the foundation of analyses of the economics of 
migration, specifically of migrants’ performance in the labour market. There is a lengthy, 
profound and ongoing debate over whether migrants’ performance has negative impacts on 
the (host country’s) labour market, particularly on the wages and jobs (employment) of 
non-migrants. 
 
There are three main conditions of migration’s impact on the host country’s labour market, 
particularly on natives’ jobs and wages, according to Borjas (2008). The first is the impact 
on the short-term labour market where migrants are assumed to be close substitutes for 
natives. The second is the impact on the short-term labour market where migrants are 
assumed to be the complements of natives. The third is the impact on the long-term labour 
                                               
1
 For the purposes of this study, migrant workers are defined as those who were born 
outside the UK to non-British parents and who are currently in employment in the UK. It 
also includes migrants who have obtained permanent residency in the UK.
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market. Figure 2.1 describes the first condition, where the major influx of close-substitute 
migrants moves the supply curve from S0 to S1 and brings the wages down from W0 to W1. 
Close-substitute migrants are those whose skills are seen as closely resembling those of 
natives; thus a major influx of such migrants leads to a reduction in wages. With lower 
wages, some natives become unwilling to take the jobs in question, and thus the 
employment of natives decreases from N0 to N2. It is interesting to note that in this case a 
certain section of the labour force is unwilling to take jobs at lower wages. This 
‘unwillingness’ factor must be taken into account in the study of low-paid, low-skilled 
jobs.
2
 
 
Wages                                                          S0 
                                                                                     S1 
       W0 
      
       W1 
                                                                          D 
                                                                                     Employment                      
                             N2              N0             N1 
Figure 2.1 Perfect-Substitute Migrants Affect the Wages and Employment of Natives  
Source: Borjas (2010: 168), Figure 4-10.  
 
Figure 2.2, on the other hand, presents the theoretical view that migrants are 
complementary to natives. In such cases, migrants compete for different types of jobs 
which require different types of skill. This condition leads natives to specialise their skills 
and develop their human capital. Thus the labour demand for natives increases from D0 to 
D1, and so do their wages. At the higher wage W1, the employment of natives increases 
from N0 to N1. However, the first and second conditions as represented by Figures 2.1 and 
2.2 only apply for a short time period, given the assumption that if capital and labour are 
the only factors of production, in the short run capital is going to be constant.   
                                               
2
 This is expressed by Moriarty (2010) as ‘who wants to do what’ from the labour supply 
point of view. 
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Figure 2.2 Complementary Migrants Affect the Wages and Employment of Natives  
Source: Borjas (2010: 169), Figure 4-11. 
 
In the long run, however, capital becomes variable, and as capital increases over time, 
employers can hire more workers. The third condition, described in Figure 2.3, shows that 
in the long run, although the abundant entrance of migrants increases the supply curve 
from S0 to S1, it also drives up the demand from D0 to D1. Wages therefore return to the 
equilibrium level (W0), and the employment of natives also returns to the equilibrium level 
(N0) that pertained before the migrants’ entry. Thus migration only has an adverse impact 
at a certain point in time, and this impact weakens as the economy self-adjusts. 
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Figure 2.3 Perfect-Substitute Migrants Affect the Wages and Employment of Natives 
in the Long Run 
Source: Borjas (2010: 171), Figure 4-12. 
 
Evidence from the US labour market shows a mixed picture in relation to this debate on 
migration and wages. Studies by Borjas (2003) and Borjas and Katz (2007) show evidence 
of a negative impact of migration on non-migrants’ wages. Ottaviano and Peri (2006) and 
Peri (2007), on the other hand, suggest that migration increases non-migrants’ wages. 
 
In his paper re-examining the impact of migration on the labour market, Borjas (2003) 
observes natives’ wage growth and compares it with the percentages of migrants between 
1960 and 2000. Using a national-level approach, the results confirm a negative correlation 
between migration and native wages: an increase of 10% in the share of migrants lowers 
wages by 3% to 4% (Borjas, 2003). In order to estimate more closely how the wages of 
specific skill groups of natives are affected by migration, Borjas and Katz (2007) in a 
subsequent study used a structural approach – an extension of the national-level approach – 
to examine the impact of Mexican-born workers on specific groups of natives. Their study 
found that in the period 1980 to 2000, Mexican migrants lowered the wages of all natives 
by 3.4%, the wages of native high-school dropouts by 8.2%, the wages of native high-
school graduates by 2.2%, and the wages of native college graduates by 3.9% (Borjas and 
Katz, 2007).  
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Using the Current Population Survey in the United States for 1994 to 2000, Orrenius and 
Zavodny (2006) examine the effect of migration at the occupational group level. They 
separate occupational group levels into the professional level, the service-related level and 
the manual-labour level (or the least skilled level). Their results indicate a significant 
negative relationship between migration and native wages at the least skilled level. In other 
words, the larger the immigration influx, the greater the reduction in native wages at the 
manual-labour level. They found that an increased share of new legal migrants lowers the 
wages of natives in blue-collar occupations by 0.8%. However, at the medium-skill and 
high-skill levels there is no evidence that migration has an adverse impact on natives’ 
wages.  
 
A study by Ottaviano and Peri (2006) challenges the earlier evidence. They found strong 
evidence that migrants in the US are not perfect substitutes for natives in term of 
educational experience. They found only a small negative impact on the group of high-
school dropouts; for the other native groups, there are significant increases in wages. They 
also found that previous migrants are the group who are hardest hit. Previous migrants are 
the group with the largest reduction in wages, because it is they who compete for similar 
jobs with the new migrants. The study by Ottaviano and Peri (2006) rejects the hypothesis 
that migrants constitute a negative attack on non-migrants’ jobs. A subsequent study by 
Peri (2007) using data from California migrants – most of whom have very low levels of 
education – even found that migration increased the average wage of US natives. These 
contradictory results, as Ottaviano and Peri (2006) suggest, might arise from the different 
methods and approaches used by the studies’ authors. For example, Ottaviano and Peri 
(2006) argue that Borjas (2003) placed greater emphasis on the ‘partial’ effect of migrants, 
whose skills are similar to those of natives, while Ottaviano and Peri (2006) themselves 
used the general equilibrium approach, which focuses on migrants with different skills to 
natives. 
 
Ottaviano and Peri’s (2006) argument is strengthened by a subsequent study by Card 
(2009). In the interpretation of his findings, Card (2009) makes three important arguments 
about education (skills). First, workers with below high-school education are perfect 
substitutes for workers with a high-school education: his study found that workers with no 
formal education, those with primary education only and high-school dropouts fall into the 
same skill categories (and thus compete for the same jobs) as those who have completed a 
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high-school education. Second, Card (2009) notes that high-school equivalents are 
imperfect substitutes for college equivalents. His interpretation is that college and high 
school give completely different skills, and that college is superior to high school. Third, 
Card (2009) found that within each education group, migrants are imperfect substitutes for 
natives. This is very interesting, as it supports the hypothesis that within the same level of 
skill (education), migrants do not substitute for natives. This probably means that they do 
not compete for the same jobs. Nonetheless, the consequences are that an influx of 
migrants with the same skills as natives will have more of an impact on migrants 
themselves (previous migrants) than on natives
3
 (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Card, 2009). 
 
Although the US evidence presents some mixed results, the same does not apply to the UK. 
Migrants in the UK have their own interesting characteristics, which differ from those of 
migrants in the US. One of the differences is in terms of skill (education): migrants to the 
UK have become more educated, while this might not have happened in the US.
4
 Although 
the definition of ‘skill’ is debatable, as it may cover educational level as well as language 
proficiency and working experience – not to mention that in specific sectors the definition 
of skill might be ambiguous
5
 – this evidence might still shed some light on migrant 
phenomena in the low-skilled, low-paid sectors that are the focus of this study.  
 
2.1.1. Migrants’ Performance in the UK Labour Market 
Empirical evidence from the UK highlights some interesting phenomena of migration in 
the country’s labour market. Migrants to the UK have distinctive characteristics and 
conditions that might not be the same as those of migrants to other countries such as the 
                                               
3
 In his earlier study of migrants and competition in the labour market, Borjas (1987) also 
confirmed that migrants’ main competitors are other migrants. His study found that a 10% 
increase in the supply of migrants led to 10% reduction in migrant wages. 
 
4
 See Passel (2005) and Card (2009), who stress that a third or more of recent migrants 
have low education and limited English skills. Peri (2007) also notes that in California in 
2004, two thirds of the workers who had no school qualifications were foreign-born. 
 
5
 Sectors such as hospitality, care and domestic work are unlikely to share the same 
definitions of skill as other sectors. 
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US. Dustmann et al. (2005) note that at the national level, migrants in the UK have similar 
skills to natives. Following Dustmann et al.’s (2005) findings, later evidence by 
Manacorda et al. (2006) concludes that migrants are better educated and tend to be 
younger. This evidence is also echoed by Dustmann et al. (2007) and Wadsworth (2010a).  
 
Dustmann et al. (2005) investigate the effects of migration in the UK by using data from 
the Labour Force Survey for the period 1983–2000. They use a spatial correlation approach 
with a percentage of migrants in different regions. Their results demonstrate that migrants 
have no significant effect on the overall employment of natives. They differentiate the 
impact of migration on three education groups: low education (no formal qualifications), 
intermediate education (O levels) and advanced education (A levels/degree). With 
disaggregate analysis, in the intermediate education group, an increase of 1% in migrants 
reduces native employment by 1.8%, reduces the native participation rate by 1.1%, and 
increases the native unemployment rate by 1%. For the advanced education group, a 1% 
increase in migrants increases the native employment and participation rate by 1.1%, but 
has no effect on unemployment rate. There is no significant effect of migrants on the native 
labour market for the low education group. 
 
Manacorda et al. (2006) use the Labour Force Survey and General Household Survey for 
the period from the mid-1970s to the mid-2000s to investigate the effects of migration on 
native wages in the UK. They adopt a similar approach to Ottaviano and Peri (2006), using 
parallel age-education groups to the US study. Their empirical findings show that within 
each age-education group, migrants are imperfect substitutes for natives; indeed, recent 
migrants are imperfect substitutes for previous migrants. This echoes Ottaviano and Peri’s 
(2006) findings. Manacorda et al.’s (2006) results show that migration reduces the wages 
of university-educated previous migrants, but has only a small effect on native wages. 
Their later study even concludes that the main impact of migration is on the wages of 
previous migrants already in the UK (Manacorda et al., 2012). 
 
Dustmann et al. (2007) in their report to the Low Pay Commission investigate in great 
detail the effects of migration on the UK labour market, predominantly in the low-paying 
sectors. They use data from the Labour Force Survey, the Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings, and the UK Census. Similarly to Manacorda et al. (2006), they conclude that 
migrants to the UK have become more educated than natives. However, although migrants 
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have become more educated, they do not easily get better jobs. Dustmann et al. (2007) 
describe how recent migrants who have resided in the UK for up to two years are more 
concentrated at the lower end of occupational distribution. Using Labour Force Survey 
data for the period 2001 to 2005, they argue that 16.92% of recent migrants earn wages 
below the 10
th
 percentile, while for earlier migrants the figure is 8.77%, and for natives it is 
10.19%. Work in private households accounts for largest proportion of recent migrants 
who earn below the 10
th
 percentile: 87.76% of all recent migrants who work in private 
households earn below the 10
th
 percentile.  
 
Dustmann et al. (2007) draw the conclusion that recent migrants, who are more educated 
and younger, are being downgraded into less skilled and lower-paid jobs. Dustmann et al. 
(2007: 19) suggest that upon arrival, migrants lack information about the host country, as 
well as key skills such as language proficiency which are required for immediate use on 
the labour market. These conditions ‘push’ migrants towards the lowest occupational end 
of the labour market on entry. As migrants acquire the information and skills they need, 
they gradually move into better jobs (2007: 25). These findings support Card’s (2009) 
argument that within each educational group, migrants are imperfect substitutes for natives. 
Migrants to the UK who have the same level of education (skills) as natives apparently do 
not compete with natives for the same jobs. However, Dustmann et al. (2007: 25–26) stress 
the importance of specifying the time period and particular immigration flow when 
analysing migration’s effects on the host labour market, as the composition of migrants 
may change over time. 
 
Dustmann et al.’s (2007) findings are particularly useful for the empirical analysis to be 
conducted in this study namely, which asks questions that arise from the phenomenon of 
downgrading: why would skilled migrants, at least initially, be concentrated in low-skilled, 
low-paid jobs? Does this only happen during the early years of residence in the host 
country? Is it solely because migrants are unable to put their human capital to immediate 
use, or are there factors other than human capital involved? Has the tightening of 
immigration controls to select ‘the best and the brightest’ contributed to the fact that 
migrants have become more educated? According to Wadsworth (2010a), India, Poland 
and Pakistan were the top three countries from which migrants came to the UK in 2009, 
accounting for 10.7%, 7.9% and 7.2% of total migrants respectively. India and Pakistan 
seem to be the countries that are most affected by the UK government’s tightening of 
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control on non-EU migration.
6
 This stricter immigration control might be the reason why 
migrants to the UK have become more educated. Nonetheless, according to the Low Pay 
Commission (2011), among all adult jobs in April 2010, migrants held approximately 8% 
of jobs below £5.80 per hour (the 2009 adult National Minimum Wage) and 11% of jobs 
below £5.93 per hour (the 2010 adult National Minimum Wage).  
 
Despite the wage discrepancies between migrants and non-migrants, or between recent 
migrants and earlier migrants, studies in the UK have also found evidence of differences in 
earnings between ethnicities. Chiswick (1980) used data from the 1972 General Household 
Survey to examine ethnic differences in male migrants’ earnings in the UK. His main 
finding confirmed that although white migrants had similar earnings patterns to natives, 
ethnic minority migrants’ earnings were around 25% lower when other factors were 
constant. Bell’s (1997) analysis of General Household Survey data for 1973–1992 also 
found that ethnic minorities were disadvantaged in earnings performance. His findings 
suggest that black migrants with significant work experience, particularly those from the 
Caribbean, were the most disadvantaged group; however, the magnitude of the wage 
difference was reduced as the group’s time in the UK increased. By using two UK surveys, 
the Fourth National Survey on Ethnic Minorities for 1993–1994 and the Family and 
Working Lives Survey for 1994–1995, Dustmann and Fabbri (2003) show that language 
proficiency (a component of human capital, which is covered in the next section) has a 
positive relationship with employment chances and earnings, although these variables 
differ widely among non-white migrants according to ethnicity. Statistics from the UK 
National Minimum Wage show that for all adult jobs in April 2010, Bangladeshis and 
Pakistanis are the top two among ethnic groups who earn the National Minimum Wage or 
below. It is estimated that of all jobs paying less than or equal to £5.93 per hour (the 2010 
                                               
6
 This began with the introduction of the Points-Based System (PBS) by the UK Border 
Agency (UKBA) in 2008, under which non-EU nationals have to have earned a number of 
‘points’ in order to acquire a permit to work or study. However, UKBA’s requirements 
have been criticised for a multitude of changes – they have changed substantially at least 
14 times in the last three years (London Metropolitan University, 2012). Although there is 
no statistical data showing how many times the PBS requirement has been substantially 
changed, this thesis demonstrates that it is becoming increasingly difficult to work and 
study in the UK. 
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adult National Minimum Wage), approximately 15% are held by Bangladeshis and 12% by 
Pakistanis (Low Pay Commission, 2011). 
 
Recent reports in the UK also show mixed results that contribute to the controversy over 
the impact of migration on natives’ wages and employment. A report by the Migration 
Advisory Commission (MAC) describes a link between the increasing numbers of non-EU 
migrants and increasing unemployment figures in the UK. Specifically the report states 
that for every 100 non-EU migrants, there are 23 natives who lose their jobs (Migration 
Advisory Commission, 2012). The report emphasises that this is an ‘association’ rather 
than a ‘causal relationship’: it bases this conclusion on the assumption that non-EU 
migrants’ association with unemployment applies only to temporary migrants who stayed 
in the UK for less than five years during the period 1995–2010 (when the economy was not 
operating at full capacity), and that it will not be a long-term phenomenon. 
 
Contrary to the MAC report, a report by National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research found no evidence that migration has any impact on unemployment (Lucchino et 
al., 2012). This study, which was conducted using the National Insurance number 
registrations of foreign nationals, found no association between migrant inflows and 
claimant unemployment, even during the recent economic downturn and recession 
(Lucchino et al., 2012). 
 
The following conclusions can be drawn about migrants’ performance on the UK labour 
market. First, taking Card’s (2009) argument into account, migrants are imperfect 
substitutes for natives at the same educational level. This is particularly true in the case of 
recent, (more) educated migrants, who are concentrated at the lower end of occupational 
distribution. Clearly these downgraded migrants do not compete for the same jobs as 
natives with similar levels of education. Second, this raises the question of the effect of 
these downgraded migrants on less skilled, low-paid jobs. It is still unclear whether 
migration has an impact on natives at the lower end of occupational distribution; however, 
the literature suggests that the impact is greater on migrants themselves (i.e. previous 
migrants) than on natives (Manacorda et al., 2006, 2012). The literature also suggests that 
there is still little evidence in the UK that migration has an impact on less skilled natives; 
Lucchino et al. (2012) suggest that the impact is modest at most. Third, although this study 
does not address whether there is competition between migrants and natives for less skilled, 
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low-paid jobs, it would be interesting to know what is driving the phenomenon of 
downgrading. Does downgrading phenomenon provides evidences that human capital does 
not work in the way that it should, given that Dustmann et al. (2007) suggest that migrants 
are unable to turn their human capital to immediate use once they arrive in the host country? 
The next section reviews the influence of human capital on migration. 
 
2.2. The Influence of Human Capital on Migrants’ Performance 
Human capital is connected with workers’ productivity, and hence with workers’ wages: 
workers who invest in their own human capital are able to boost their performance and 
earn higher wages. This section discusses selected factors in human capital – training, 
education and language proficiency – and how they influence migrants’ performance in the 
labour market.  
 
The pioneering work of Becker (1964) emphasises the importance of on-the-job training, 
i.e. training in the workplace. According to Becker, there are two types of on-the-job 
training. The first is general training, which increases the marginal products of the firm 
providing the training as well as those of other firms. General training may benefit workers, 
in the sense that workers with general training may quit their job and get higher wages 
elsewhere. In return for this benefit, Becker explains that workers have to bear the cost of 
the training, unless there is legislation that requires the employers to provide general 
training or common ground in the sense that all firms in the industry benefit from the 
provision of such training. If employers have to provide training as a non-wage benefit, 
workers do not bear any cost (non-wage benefits are discussed later in this chapter). 
Becker also states that general training makes an important contribution by boosting 
workers’ earnings in accordance with their age. Figure 2.4 describes the age-earnings 
profile of such workers, and shows that the earnings of workers who are equipped with 
training (line TT) eventually surpass those of untrained workers (line UU). When workers 
are younger, the earnings of trained workers are less than those of the untrained, as the 
workers have to bear the cost of training; but eventually, at older ages, their earnings 
surpass those of the untrained, as the trained workers are able to collect a return on their 
training. 
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Figure 2.4 Age-Earnings Profile 
Source: Becker (1964: 23), Chart 1. 
 
The second type of on-the-job training is specific training. Becker (1964) notes that this 
type of training only benefits the firm providing the training, and not other firms elsewhere. 
Workers who quit their job, therefore, do not get an increase in wages merely because of 
their specific training. The employers are obliged to pay for the training, and thus have less 
incentive to reduce employee numbers, even if demand is in decline: employers prefer not 
to fire workers who have received specific training, because their marginal productivity is 
initially higher than their wages. Workers therefore have less incentive to quit, as 
employers generally pay higher wages to specific-trained workers so as to secure long-term 
worker commitment and prevent any increase in turnover. Becker also states that 
monopoly firms tend to invest in more specific training than competitive firms.  
 
From the analysis of low-paying sectors, this thesis argues that general training is more 
likely to be the type of on-the-job training offered by low-paying companies. This is 
simply because it is less likely for employers who offer low-paid, low-skilled jobs to be 
willing to bear higher costs (to pay for specific training) in order to retain workers in the 
long term. It is a criticism of employers offering secondary jobs in particular that 
employment has become more temporary, flexibilised and demand-driven, and hence less 
focused on training. 
 
Evidence of the effect of training on workers’ performance, as discussed by Bishop (1994), 
shows that on-the-job training by a previous employer has a positive impact on the 
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productivity of newly hired workers, and reduces the time required to train them. This 
finding is in line with Becker’s theory that general on-the-job training benefits not only the 
current employer but also future employers. This will prove interesting for the analysis of 
the research findings presented in Chapter 5, which will consider why some workers in 
low-paid, low-skilled jobs receive no training at all. Further confirming Becker’s theory, 
Bishop (1994) also finds that new hires with relevant vocational training obtained from 
vocational (or technical) schools (or colleges) require less training, are more productive, 
and are more likely to receive higher initial wages.  
 
In their survey report on training statistics in the UK, Felstead et al. (1997) found that just 
under 10% of individuals in receipt of training thought that they had gained no benefit in 
terms of improvements to their skills, while 9% stated that their improved skills would 
only be useful if they continued to work for their current employer. This 9% figure exactly 
represents workers in receipt of specific training from their employers. Eighty per cent of 
individuals in the survey, however, believed that they had gained transferrable skills from 
training. Another interesting finding is that only 63% of employers paid their entire 
training bill, and roughly 10% of employees paid the entire bill for their own training. In 
relation to this study, it would be interesting to ask whether employers bear any of the 
costs of providing training in low-paid, low-skilled jobs. Another interesting finding from 
Felstead et al. (1997), which is also cited in Dickerson (2007), is that ‘In comparison with 
other European countries, training provision in Britain is actually quite high, but much of it 
is of low level – for example, concerned with induction or health and safety – rather than 
directed towards productivity enhancing activities’ (Dickerson, 2007: 6, footnote 2). This 
might be because, as Becker suggests, firms are obliged to provide such training by 
legislation or union pressure. This study will attempt to establish the types of training 
received by workers in low-paid, low-skilled jobs, in order to confirm Dickerson’s 
argument. 
 
The next human capital factor is education (schooling), which has the same theoretical age-
earnings profile as training. As Becker emphasises, investment in human capital increases 
the marginal productivity of labour and drives wages up. However, Becker adds that 
investment in human capital is not without cost, and that cost may include not only money 
but also time (Equation 2.1). The model developed by Mincer (1974) outlines the present 
value of the individual at the start of schooling with a discounted rate of return (Equation 
42 
 
2.2). The model shows a trade-off between current earnings and future earnings as a result 
of the number of years the individual takes to complete their training or schooling (Weiss, 
1986). The longer the individual spends in school (or training), the shorter the lifetime of 
earnings. More time in school means a reduction in current earnings, but an enhancement 
of future earnings (Weiss, 1986). 
 
W = M PL – k         
where 
W = wages 
MPL = marginal productivity of labour  
k = cost of investment in human capital 
(Equation 2.1)  
Source: Becker (1964). 
 
      ∑ (
 
   
)
 
 
         
where 
Vs = present value of earnings at start of schooling 
Ys = net annual earnings with s years of schooling 
r = discount rate 
t = 1,2,3…n in years 
(Equation 2.2)  
Source: Mincer (1974). 
 
Language proficiency is the next (and last) human capital factor discussed in this study. 
Language proficiency, as with the other human capital factors, increases the productivity of 
workers, because it decreases the cost of communicating with others (Chiswick, 1991; 
Chiswick and Miller, 1995). It also is complementary with the other human capital factors. 
Workers with professional skills and high levels of proficiency in the host country’s 
language are more productive than those who lack language proficiency (Chiswick and 
Miller, 1995, 2001).  
 
Most importantly, migrants tend to invest in the host country’s language for one of three 
reasons: for economic benefit, because of their efficiency at language acquisition, and 
through exposure to the host country’s language (Chiswick and Miller, 1995). Economic 
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benefits occur if the acquisition of the host country’s language leads to an increase in 
earnings and a probability of getting a better job. Efficiency occurs when migrants have 
higher levels of education and migrate at younger ages; the hypothesis here is that the 
higher the level of education and the younger the age at migration, the greater the person’s 
language proficiency. Efficiency also occurs when the linguistic distance between the 
person’s native language and the host country’s language is relatively narrow (Chiswick 
and Miller, 1998). Exposure to the host country’s language is measured by the time of 
residence abroad, the cross-country/culture contact, and the characteristics of the person’s 
home and location (Chiswick and Miller, 1998).  
 
In relation to this study, language proficiency is most closely related to economic benefit in 
terms of whether the level of language proficiency has an impact on migrants’ earnings. Is 
it because their language proficiency is minimal that a person’s wage is also minimal? 
Does language proficiency matter in low-skilled and low-paid jobs?  
 
The pioneering study by Chiswick (1978) introduced an important theory of how human 
capital influences the wage differentials between migrants and non-migrants. Using data 
from the 1970 US Population Census, Chiswick (1978) suggests that the number of years 
since migration is an important explanatory factor in the wage gap between migrants and 
natives. According to Chiswick, post-migration experiences – including migrants’ ability 
to acquire the host country’s language and customs, the nature of the labour market, and 
investment in post-school training – depress the wage gap. Chiswick (1978) also suggests 
that the earnings of migrants (and even of migrants’ sons) are ‘overtaking’ those of natives 
(and their sons) because migrants ‘have more innate ability, [and] are more highly 
motivated toward labour market success’(Chiswick, 1978: 919). Chiswick emphasises 
migrants’ propensity for positive self-selection by stating that the more able the migrants 
are, the more productive they are in both the labour market and the migration process 
(Chiswick, 2000). He also stresses that migrants who are more able to invest in human 
capital such as education and the host country’s language, and who have more ‘ambition, 
intelligence, learning speed, entrepreneurial skills, aggressiveness and tenacity’ (Chiswick, 
2000: 62), are offered higher rates of return.  
 
In relation to the present study, Chiswick’s concept of human capital is important for 
explaining whether migrants’ wage levels (minimum wage or below, and above minimum 
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wage) are determined by human capital factors. If that were the case, why would the 
phenomenon of downgrading exist? Supporting Chiswick’s view, Carliner (1980: 89) also 
comments that migrants ‘choose to work longer and harder’. Migrants who work longer 
hours are mainly highly motivated to support their relatives or friends abroad (Barwell, 
2007). The notion that migrants are highly motivated, hardworking, and have innate 
desirable abilities is commonly cited to explain why employers hire migrants in the 
segmented labour market. However, this might adversely affect the labour market if 
employers are able to form a segmented labour force in ways that are favourable to 
themselves. This suggests that certain segments of labour are vulnerable to exploitation.  
 
The downgrading phenomenon – whereby migrants are concentrated at the lower level of 
pay distribution – seems to contradict theories of the economics of migration. Chiswick 
(2000) points out that migrants with high abilities can spend the costs of migration more 
efficiently, and thus have greater incentives to migrate. The decision to migrate is taken if 
the net gain of migration is positive (Borjas, 2000). Equation 2.3 shows that the larger the 
wage differential and the smaller the cost of migration, the greater the individual’s 
intention to migrate. Linking with Chiswick’s theory, as the wage differential increases, 
positive self-selection also increases, meaning that only individuals with high abilities, 
high motivation, high productivity and high efficiency decide to migrate (Chang, 2000). If 
we link the economics of migration with the current research, it is unclear why migrants 
would choose to work at the lowest level of pay. The minimum level of wages lowers the 
wage-differential component in Equation 2.3. Nevertheless, the self-selection theory of 
migration might be insufficient to explain the downgrading phenomenon, as some migrants 
might have no idea that they will be entering low-paid, low-skilled jobs.
7
 
 
Net Gain = ∑ (
       
        
)
 
   
       
Where: 
Wjk = wage in the new region 
Wik = wage in the current region 
 
                                               
7
 McKay et al. (2011: 116) provide empirical evidence of undocumented migrants being 
unware that their work is part of the underground economy. 
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r = discount rate 
T = retirement age 
M = migration cost 
(Equation 2.3)  
Source: Borjas (2000). 
 
As the literature reviewed suggested earlier, migrants to the UK tend to be concentrated at 
the lower level of pay distribution, and skilled migrants are likely to undertake low-skilled, 
low-paid jobs, at least during the initial period after migration. These findings help to 
further deepen the understanding of the relationship between migration and secondary jobs. 
As the focus of this study is on the minimum wage and migration, Piore’s labour market 
segmentation theory – which bridges the migration and minimum-wage literature – is 
particularly useful for formulating some of the hypotheses to be tested through empirical 
data analysis in this thesis. 
Geddes and Scott (2010: 197) also comment that an influx of migrants into secondary jobs 
might be ‘constructed rather than inevitable’, which supports Piore’s (1979) thesis. Thus 
the duality of the labour market might prove to be a significant factor if human capital 
alone is not sufficient to explain either the phenomenon of downgrading or the 
concentration of migrants in minimum-wage jobs.  
 
2.3. Dual Labour Market Segmentation 
The work of Dustmann et al. (2007), discussed above, showed that migrants, particularly 
skilled migrants, are concentrated at the lower end of occupational skill distribution, in a 
phenomenon known as downgrading. It would be interesting to know which industry has 
the greatest proportion of low-paid workers. Table 2.1 describes Dustmann et al.’s (2007) 
work with Labour Force Survey data. It is clear that four major sectors have the largest 
share of workers (including migrants and natives) with wages below the 10
th
 percentile: 
private households with employed persons; hotels and restaurants; other community, social 
and personal work; and the wholesale, retail and motor trades. Of these four, private 
households with employed persons have a greater percentage of recent migrants with 
wages below the 10
th
 percentile, followed by other community, social and personal work. 
On the other hand, hotels and restaurants and the wholesale, retail and motor trades have a 
higher proportion of natives with wages below the 10
th
 percentile. 
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Natives 
Migrants 
Earlier Recent 
All industries 10.19 8.77 16.92 
Industry       
Manufacturing 5.29 7.58 17.67 
Construction 7.28 5.06 5.17 
Wholesale, retail and motor trade 21.02 16.63 16.28 
Hotels and restaurants 36.70 26.07 33.86 
Transport, storage and communication 5.07 4.60 8.67 
Financial intermediation 1.83 1.86 1.62 
Real estate, renting and business activities 6.46 5.21 6.77 
Public administration and defence 1.90 1.85 4.15 
Education 6.64 6.18 7.19 
Health and social work 9.43 5.16 10.15 
Other community, social and personal 16.79 13.20 26.68 
Private households with employed persons 21.52 36.94 87.76 
Other 8.12 2.86 6.84 
 
Table 2.1 Percentages of Natives and Migrants with Wages Below the 10
th
 Percentile, 
2001–2005 
Source: Dustmann et al. (2007: 77), Table 3.13. 
 
This section of the literature review will look closely at dual labour market segmentation, a 
concept that originates mainly from the work of Michael J. Piore. The theory of the dual 
labour market divides the labour market into two segments, primary and secondary. The 
primary segment is full of jobs with high wages, good working conditions, secure 
employment and fairness in the workplace; the secondary segment, by sharp contrast, 
offers jobs with low pay, poor working conditions, insecure employment and unfair 
working practices (Doeringer and Piore, 1970). Osterman (1975) further develops the work 
of Doeringer and Piore by dividing the primary segment into an upper and lower tier: the 
upper tier has greater personal involvement and autonomy. Using data from the 1967 US 
Survey of Economic Opportunity, Osterman (1975) found that the upper tier of the primary 
segment accounted for 5% of all male workers, while the lower tier accounted for 90%, 
and the secondary segment for the remaining 5%. He added that the secondary segment on 
average comprised a less educated labour force and more non-whites than the other 
segments. He also noted that human capital such as education and experience (age) were 
significant factors in the primary segment, but had no influence in the secondary segment.  
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The secondary segment has recently consisted of jobs that tend to be ‘informal’8 in nature 
or – as referred to by Undocumented Worker Transitions (2008) – are part of the 
‘underground’ economy. The term ‘underground economy’ refers to ‘irregular production 
and/or labour that is perfectly integrated into the formal economy and represents ensembles 
of activities which contribute to the formation of the revenue and the wealth of the nation 
without, however, being reported in the official statistics’ (Undocumented Worker 
Transitions, 2008:11–12). Chaudhuri (1989) also suggests that informal jobs can be 
extended in terms of both output and employment, regardless of any connection between 
the two; informal jobs can even arise within formal jobs, for example in subcontracting or 
agency work (McKay et al., 2011). This echoes Piore’s theory that the dual labour market 
often exists within the same firm: the firm may use primary workers as core workers, 
alongside secondary or ‘flexible’ workers who can be hired and fired depending on 
demand (Piore, 1980). Jobs in the secondary segment are also somewhat precarious, 
according to the International Labour Organisation’s definition of precarity: uncertainty 
about the duration of employment, multiple possible employers or ambiguous employment 
relationships, a lack of access to social protection and benefits associated with employment, 
low pay, and the presence of obstacles to joining a trade union (International Labour 
Organisation, 2011).  
 
In relation to the analysis of migrant workers, migration tends to confirm Piore’s dual 
labour market theory (Piore, 1979). His analytical framework is becoming increasingly 
relevant, particularly in the UK (most notably in London), where migrant workers tend to 
occupy the secondary sector of the market. This is also true of other countries, including 
Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal (McKay et al., 2011: 113). Nevertheless, Warhurt et al. 
(2008) suggest that the low payment of workers does not depend on employers’ 
compliance or non-compliance with minimum-wage legislation, but rather arises from 
employment practices that are centred on the need for flexibility to hire or fire workers in 
reaction to fluctuations in demand (Entorf and Moebert, 2004). This effectively positions 
‘flexible’ workers as ‘residual’ workers, while their non-permanent status also positions 
them as low-waged workers. As employers can flexibly hire or fire workers, they can also 
modify pay rates in response to demand fluctuations (McKay et al., 2011). This thesis will 
argue that the employer’s ability to modify pay rates in response to demand is extremely 
                                               
8
 The term ‘informal’ is used to describe a labour market that exists outside the influence 
of institutional regulation (e.g., the minimum wage regulation).  
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problematic, and relates to the weak enforcement of employment standards; indeed, it 
places the constitution of the National Minimum Wage in doubt.  
 
A further concern is that if, even with the National Minimum Wage, employers are still 
able to modify pay rates, then how strong is the position of other (workers’) rights? These 
rights include the right to non-wage benefits – forms of compensation other than wages. 
Non-wage benefits are often less clearly stipulated in legislation than wage rights; even 
when they are provided, they are less easily enforceable, and they are often not written into 
employment contracts. Consequently, in secondary-segment jobs, the position of non-wage 
benefits is unclear, and the provision or otherwise of such benefits strongly depends on 
employers’ decisions; moreover, some non-wage benefits are ‘voluntary’ and ‘flexible’, 
and thus are entirely at the discretion of employers. The next section reviews theories 
about the minimum wage and non-wage benefits, including debates and evidence from the 
UK. 
 
2.4. The Minimum Wage  
This section covers the key literature in minimum-wage studies. These studies largely arise 
from neoclassical economics, with a substantial contribution from institutionalists. 
Neoclassical theory emphasises the idea of marginal utility: for every marginal (extra) cost, 
there should be an extra benefit (Menger, 1871).
9
 The marginal theory in turn generates the 
theory of production function, particularly the Cobb-Douglas (1928) production function.
10
 
The marginal theory also constitutes a theory of wage determination, whereby wages are 
                                               
9
 Although the marginal return (benefit) is diminishing (Jevons, 1871). The marginal 
theory, together with Cobb-Douglas’ (1928) production function, is also reiterated in the 
human capital theory that an increase in earnings signals an increase in productivity. 
 
10
 The neoclassical economist Paul Douglas, together with Charles Cobb, developed the 
Cobb-Douglas production function: capital and labour as the only input produce a total 
production output. In the short run, the capital input is assumed to be constant, and 
therefore in order to produce more output, the firm can only increase labour input. As the 
goal of the firm is to maximise profit, the neoclassical marginal theory is used to explain 
that the firm should hire additional labour only if the marginal revenue exceeds the 
marginal cost of hiring that labour. 
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determined by the intersection of supply and demand.
11
 Neoclassical theorists also firmly 
believe that wages are determined by the action of ‘invisible hands’ in the supply of and 
demand for labour.  
 
Institutional thought, in sharp contrast with neoclassical theory, considers the neoclassical 
view of the determination of wages to be unrealistic. Institutionalists believe that there are 
imperfections in the market: the costs of mobility, imperfect information, unions, 
government policies, market segmentation and discrimination obstruct the efficiency of 
supply and demand. Institutionalists therefore do not believe in ‘invisible hands’ (Kerr, 
1954).  
 
Neoclassical theory raises the question of what would happen if an enforced increase in the 
(minimum) wage were not followed by an increase in productivity. Would there be any 
reduction in employment, working hours or non-wage benefits? 
 
Neoclassical theory suggests that, in a competitive market, an increase in the (minimum) 
wage results in a decline in employment (Brown et al., 1982). Figure 2.5 shows that an 
imposed minimum wage drives wages up from W1 to W2. Fewer employers are then able 
to pay the higher wage, resulting in a cut in employment. Employment thus declines from 
L1 to L2, while the number of workers willing to work for the higher wage increases to L3. 
This creates unemployment of L3-L2. Workers at L2 who are still in their jobs, however, 
derive a benefit from the minimum wage, as their actual wages increase to W2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
11
 The firm may employ additional workers whenever the marginal revenue product 
exceeds the marginal cost of labour.  
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Figure 2.5 The Impact of the Minimum Wage in a Competitive Market 
Source: Brown et al. (1982: 488), Figure 1. 
 
Nevertheless, the negative effect of the minimum wage on employment is debatable. The 
efficiency wage theory pioneered by Stiglitz (1976) suggests that workers in receipt of 
higher wages consequently have higher productivity. Figure 2.6 describes the condition 
where the minimum wage drives up employment. The increase in the minimum wage from 
W1 to W2 motivates workers to increase their work efforts, improve their physical strength 
(e.g. by eating healthier food as their standard of living improves), and consequently 
increase their productivity. The demand for productive labour then increases from D1 to D2, 
which leads to an increase in employment from L1 to L2. The increasing wage may also 
attract high-quality workers currently working for a wage below W2 to apply for these jobs, 
thus leading to an overall productivity increase (Kaufman and Hotchkiss, 2006). The view 
that the minimum wage has little or no effect on employment is also influenced by the neo-
institutionalists or ‘social economics revisionists’ (Kerr, 1954; Card and Krueger, 1995). 
Their theory suggests that there is ‘indeterminacy in wages’ – that is, higher wages lead to 
increased productivity and reduced turnover – and that the minimum wage may ‘shock’ 
firms into adopting better management practices that will also result in an increase of 
output and employment (Card and Krueger, 1995). 
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Figure 2.6 The Efficiency Wage Theory and the Impact of the Minimum Wage in a 
Competitive Market  
Source: Kaufman and Hotchkiss (2006: 291), Figure 6.8.  
 
In a non-competitive market, however, neoclassical economics suggests that the minimum 
wage increases employment (Kaufman and Hotchkiss, 2006). Figure 2.7 describes the 
minimum wage’s impact in a monopsonistic labour market. Kaufman and Hotchkiss (2006) 
argue that when the minimum wage is imposed, wages rise from W1 to W2 and 
employment increases from L1 to L2. Workers in L1 to L2 benefit the most, as they receive 
higher wages and still retain their jobs. The firm, however, loses some of its monopoly, 
which previously constituted the difference between B and A. The marginal cost to the 
firm changes from MCL to W2CD and continues up the MCL curve. If wages somehow 
increase above the W3 level, employment will return to L1 (Kaufman and Hotchkiss, 2006). 
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Figure 2.7 The Impact of the Minimum Wage in a Monopsonistic Labour Market  
Source: Kaufman and Hotchkiss (2006: 288), Figure 6.7. 
 
The minimum wage was first introduced in the United States in 1938 by the Fair Standards 
Act, the main objective of which was to maintain standards of living, especially for 
workers at the lowest level of pay distribution. Workers in the manufacturing industry had 
previously been exploited through an increase in sweatshop practices, particularly in the 
payment of unfair wages to women and young workers (Neumark and Wascher, 2008).  
 
In relation to the US labour market, evidence from Card and Krueger (1994) shows that the 
minimum wage has no effect on employment. They surveyed 410 fast-food restaurants in 
New Jersey and eastern Pennsylvania using the difference-in-difference method, making a 
comparison between affected and unaffected groups before and after minimum-wage 
changes; the affected group was the New Jersey restaurants, and the unaffected group was 
the Pennsylvania restaurants. They followed nearly 100% of the restaurants, from just 
before the rise in the minimum wage (in February and March 1992 – the rise took place in 
April) to after the rise in the minimum wage (between seven and eight months later, in 
November and December 1992). The results showed that the 1992 minimum-wage rise in 
New Jersey had no effect on average employment. They also found no decline in the 
number of hours the restaurants were open on weekdays, the number of cash registers in 
operation in the restaurants, or the number of cash registers typically open at 11am.  
 
D 
C 
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The next section discusses the implementation of the National Minimum Wage in the UK. 
 
2.5. The Minimum Wage in the UK 
In the UK, when the Labour Party came into government in 1997, one of its priorities was 
to establish the National Minimum Wage (NMW). The Low Pay Commission was 
established in July 1997 to recommend the initial rates for the NMW. A National 
Minimum Wage Bill was approved by Parliament in early 1999, and the NMW came into 
force on 1April 1999 (Low Pay Commission, 1998). Since the first Low Pay Commission 
report in 1998, the Low Pay Commission has continued to advise the government on the 
NMW. There are four types of rate regulated by the NMW: the adult rate, the development 
rate, the 16–17-year-olds’ rate and the apprentice rate. The apprentice rate was introduced 
on 1 October 2010. Table 2.2 describes historical NMW rates. 
 
 
Table 2.2 Historical (Hourly) NMW Rates 
Source: Low Pay Commission (2012)  
 
The Low Pay Commission (2010) demonstrates that there has been an increase in the real 
and relative value of the minimum wage since its introduction. The adult rate increased by 
 From 
 
 
Adult Rate 
(For Workers 
Aged 22+) 
Development 
Rate (For 
Workers Aged 
18–21) 
16–17-Year-
Olds’ Rate 
 
Apprentice 
Rate 
1 Apr 99 £3.60 £3.00 - - 
1 Oct 00 £3.70 £3.20 - - 
1 Oct 01 £4.10 £3.50 - - 
1 Oct 02 £4.20 £3.60 - - 
1 Oct 03 £4.50 £3.80 - - 
1 Oct 04 £4.85 £4.10 £3.00 - 
1 Oct 05 £5.05 £4.25 £3.00 - 
1 Oct 06 £5.35 £4.45 £3.30 - 
1 Oct 07 £5.52 £4.60 £3.40 - 
1 Oct 08 £5.73 £4.77 £3.53 - 
1 Oct 09 £5.80 £4.83 £3.57 - 
 From 
 
 
Adult Rate 
(for workers 
aged 21+) 
Development 
Rate (for workers 
aged 18–20) 
16–17-Year-
Olds’ Rate 
 
Apprentice 
Rate 
1 Oct 10 £5.93 £4.92 £3.64 £2.50 
1 Oct 11 £6.08 £4.98 £3.68 £2.60 
1 Oct 12 £6.19 £4.98 £3.68 £2.65 
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61.1% between 1999 and 2009; this figure is higher than the increase in Average Earning 
Income (47.7%), the Retail Price Index (30.8%) and the Consumer Price Index (20.9%).  
 
Evidence from the UK about the impact of the NMW on employment and hours of work is 
mixed. In their report to the Low Pay Commission, Dickens et al. (2009) suggest that there 
is not enough evidence to indicate that changes in the NMW have an adverse effect on 
employment, although there is some evidence of this in relation to hours of work. They use 
panel data from the Labour Force Survey and the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. 
Their methodology is difference-in-difference, differentiating between a group that is 
affected by the NMW and a group that is not. The affected group is people who are paid 
below the NMW at time t, and the unaffected group is those who are paid within some 
range above the NMW at time t. The outcome is then compared within the time t+1. Their 
results suggest that an increase in the NMW may reduce hours of work among some 
groups, but this evidence is inconsistent across different models. For adult women, in some 
models, an increase in the NMW has a significant negative impact on the total hours of 
work, but this effect is less strong for basic hours. For adult men, in some models, an 
increase in the NMW has a negative impact on basic hours, but this effect is less strong on 
the total hours of work. They define total hours of work as basic hours of work plus 
overtime.   
 
Dickens et al. (2009) found that for adult women, when six months’ changes in basic hours 
of work are analysed using the single difference and double difference method, the 
increase in the NMW in 2006 reduced basic hours by 1–1.5 hours per week when directly 
compared with the group who are paid 10–20 % above the NMW. For adult men, looking 
at six months’ changes in basic hours of work, the increase in the NMW in 2001 reduced 
basic hours by 2.3–5.3 hours per week compared with the groups paid 0–10% and 10–20% 
above the NMW; in 2003, the NMW increase reduced basic hours by 3.2–5.8 per week.  
 
There is stronger evidence of a reduction in total hours per week for adult women. When 
six months’ changes are analysed using the dummy double difference model to compare 
with those who earn 0–10% above the NMW, there was a 10% reduction in total hours due 
to the increase in the NMW in 2003. When the single difference model is used, there is a 
reduction in total hours of two hours in 2003. If we look at changes over 12 months, the 
result is also statistically significantly negative on the pooled wage gap model using the 0–
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10% comparison group. There is also some evidence of a negative impact of the increase in 
the NMW in the dummy model for 12 months’ changes in 2001 and 2005. For adult men, 
there is less strong evidence about the total hours of work. The NMW increase in 2003 
reduced total hours by 10% only in the wage gap model for six months’ changes. 
 
Thus there are interesting gender differences in terms of the effect of the minimum wage 
on working hours, according to Dickens et al. (2009). Women are apparently negatively 
affected in relation to total hours of work, while men are negatively affected in relation to 
basic hours of work. There are several theories to explain gender differences in the labour 
market. The neoclassical household model suggests that an increase in a person’s wage 
may affect their spouse’s participation in the labour market. Mincer (1962) and Kosters 
(1966), in their discussions of the household model, explain that family members allocate 
their time between market work, non-market work (housework or study) and leisure time. 
Becker thereafter introduced an extension of the household model of the allocation of time 
(Becker, 1965). According to Becker, there is a cost of time, as well as a cost of market 
goods, and households are both ‘producers’ – producing income (from working time) – and 
‘consumers’ – consuming the income. Therefore, when wages increase, individuals 
substitute away not only their leisure time but also other time-consuming activities, such as 
cooking, cleaning and childcare. A theory of the allocation of time is relevant to explaining 
the rise of women’s participation in the labour force, because women are substituting away 
their leisure time and housework time (cooking, cleaning and childcare) in order to take 
advantage of increasing wages.  
 
However, referring back to Dickens et al.’s (2009) findings, there is still no clear 
explanation why, when the minimum wage rises, women are more affected in relation to 
total hours while men are more affected in relation to basic hours. Why would employers 
cut both basic hours and overtime for women, while for men they cut only basic hours? An 
earlier study by Stewart and Swaffield (2004) using New Earnings Surveys data found 
similar negative effects of the minimum wage on hours, but with no significant difference 
by gender. Stewart and Swaffield (2004) show a 1–2 hours’ per week reduction in basic 
hours and total hours for both men and women. The effect on overtime, however, is 
minimal and insignificant. 
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When hours and gender differences are linked with migration, this thesis suggests that 
different issues may arise. Becker’s allocation of time, for example, may affect migrant 
workers differently. Migrants might not value leisure time as much as native workers do, 
as their reference point might be costs (of goods) and wages in their home country rather 
than in the host country. Migrants might also have a fixed (limited) time that they want to 
use to the utmost so as to maximise their earnings. The allocation of time to some extent 
may also explain the rise in migrant domestic workers: the increasing participation of 
women in work may mean that women are substituting away their housework and 
childcare, thus leading to a rising demand for domestic workers and carers. 
 
Allison et al. (2009)’s report to the Low Pay Commission on the various impacts of the 
NMW found that there was no conclusive evidence that the NMW reduces employment 
and hours of work. They used telephone interviews and a postal/email survey of 202 
companies/organisations in six low-paying sectors: hotels, housing and social care, retail, 
nurseries, fast food and pubs, and the leisure sector. The telephone questionnaire ask 
employers about the impact of the NMW on the benefit packages provided to staff, pay 
scales, staffing levels, hours of work, training and development, and recruitment and 
retention. There was some evidence that the increase in the NMW between 2007 and 2008 
had led to a reduction in the hours of work, although in general the evidence was not 
conclusive. One fast-food company reported that hours had been scaled back and also 
regulated more closely, partly because of the NMW but also because of rising costs 
elsewhere. One restaurant reported that, as part of ongoing NMW cost management, it had 
reduced basic hours of work. Five nurseries in the childcare sector had also reduced hours. 
However, the respondents generally said that the reduction of hours was not entirely due to 
the increase in the NMW, but was also because of rising costs elsewhere. There was some 
evidence of a reduction in staffing: two restaurants reported lay-offs during quiet periods, 
and four nurseries had reduced their staffing levels, but there was no indication that these 
were because of the rise in the NMW. 
 
2.6. The Minimum Wage’s Impact on Non-Wage Benefits 
While a relatively large amount of research has been conducted on the minimum wage’s 
impact on employment and hours of work, this study focuses its investigation on the 
impact of the minimum wage on non-wage benefits. As with employment and hours of 
work, neoclassical economics suggests that an increase in the minimum wage will lead to a 
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reduction in non-wage benefits (Simon and Kaestner, 2003). There are good reasons why a 
firm would react to the minimum wage by adjusting the non-wages component, as Simon 
and Kaestner (2003) explain. Consider a firm that hires only low-skilled workers in a 
competitive labour market. Suppose that the firm receives a constant price for its output 
(i.e. it has no monopoly power), and that its production process yields diminishing 
marginal returns on labour. Before the rise in wages, the firm hires a worker until the 
Marginal Revenue Product (MRP) equals the marginal cost. The marginal cost here 
represents wages plus fringe benefits (non-wage benefits). If wages go up, there will be an 
imbalance between the marginal cost and the value of worker productivity. Thus the firm 
has two non-mutually exclusive options: to reduce employment until the MRP increases by 
a sufficient amount, or to reduce the non-wages component of compensation. 
 
Non-wage benefits by definition are compensation other than wages. They are an 
important issue because their proportionality in relation to total compensation is 
continuously rising. In the US, non-wage benefits may account for 26.9% of total 
compensation (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2006).
12
 Table 2.3 shows that non-wage benefits 
comprise a significant proportion of overall compensation. Employers may therefore 
implement changes to their non-wage benefits programmes in order to control costs 
(Williams, 1995). Moreover, given that roughly 15% of all non-wage benefits are 
voluntary and flexible (Pierce, 2001), it is much easier for employers to change the non-
wage proportion of benefits (or value) rather than to cut employment or reduce hours of 
work in response to a minimum wage rise. Terms of employment and hours of work are 
likely to be written into formal employment contracts (which have legal value or rest on 
prior agreements with unions); it is less likely for non-wage benefits to appear in such 
formal agreements. It might also be more costly for employers to fire workers, as there are 
costs in terms of recruitment and training.
13
 
                                               
12
 Wessels (1980) shows that in 1971 all companies in the US spent on average 21% of 
their payroll on voluntary fringe benefits and paid leave. This percentage did not cover the 
other costs of providing a safe working environment and forms of management such as 
grievance procedures. However, Wessels also stresses that the percentage of these non-
wage expenditures for low-wage workers was considerably smaller.  
 
13
 Although with secondary jobs, employers are more likely to hire and fire workers as and 
when needed.  
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Type of Benefit Percentage 
Legally required payments 6.1 
 Social security 5.0 
 Workers’ compensation 0.7 
 Unemployment insurance and other 0.4 
Retirement 6.3 
 Employment costs based on benefit formulas 2.4 
 Employer costs proportional to earnings 2.5 
 Other (including insurance, annuities and administrative costs) 1.4 
Insurance (medical, life) 6.4 
Paid rest (coffee breaks, meal periods, set-up and wash-up time) 1.2 
Paid vacations, holidays, sick leave 6.5 
Miscellaneous (discounts on products bought, employee meals, childcare) 0.4 
Total 26.9 
 
Table 2.3 Non-Wage Benefits as a Percentage of Total Compensation 
Source: Ehrenberg and Smith (2006: 148), Table 5.3. 
 
Types of non-wage benefits vary by country. This thesis is specifically interested in the 
non-wage benefits available in the UK, particularly in secondary-segment jobs. In 2009 
Employeebenefits.co.uk conducted a survey to ask 639 organisations
14
 about the core non-
wage benefits that they provided. The results, presented in Table 2.4, demonstrate the types 
of benefit and the proportions that were offered to all staff and some staff. Seventy-three 
per cent of respondents said that their organisation offered training and development to all 
staff, followed by life assurance/death-in-service insurance for 72%. Counselling or 
employee assistance programmes were the third most frequently offered to all staff. 
However, the results might have been different if the survey had included only 
organisations in low-paid, low-skilled sectors.  
 
Workers in secondary jobs might not have the privilege of receiving the kinds of benefit 
revealed by this survey. Life insurance and counselling/employee assistance programmes, 
two of the three benefits that are offered most frequently according to this survey, might 
                                               
14
 The survey was conducted in January 2009 among readers of the Employee Benefits 
magazine and the users of www.employeebenefits.co.uk. Respondents were drawn from all 
types of organisations, of which just over two thirds were privately owned (52%) and 24% 
were publicly quoted. A fifth was from the public sector. 
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not be offered in low-paying sectors. Moreover, there are variations in the non-wage 
benefits received by migrant workers, as this thesis will demonstrate. 
 
Therefore this thesis will investigate the non-wage benefits received by migrants in low-
paid, low-skilled jobs, and will explore the hypothesis that the minimum wage adversely 
affects the provision of non-wage benefits to such workers.  
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Non-Wage Benefits 
To All 
Staff 
To Some 
Staff 
Training and development 73% 7% 
Life assurance/death-in-service 72% 17% 
Counselling/employee assistance programme 60% 6% 
Childcare vouchers 55% 3% 
Extra holidays for long service 52% 8% 
Additional voluntary contributions to pensions 35% 14% 
Give-as-you-earn/payroll giving 35% 1% 
Income protection/permanent health insurance 31% 26% 
Season ticket travel loan 31% 9% 
Car parking 29% 34% 
Group personal pension 28% 12% 
Private medical insurance for employees 27% 41% 
Legal advice/counselling 27% 2% 
Stakeholder pension scheme 25% 11% 
Bicycle loans (bikes for work) 25% 3% 
Organisation’s own products for staff 24% 1% 
Tax-efficient car parking 20% 22% 
Optical care/vouchers (above statutory minimum) 20% 6% 
Personal accident insurance for employees 19% 9% 
Discounts on food and beverages in on-site restaurants 18% 7% 
Financial advice 17% 5% 
Gym membership 17% 5% 
Retail/leisure discounts 16% 0% 
Defined benefit (final salary/career average) pension 15% 31% 
Save-as-you-earn (share save) scheme 15% 1% 
Financial education 15% 7% 
Trust-based defined contribution (money purchase) pension 14% 16% 
Private medical insurance for partners and dependants 13% 35% 
Health screening 13% 31% 
Buy/sell some holidays 13% 3% 
Healthcare/hospital cash plan 11% 7% 
Share incentive plan 9% 4% 
Non-vocational training 9% 5% 
Travel insurance 9% 7% 
Subscriptions (publications) 9% 18% 
Life assurance/death-in-service for partners and dependants 8% 9% 
Critical illness insurance for employees 7% 11% 
 
Table 2.4 Types of Non-Wage Benefit and Proportions 
Source: Employee Benefits Research (2009).  
 
I will now go on to review the existing literature on the minimum wage’s impact on non-
wage benefits, including the debate over whether the minimum wage adversely affects 
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such benefits. In relation to training, Leighton and Mincer (1981) and Hashimoto (1982) 
support the hypothesis that the minimum wage tends to reduce on-the-job training. Their 
findings are based on the argument that lower wage growth is associated with a reduction 
in training. This argument is derived from human capital theory, which predicts that 
investment in training will result in higher wage growth; thus lower wage growth indicates 
that training provision has been reduced.  
 
Leighton and Mincer (1981) took data from National Longitudinal Survey and the Panel 
Study of Income and Dynamics. They found that the minimum wage’s effect on wage 
growth is negatively significant only for white ethnicities; the coefficient for black 
ethnicities is also negative, but it insignificantly affects wage growth. They also use data 
from the Michigan Income Dynamics Panel for white male workers in 1973–1975, 
specifically using as dependent variables the answers to the question ‘Do you feel you are 
learning things on the job that could lead you to better promotion?’ and then regressing 
them with the wage growth. Their results show a strongly and consistently negative effect 
of the minimum wage on training for the lower-educational level group. However, no 
effect was found on the group with education beyond high school. 
 
Hashimoto (1982) focuses on young workers. Many young workers who lack skills and 
experience accept the minimum wage as the best available rate that they can earn. 
Hashimoto therefore suggests that any negative impact on training is likely to be greater 
for these workers. Hashimoto uses data from the National Longitudinal Survey. The results 
confirm that the minimum wage has an adverse effect on training, particularly for young 
white males, and the effect on training is expected to be ‘unambiguously negative’ 
(Hashimoto, 1982: 16).  
 
On the other hand, Lazear and Miller (1981), using the data from the National Longitudinal 
Survey and the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972, found no 
change in wage growth with the increase in the minimum wage. They also found that the 
minimum wage may prevent a growth in wages, and a reduction in training is not the only 
reason for low wage growth. A later study by Grossberg and Sicilian (1999) using data 
from the Employment Opportunities Pilot Project supports Lazear and Miller’s (1981) 
finding that there is no evidence that the minimum wage has an effect on training. They 
criticise the methods used by Leighton and Mincer (1981) and Hashimoto (1982), which 
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linked a reduction in wage growth with a reduction in training. Grossberg and Sicilian 
(1999) argue that these studies’ methods might have been misleading, as they could not 
explain the causality between reduced wage growth and reduced training. 
 
In relation to the minimum wage’s impact on non-wage benefits other than training, 
Wessels (1980) found that an increase in the minimum wage created a reduction in fringe 
benefits in the retail and restaurant industries. Using data from the New York State 
Department of Labor, Wessels (1980) found that approximately 29% of retailers made 
some form of offset due to the increase in the minimum wage in New York State in 1957. 
One of the offsets was a reduction in non-wage expenditures; this included reductions in 
paid vacations, holiday pay, paid sick leave, year-end bonuses, store discount privileges, 
premium pay and profit sharing. On the basis of this evidence, Wessels argued that there 
are three main types of offset. The first is the reduction in money wages: this means the 
reduction in other forms of wages, such as bonuses and commission, which are not directly 
tied to hours of work. It also includes a delay in wage rises in anticipation of a minimum 
wage rise (Wessels, 1980: 5). The second offset is a reduction in non-wage expenditures, 
as explained above. The last offset is when the firm reduces the utility of the workers or 
imposes more effort on the workers.
15
 This includes reductions in meal and coffee breaks, 
the rearrangement of start and end times so as to be more convenient and profitable for the 
firm (but not for the workers), and changes in work assignments, such as having clerks 
handle additional cash registers. Wessels argues that this offset also includes laying off 
workers more readily when demand for output falls, which results in reduced job stability 
(Wessels, 1980: 6). This last argument is very important in relation to this thesis, as it links 
the minimum wage with the creation of secondary-segment jobs (jobs that are less secure 
and demand-driven). This thesis stresses Wessels’ point that demand-driven jobs (as a 
minimum wage offset) are increasingly relevant in the UK labour market, where particular 
sectors certainly are demand-driven. His argument creates a clear link between the 
minimum wage and the duality of the labour market. 
 
                                               
15
 Wessels explain this offset in other words as an increase in the productivity of workers 
that is directed in a negative way: to make the workers work harder and during unsocial 
hours (Wessels, 1980: 2, 13). 
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In their survey of restaurants in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, Card and Krueger (1994) 
found no overall evidence that an increase in the (New Jersey) minimum wage led to a 
decrease in the provision of meals by employers. They observed both free meals and 
reduced-price meals; although there was a greater decline in reduced-price meals in New 
Jersey, they found that New Jersey employers were shifting towards free (rather than 
reduced-price) meals – in other words, more generous fringe benefits were being provided. 
 
Royalty (2000) found that a large increase in the minimum wage (or a small increase at a 
higher level of the minimum wage) led to a reduction in health insurance and pension 
eligibility for less-educated workers. Nevertheless, a small increase at the very low level of 
the minimum wage generally had no effect on health insurance and pension eligibility; in 
some cases it increased health insurance and pension eligibility at small points. His 
findings show that a $0.50 increase in the minimum wage from its 1999 rate was predicted 
to reduce health insurance eligibility by 3.9 points and pension eligibility by 6.8 points for 
less-educated workers.  
 
Simon and Kaestner (2004) used data from the Current Population Survey for 1979–2000, 
and found that the minimum wage had no effect on health insurance, family health 
insurance or pension benefits offered by employers. Their results remained unchanged 
whether the state-only variation or federal and state variations were used. 
 
In the UK, there is little evidence available on the NMW’s effect on non-wage benefits.16 
In his report to the Low Pay Commission, Dickerson (2007) uses Labour Force Survey 
data to estimate the effect on training of the rise in the NMW. His results confirm that for 
both men and women, and for both adult workers and young workers entitled to the 
development rate, the NMW has no significant impact on employer-provided training. This 
result is consistent across various methods. 
  
In their report to the Low Pay Commission, Allison et al. (2009) found that among 202 
organisations surveyed in low-paying sectors, two organisations in the social-care sector 
reported a reduction in their training budgets, and one organisation in the same sector 
reported limit training availability for some employees; however, this was not because of 
                                               
16
 This is probably not because of lack of interest, but because of lack of available data. 
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the increase in the NMW. There were also two companies in the fast-food sector that 
reported that they had had to freeze non-essential training; however, this was not only 
because of the rise in the NMW, but also because of rising costs elsewhere, such as for fuel, 
and the economic downturn. The study concluded that there was almost no evidence that 
the NMW has an impact on other non-wage benefits. Thirty per cent of respondents 
reported that there had been some changes to holiday entitlements; however, this was 
because of changes in statutory annual leave, not the NMW. The study also found evidence 
related to the presence of migrants in some sectors: 82% of respondents in the hotel sector 
and 100% of respondents in the fast-food and restaurant sector employed migrant workers. 
Approximately 11% of the 202 organisations surveyed employed agency workers (Allison 
et al., 2009: 12).  
 
The non-significant effect of the NMW appears to support the institutionalist (as opposed 
to classical) view that the labour market is shaped by institutional rules set down by the 
government, unions or employers, or by unwritten rules derived from collective bargaining 
or customary law (Kerr, 1954). These ‘non-economic’ factors may influence wage-setting 
and employment, and may explain why the minimum wage has little or no impact on 
employment or non-wage benefits (Card and Krueger, 1995). 
 
As non-wage benefits vary among sectors and industries, it is interesting to analyse non-
wage benefits in low-paying sectors, particularly in the secondary segment, which has 
significant numbers of informal (or ‘underground’) jobs. Some higher-wage workers see 
non-wage benefits as ‘normal goods’ and use some of their compensation to purchase them 
– for example, to buy health insurance (Card and Krueger, 1995). However, this thesis will 
suggest that low-paid workers do not have similar attitudes. Some workers also see non-
wage benefits as non-taxable income, but this may not be the case with workers in the 
informal or ‘underground’ economy.  
 
2.7. The Minimum Wage’s Impact on Migration 
There is limited literature from the UK that examines the NMW’s impact on migration. 
Dustmann et al. (2007) and French and Möhrke (2007) are among the very few studies to 
investigate the minimum wage’s effects on migration. The study by Dustmann et al. (2007) 
highlights the downgrading phenomenon in migration, and analyses the impact of 
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migration (migrant performance) on the UK labour market (see section 2.1 above for a 
discussion of this study).  
 
The study by French and Möhrke (2007) explores the impact of migration on the operation 
of the NMW, and examines how migration and the NMW affect the supply of labour in 
low-paying sectors. It is based on a survey (using semi-structured interviews) of employers’ 
representatives in north Staffordshire. The results show that 42 of the 78 firms surveyed 
employ migrant workers. One of the most interesting findings is the explanation given by 
these firms’ representatives (i.e. personnel managers) of why they employ migrants: 11 
firms (of the 42 that employ migrants) state that they do so specifically in order to address 
skills shortages. This is a very interesting response, because it suggests that the skills 
shortage issue still exists, although it should be borne in mind that the firms in the sample 
are not all from low-paying sectors. Five firms employ migrants because of international 
activities in relation to employment. Eight firms (approximately a fifth) claim that they 
employ migrant workers in order to develop flexible working practices. This again is a 
very interesting response, because to some extent it supports the argument that migrants 
are utilised to fulfil businesses’ needs for flexibility and temporary working. The term 
‘flexibility’ here (and in the thesis as a whole) refers to numerical flexibility, i.e. the 
adjustment of numbers of workers (or employment) and hours of work: workers can be 
hired and fired according to need, and their working hours can be adjusted through the 
implementation of shifts, part-time work, overtime or flexible hours. Thus flexibility in this 
sense is a working arrangement that is made for the convenience (or to the benefit) of 
employers, not of workers. 
 
There are also interesting findings from French and Möhrke’s (2007) interviews with 
agencies: two of the agencies in the survey reported that 97% and 95% of their workers 
were migrants. The agencies reported that their reason for employing so many migrants 
was that native workers were not prepared to work long hours in low-wage sectors and did 
not want to travel far to work (French and Möhrke, 2007: 47). French and Möhrke also 
conducted interviews with migrant workers; their findings were that the majority of 
migrants were paid at or slightly above the NMW. French and Möhrke argue that 
employers gain advantages from utilising migrants, with no need to cut pay rates; those 
advantages include migrants’ reliability and their willingness to do low-status work for 
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long and flexible hours. French and Möhrke’s findings have had an important influence on 
this thesis’ investigation of how the minimum wage differently affects migrant workers. 
 
French and Möhrke also argue that some agencies reduce workers’ total wages by 
deducting accommodation costs (although the accommodation is poor quality, and in one 
case the worker had to pay their own repair costs) and transport costs (although no 
transport was actually provided, as the accommodation was near the workplace). 
Employers will always be looking for ways to offset the costs of a minimum-wage rise, 
and at some point it will therefore be the workers who will bear the costs of such a rise. It 
is my argument that these adverse effects of the minimum wage will be more significant 
for migrant workers. Migrant workers are differently affected by the minimum wage, in the 
sense that they might not be paid the statutory wage, they might face more unfair working 
conditions and greater reductions in non-wage benefits, and they are more neglected in 
relation to their overall employment rights. 
 
There are some studies that link migrant workers with flexibilised/temporary jobs, 
although these studies do not specifically discuss the minimum wage. Anderson and Ruhs 
(2008, 2010) discuss the central debate over the link between migration and the ‘needs’ of 
the host country’s labour market. They mention two key issues in this debate. First, labour 
demand and supply are dynamic and mutually condition one another. They argue that 
‘what employers want’ can be partially influenced by ‘what employers think they can get’ 
from different groups of workers (2008: 36, 2010: 16). A possible consequence is that 
employers will develop a specific demand and preference for migrant workers over natives, 
and in extreme cases may develop requirements that natives are unable or unwilling to 
meet (2008: 36). Such requirements may include short-term (temporary) employment or 
working on an ‘as/when needed’ basis (flexibilised employment). The second key point is 
the ‘system effects’ that arise from regulations and institutional frameworks, such as 
welfare benefits or public-sector cuts, which are out of the control of employers and 
workers. These system effects, reiterated by macroeconomic conditions (as seen in the 
recent economic downturn), influence the decision to adopt a low-cost employment model, 
which may include temporary working and flexibilisation, and the utilisation of low-cost 
migrant workers. 
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Anderson and Ruhs (2010) also argue that the need to hire migrants might vary between 
sectors. Thus the degrees of temporary and flexible employment might also vary. Moriarty 
(2010) investigates the need for migrants in the social-care sector, a sector which is mainly 
publicly funded. Given the condition of public-funding cuts, employers have to adopt low-
cost employment by offering low pay (only paying the actual hours worked) and temporary 
work (on an ‘as/when needed’ basis). The work itself (i.e. social care) is devalued, as the 
skills needed are ‘only’ those required for domestic labour; gender and ethnic stereotypes, 
limited career prospects, and the reality of working conditions (24/7 care with unsociable 
hours) also make this kind of work less appealing to non-migrants.  
 
Lucas and Mansfield (2010) investigate the use of migrants in the hospitality sector. They 
state that the sector demands high ‘flexibility’ in employment, as the customer side is 
unpredictable. They also state that the proportion of full-time jobs is only 56%, with 
restaurants and pubs employing more part-time workers. Seventy-five per cent of all 
hospitality businesses are micro-enterprises employing no more than 10 people (Lucas, 
2004), and these might include temporary agency workers such as caterers and cleaners. 
The turnover in the hospitality sector on average is 31%, with restaurant and pubs reaching 
90%–100% (People 1st, 2009). The particular group that is seen as fitting employers’ needs 
are students, because students can meet the requirements of ‘temporary’ and ‘flexible’ jobs 
while also bringing ‘intellectual-courteous’ soft skills (Lucas and Mansfield, 2010). 
Although this is a sector where migrants and non-migrants work side-by-side, there is no 
evidence that migrants have been taking students’ jobs, as employers tend to place 
migrants in roles that the employers feel are most suited to them, such as kitchen assistant 
and housekeeping roles (People 1
st
, 2009). 
 
McGovern (2007) argues that immigration is better understood by institutionalists (such as 
through labour market segmentation) rather than neoclassical economists. He stresses 
Piore’s (1979) analysis of why the demand for migrants is ‘chronic and unavoidable’ 
(McGovern, 2007: 225–226). First, during periods of economic prosperity, when primary 
jobs become more available and natives therefore move into them, shortages occur in 
secondary jobs offering lower pay and lower status. In such cases, hiring migrants is a less 
costly solution than raising wages or replacing labour with capital. Second, labour is seen 
more flexible than capital, and employers reserve capital for fixed demands while labour is 
used for flexible ones. Labour-intensive sectors are thus filled with secondary jobs which 
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are low-paid and more disposable, in which workers can be hired and fired as and when 
needed. Third, occupational hierarchies motivate people to seek jobs with higher status and 
advancement. The bottom level of the hierarchy therefore suits those who are more 
concerned with economic survival than with status. Migrant workers, at least during the 
early years after migration, fit the bill in all three cases, to a greater or lesser extent.  
 
2.8. The Minimum Wage’s Impact on the Non-Wage Benefits of Migrants: the Gap 
Although plenty of studies have been done to analyse the impact of the NMW in the UK, 
only a few studies discuss its impact on non-wage benefits. Dickerson (2007), Allison et al. 
(2009) and a subsequent study by Melis et al. (2009) are among the few that do so. 
  
Only a few studies in the UK have investigated the NMW’s impact on migration. Dustman 
et al. (2007) and French and Möhrke (2007) do so, but again they do not focus on the 
NMW’s effects on non-wage benefits.  
 
Dustman et al. (2007) mostly discuss the effects of migration on the labour market, 
particularly on wages, but this differs from the aim of this thesis,which is to investigate 
how the minimum wage affects migration. Moreover, Dustman et al. (2007) do not discuss 
any relationship with non-wage benefits. French and Möhrke (2007), on the other hand, 
focus more on the utilisation of migrant workers. Their study does not aim to find any 
causal effects of the National Minimum Wage. Their findings discuss some non-wage 
benefits received by migrant workers, but make no link between the minimum wage and 
non-wage benefits. 
 
Thus there is an absence of literature that discusses the minimum wage’s effects on the 
non-wage benefits of migrant workers. In particular, the UK literature to date does not 
discuss whether the NMW might have causal effects on the non-wage benefits of migrants. 
This thesis therefore aims to address this gap, and in doing so to make an original 
contribution to the minimum-wage literature in the UK. 
 
2.9. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a thorough review of the literature on the relationship between 
the minimum wage and migration. The review started with the debate in migration studies 
over whether migration has any impact on the labour market. There is little evidence that 
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migrants are in competition with non-migrants; there is also little evidence that migrants 
are substitutes for non-migrants (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Peri, 2007; Card, 2009). Even 
when they have similar levels of education, migrants are imperfect substitutes for natives 
(Card, 2009). These findings importantly challenge the argument that migrants are in 
competition with non-migrants in the labour market. Indeed, a recent study by Lucchino et 
al. (2012) found no link between migration and unemployment in the UK.  
 
There have been some interesting findings about migrants’ performance in the UK labour 
market. Migrants to the UK have become more educated and tend to be younger than either 
previous migrants or non-migrants (Manacorda et al., 2006; Dustmann et al., 2007; 
Wadsworth, 2010a). However, migrants to the UK, particularly recent migrants, are more 
likely to be concentrated at the lower level of occupational distribution; in other words, 
they tend to become downgraded (Dustmann et al., 2007).  
 
There is little evidence as to whether downgraded migrants have an effect on less-skilled 
natives. Although this study does not seek to address whether such competition exists, 
Manacorda et al. (2006, 2012) suggest that the impact of migration is likely to be greater 
on migrants themselves (or previous migrants) than on natives. Lucchino et al. (2012) 
suggest that if any such competition does exist, the impact on less-skilled natives is modest 
at most. 
 
This study will examine whether the downgrading phenomenon exists within its sample of 
migrants in low-paid, low-skilled jobs. Moreover, it seeks to identify the factors that affect 
whether migrants earn the minimum wage or below: whether human capital can explain 
the minimum wage, or whether there are factors other than human capital that explain the 
downgrading phenomenon. 
  
There has been a debate in minimum-wage studies about the adverse effects of the 
minimum wage. Neoclassical economics suggests that a rise in wages that is not followed 
by a rise in productivity will create a reduction in labour demand. Thus the minimum wage 
will adversely affect employment, working hours and non-wage benefits, as employers will 
take the necessary action to reduce labour costs. 
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The main focus of this thesis is on the minimum wage’s effects on non-wage benefits. The 
literature reveals that the effects of the minimum wage on non-wage benefits are adverse 
(Wessels, 1980; Leighton and Mincer, 1981; Hashimoto, 1982). Wessels (1980) suggests 
that the minimum wage offsets non-wage benefits such as holiday pay, paid sick leave, 
year-end bonuses, store discount privileges, premium pay and profit sharing. He also 
suggests that the minimum wage is linked to a reduction in job stability, as employers are 
able to flexibilise jobs when demand for output falls (Wessels, 1980: 6). His study not only 
stresses the importance of the minimum wage’s effects on non-wage benefits, but also 
makes a link between the minimum wage and the duality of the labour market. It is evident 
that certain sectors in the UK are demand-driven (Ruhs and Anderson, 2010).  
 
Piore (1979) suggests the relevance of migrants to the duality of the labour market. This 
thesis will attempt to link Piore’s (1979) argument with Wessels’ (1980) argument, and to 
examine whether there is a link between the minimum wage, the duality of the labour 
market and migration. The thesis will argue that the minimum wage does affect migrants 
differently. French and Möhrke (2007) suggest that employers’ demands for flexibility are 
one of the reasons for hiring migrant workers. They claim that employers gain advantages 
from utilising migrant workers, without a need to cut pay rates. This thesis will suggest 
that this is exactly how migrants are differently affected by the practical implementation of 
labour standards: the minimum wage adversely affects migrants in the sense that 
employers treat migrant workers differently. French and Möhrke (2007) make it clear that 
employers’ utilisation of migrant workers has adverse effects in terms of unnecessary costs, 
unfair working conditions and exemptions from workers’ rights (including rights to non-
wage benefits). These previous findings tend to support the argument of this thesis that the 
minimum wage adversely affects migrant workers. 
 
There is still little UK literature that discusses the minimum wage’s impact on non-wage 
benefits and migration. Dickerson (2007), Allison et al. (2009) and Melis et al. (2009) are 
among the few to analyse the NMW’s impact on non-wage benefits; Dustman et al. (2007) 
and French and Möhrke (2007) are among the few that examine the NMW’s impact on 
migration. This study might therefore be the first of its kind to examine the NMW’s impact 
on a wide range of non-wage benefits, which seems not to have been tested before. It might 
also be the first to examine the minimum wage’s impact on the non-wage benefits of 
migrant workers.  
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This literature review has helped to clarify the research questions asked by this thesis. First, 
the thesis aims to address the NMW’s adverse effects on non-wage benefits. Second, it 
aims to examine the NMW’s adverse effects on migrant workers. Third, on the basis of its 
findings, the thesis will present evidence-based recommendations for National Minimum 
Wage policy. Last, and to stress the importance of this chapter, this thesis aims to fill the 
gap in the minimum-wage literature by making an original contribution to knowledge 
about the NMW’s effects on the non-wage benefits of labour migrants in the UK. 
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Chapter 3  
Methodology 
 
We must extend to social phenomena a scientific distinction that is truly 
fundamental, and applicable by its nature to any phenomena, above all to those of 
living bodies: that between the static and the dynamic state of every subject of 
positive study. 
(Comte 1974 [1830–42]: 147) 
 
August Comte’s philosophy of positivism affects the methodology chosen for this study. 
This thesis studies the social phenomena of migration in low-skilled, low-paid sectors, and 
uses positivist methods as an extension of the scientific distinction referred to by Comte – 
that is, it uses mathematical rationality to explain reality. This thesis is positivist in the 
sense that it explains reality through empirical data, mostly through the elaboration of 
statistics. To be precise, this study defines its methodology as positivist and quantitative. 
 
This chapter is devoted to explaining how the research for the study was conducted; that is, 
how positivist and quantitative methodology was utilised to answer the research questions. 
The starting point is the understanding that the positivist-quantitative approach might lose 
some of the sense of the ‘qualities’ of reality. Therefore the research also draws on a 
(limited) number of qualitative interviews to inform its primary research analysis. 
Nevertheless, it stands by the argument that the positivist-quantitative approach should be 
able to explain the phenomena of migration. In the wake of studies in labour economics 
which are founded primarily on the use of statistics and econometrics, it is expected that a 
positivist-quantitative approach using similar econometric techniques will be adequate to 
answer the research questions. 
 
The first research question posed by this thesis refers to the minimum wage’s effects on 
working hours, working arrangements and especially non-wage benefits. In order to 
answer the first question, the thesis develops an analysis using secondary data from public 
surveys in the UK. The second research question concerns how the minimum wage might 
differently affect migrants; in order to provide a thorough answer to this question, the 
thesis collects and analyses primary data. 
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This chapter explains how both the secondary and primary research was conducted and 
analysed. The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part introduces the 
secondary and primary research, including the research plan and rationale, the types of data 
sought, and how access to the data was gained. As quantitative methods tend to use large 
samples of empirical data, this thesis too uses large datasets, particularly for its secondary 
data.  
 
The second part explains how the positivist-quantitative method is able to analyse the data. 
This part explores methods and techniques – in other words, how the thesis applies its 
positivist-quantitative methodology. It follows previous quantitative studies in labour 
economics, particularly on the minimum wage and migration. This part will explain the 
statistical and econometric techniques used, including the equations and variables, and how 
such techniques were able to answer the research questions. 
 
The secondary research was conducted in accordance with existing minimum-wage 
literature,
1
 which mainly utilises public surveys as the main data source. This thesis utilises 
three core labour surveys in the UK as the secondary dataset. The surveys are the Annual 
Survey of Hours and Earnings, the Workplace Employee Relations Survey, and the Labour 
Force Survey. Each of these surveys has its strengths and weaknesses: this chapter will 
explain the dataset that has been drawn from these three particular surveys, which do not 
substitute for but rather complement each other. 
 
Secondary research alone would not be sufficient to answer all the research questions, or to 
address the national minimum wage’s effect on migration. Moreover, data on migration is 
under-represented in public surveys and statistics. Therefore primary research was 
conducted in order to capture migration information that is less available from the 
secondary (public) database. The technique for collecting the primary data was also 
quantitative, and used a questionnaire survey. This follows previous studies on the 
minimum wage (see Card and Krueger, 1994; Allison et al., 2009), which also conducted 
primary research using questionnaire surveys. It also follows earlier labour migration 
                                               
1
 See Leighton and Mincer (1981), Hashimoto (1982), Lazear and Miller (1981), Simon 
and Kaestner (2004), Dustmann et al. (2007), Dickerson (2007) and Dickens et al. (2009). 
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research which has utilised quantitative questionnaire surveys (see Markova and Black, 
2007; McKay et al., 2011). 
 
Since the research seeks to investigate the impact of the minimum wage, and specifically 
its causal effects, the thesis uses econometric/statistical techniques to identify any causal 
relationships. The techniques used for analysing the secondary and primary data are not the 
same, however, as the types of data are different. The secondary data consists of panel 
data, which allows a comparison of variables across different time periods; the primary 
data is cross-sectional data, which captures information only at a particular point in time. 
 
The secondary data is analysed using the difference-in-difference (DID) technique, an 
econometric technique that analyses two different groups (an affected and an unaffected 
group) at different times. DID is mainly used to detect the effects of policy changes 
(Meyer, 1995), and is a common technique for analysing the impact of the minimum wage 
(see previous studies by Card and Krueger, 1994; Stewart 2003, 2004; Arulampalam et al., 
2004; Dickerson, 2007). For the primary dataset, the thesis mainly uses logistic regression 
analysis (because of the binary character of the dependent variables), in order to explore 
the causal effects of the minimum wage. Apart from logistic regression analysis, it also 
uses Pearson’s Chi-square coefficient to examine any association between variables. It also 
uses descriptive statistics in order to generate a profile of migrants in low-paid, low-skilled 
jobs. Moreover, so as not to completely lose the insights gained from migrants’ own 
experiences, the primary research analysis uses a (limited) number of qualitative interview 
responses by utilising the open-ended questions in the questionnaire.  
 
The quantitative-positivist methodology and analytical techniques are deemed to be 
adequate to answer the research questions, which will make an original contribution to 
minimum-wage literature by examining the minimum wage’s impact on the non-wage 
benefits of migrant workers. They will also generate original evidence about how the 
minimum wage differently affects migrants’ access to non-wage benefits, and will provide 
substantial evidence from the UK labour market.  
 
3.1. Secondary Research 
The thesis mainly uses secondary research to address the first research question on the 
minimum wage’s impact on working hours, working arrangements, and especially non-
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wage benefits. Part of the secondary research also investigates whether the minimum wage 
has any impact on the non-wage benefits of migrants. Previous studies on the effects of the 
minimum wage have mainly used secondary research, drawing data from existing public 
surveys.
2
  
The secondary research in this study follows previous studies by utilising existing data 
from public surveys, choosing surveys which are relevant to the research questions. These 
include public surveys that capture information on employment, and in particular on 
wages, non-wage benefits, and working hours. On the basis of a review of previous studies 
of the minimum wage in the UK, three public surveys were selected as particularly suitable 
for addressing the research questions: the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), 
the Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS), and the Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
 
There are extensive studies in the UK, including studies of the minimum wage, which have 
been done using the data from these three surveys. The Low Pay Commission (2011) uses 
ASHE as the main dataset to assess the minimum wage’s impact on earnings distribution. 
Dustman et al. (2007)’s study of migrant workers in relation to the National Minimum 
Wage uses data from both ASHE and the LFS. Dickens et al. (2009)’s investigation of the 
minimum wage’s effects on employment and hours of work uses both ASHE and the LFS. 
Forth and Millward (2001) use WERS data for 1998 to examine unions’ impact on pay 
levels in lower-skilled jobs in the private sector. Draca et al. (2008) also use WERS to 
                                               
2
 Leighton and Mincer (1981), Hashimoto (1982) and Lazear and Miller (1981)’s 
investigations of the minimum wage’s impact on training use National Longitudinal 
Survey data from the US Department of Labor. Leighton and Mincer (1981) also use the 
Panel Study of Income and Dynamics, a longitudinal household survey in the US. Simon 
and Kaestner (2004)’s investigation of the minimum wage’s effects on health insurance 
and pensions use data from the Current Population Survey from the US Census Bureau and 
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Dustmann et al.’s (2007) study of the minimum wage 
and migration in the UK uses the Labour Force Survey, the Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings and the UK Census as its data sources. Dickerson’s (2007) analysis of the 
minimum wage’s effects on training in the UK utilises data from the Labour Force Survey. 
Dickens et al.’s (2009) investigation of the National Minimum Wage’s impact on 
employment and hours of work uses data from the Labour Force Survey and the Annual 
Survey of Hours and Earnings.  
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determine the impact of the minimum wage on company profitability. Experian Business 
Strategies (2009) utilises the LFS to determine the impact of the minimum wage on staff 
turnover, retention and recruitment. Stewart (2003) uses the LFS as one of the datasets to 
examine the minimum wage’s effects on employment. 
 
The information in each of the three surveys has its limitations. However, the three surveys 
complement (and do not substitute for) each other. Therefore it is crucial to accommodate 
information from all three. The strengths and weaknesses of each survey are as follows. 
 
ASHE comprises data on individual earnings in the UK, with a sample size of 
approximately 300,000. The ASHE survey was introduced in 1997, and since then it has 
been conducted annually. In 2004 ASHE replaced the New Earnings Survey, which had 
been in use since the 1970s. The Economic and Social Data Service (2011) considers 
ASHE one of the largest surveys of individual earnings in the UK. ASHE claims that it has 
particularly accurate responses about wages and hours, since the responses are usually 
provided by employers rather than employees. However, this thesis contends that 
information from workers is no less vital than that from employers, particularly for the 
analysis of the non-wage benefits of workers in low-paying jobs. 
 
One of ASHE’s strengths is that it provides very detailed information on hours and 
earnings (basic paid hours, overtime hours, basic weekly earnings and overtime pay) and 
some information on non-wage benefits (incentive pay, shift and premium payment, and 
employee and employer contributions to pensions). Section 3.3 below discusses each of the 
ASHE variables used in the analysis. However, ASHE provides limited data on non-wage 
benefits. It also does not provide any information on migration, ethnicity or educational 
background.  
 
Two ASHE datasets, one covering a shorter and one a longer period comparison, are 
included. The first dataset is the shorter one, consisting of ASHE data for the years 2009 
and 2010 (the latest datasets that were available at the time of data collection for this 
thesis). The second dataset is the longer one, consisting of ASHE data for the years 1997 
and 2010 (the first and the latest available ASHE datasets). Each dataset compares two 
different years, as required in DID techniques, so as to establish whether the minimum 
wage has dissimilar impacts over shorter and longer periods. ASHE 1997 has limited 
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variables compared to ASHE 2010: the earliest ASHE survey does not capture as many 
non-wage benefit variables as the most recent ASHE survey. This problem affects this 
thesis in the sense that the longer-period dataset is not able to present as many analyses as 
the shorter one, which uses the more recent year. 
 
WERS is a national survey of employment relations in Britain that collects data from both 
employees and employers (managers). WERS provides cross-sectional survey data from 
employees and employers in the years 1998 and 2004. Its sample size is approximately 
40,000. In the cross-sectional survey of employees, WERS provides information about 
payment per week; hours of work (including basic hours and overtime) per week; whether 
particular working arrangements (such as flexitime, job sharing, working from home or the 
provision of workplace nurseries) are available; and whether parental leave (as a non-wage 
benefit) is available. It also provides information about ethnicity and educational 
background. WERS, however, does not provide any information on migration. The 
relevant WERS variables are explained in Section 3.3 below.  
 
This thesis uses cross-sectional data from employees for 1998 and 2004 as its WERS 
datasets. In WERS there were no major changes to the questionnaire between 1998 and 
2004, and so there are no significant problems which might affect the comparison of the 
data. 
 
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a quarterly continuous household survey conducted in 
Britain. It is one of the largest surveys of the labour force in Britain, with a sample size of 
approximately 20,000. It has very detailed and complete information on hours of work, 
pay, migration status, ethnicity, age, gender and educational background. Some other 
useful variables are working arrangements, such as whether respondents work flexitime or 
in term time, or job share; whether respondents receive any additions to basic pay, such as 
bonuses, profit-related pay, a London allowance, a standby allowance or a shift allowance; 
whether respondents receive training opportunities; the extent of holiday pay entitlement; 
and whether respondents are union members. However, it has limited information on non-
wage benefits.  
 
The LFS datasets were selected to show the effects of the minimum wage over short and 
long time periods. Most importantly, it was hoped that the two datasets would be able to 
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reveal the minimum wage’s impact on the non-wage benefits of migrants. LFS Quarter 1 
(Q1) is used simply because more information on non-wage benefits is available in this 
quarter. There were no major changes to the questionnaires over the time, at least not in the 
LFS datasets used in this study. Therefore there is no major problem in comparing the data. 
 
Thus in total there are four datasets used as secondary data: 
 
1. ASHE 2009 and 2010 
Total eligible sample: 346,544 
2. ASHE 1997 and 2010 
Total eligible sample: 315,911 
3. WERS Cross-Section of Employees 
  Total eligible sample: 48,675 
4. LFS Q1 2000 and Q1 2011 
Total eligible sample: 26,057 
 
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the strengths and limitations of the three surveys used to 
build the datasets. ASHE provides very detailed information about hours and earnings, but 
has limited information on non-wage benefits, and does not provide information on 
ethnicity or migration. WERS provides very detailed information on non-wage benefits 
and some information on ethnicity, but no information on migration. The LFS 
complements the other two by providing information on migration (by country of birth), 
but has limited information on non-wage benefits. 
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Information ASHE WERS LFS 
Sample size +300k +40k +20k 
Ethnicity No Yes Yes 
Migrant/native  
(country of birth) 
 
No No Yes 
Employers’ views No Yes No 
Non-wage benefits Few: incentive pay, 
shift/premium pay, 
pensions. 
 
Many: training, 
pensions, profit/ 
ownership share, 
health insurance, 
paid leave 
(sickness, holiday, 
childcare, 
paternity), working 
arrangements 
(flexitime, job 
share, work from 
home, workplace 
nurseries). 
Medium: training, 
additions to basic 
pay (bonuses, profit 
share, London 
allowance, standby 
allowance, shift 
allowance), holiday 
pay, working 
arrangements 
(flexitime, term- 
time working, job 
share). 
 
Table 3.1 Secondary Data 
 
The secondary data also has limitations in relation to the research questions regarding 
migration. First, only the LFS contains information on migration; even here, the variables 
that discuss migration are very limited.
3
 Second, the LFS data might under-represent 
particular types of migrants, such as migrants who work in low-paid, low-skilled jobs. The 
data also has no information about migrants’ legal status. Third, the secondary data overall 
does not provide information on particular non-wage benefits in secondary-segment jobs
4
; 
thus migrants’ experiences in low-paid, low-skilled jobs, and especially their non-wage 
                                               
3
 Although the LFS does provide information on country of birth, there are other migration 
variables which are not covered by the LFS, such as level of spoken English, legal status 
(visas), employer’s ethnicity, and migrants’ previous experiences (in their home country or 
abroad). 
 
4
 The types of non-wage benefits available in secondary jobs might differ from those in 
primary jobs; moreover, some of the non-wage benefits in secondary jobs might not be 
captured in official statistics. 
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benefits, are not completely addressed. I therefore also conducted primary research to 
gather information which could not be found in public surveys. 
 
There were restrictions on access to the three public surveys. First and foremost, in order to 
conduct secondary research, ethical approval had to be obtained from London Metropolitan 
University’s Research Ethics Review Panel for the Faculty of Applied Social Sciences 
(now the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities). The next step was to make an 
application to the Office for National Statistics (ONS) for approval to access the Virtual 
Microdata Laboratory (VML) where the public survey data is located. This approval 
required several stages. An extensive review of the research project and its relevance to the 
data requested had to be provided, as did information regarding my research experience, 
especially in relation to confidentiality and data protection. I made a formal application to 
become an Approved Researcher in November 2010, and attended a one-day technical 
training session on confidentiality and data protection in December 2010. In late December 
2010 I received my Approved Researcher status.  
 
I began data collection in May 2011. I had to regularly visit the VML at the ONS offices in 
order to conduct the analysis. It took five months in total to complete the collection of 
secondary data. I spent approximately 20 hours per week at the VML during the data 
collection period. The first two months were devoted to reviewing the survey 
questionnaires, choosing the relevant variables, learning to use Stata (the econometric 
software for large sets of data), and conducting a trial-and-error regression test. The last 
three months were used to compile the sort data, code the data, analyse the data using DID, 
and make corrections and revisions. 
 
3.2. Primary Research 
As the secondary research alone could not completely address migrants’ experiences and 
the non-wage benefits they receive in low-skilled, low-paid jobs, I also conducted primary 
research to gather such information. The primary research was particularly designed to 
investigate the second research question on how the minimum wage differently affect 
migrants: a) what factors affect migrants’ earning the minimum wage or below, b) how the 
minimum wage affects migrants’ access to non-wage benefits, and c) whether the 
phenomenon of downgrading exists and how it relates to the duality of the labour market. 
The primary research was designed to capture substantial migration variables which are 
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rarely found in official statistics, such as human capital and legal status. Section 3.4 below 
explores in detail the variables used in the primary research and the regression techniques 
used to analyse the data. 
 
In accordance with positivism and the quantitative method, I used a quantitative technique 
to collect the primary data. A questionnaire survey was developed, and responses were 
collected by conducting face-to-face interviews based on the questionnaires. The face-to-
face interview was seen as the most appropriate way to collect responses, particularly with 
regard to the target sample.  
 
Although this study’s main methodology is quantitative, I did not want to completely lose 
‘insight’ into the realities of migrants’ experiences of wages and non-wage benefits. Thus 
the questionnaire design also allowed a few open-ended questions which gave room for 
respondents to express their concerns. The questionnaire design was an adapted version of 
the questionnaires designed by the Undocumented Workers Transitions project
5
 and the 
East European Immigration and Community Cohesion project.
6
 The template for the 
questionnaire is available in Appendix 1. There were 41 questions in total; the majority of 
the questions were multiple choice, with a few open-ended questions.  
 
I submitted the ethics application to conduct the primary research to the Research Ethics 
Review Panel at the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, London Metropolitan 
University, in May 2011. A thorough review was conducted in order to gain ethical 
approval on how to approach migrants while avoiding unethical conduct, how to ensure 
voluntary participation, and how to maintain the confidentiality of respondents. To this end 
an Information Sheet was created for distribution and communication to the respondents 
                                               
5
 An EU-funded project by McKay et al. (2011), Working Lives Research Institute, 
London Metropolitan University. Published report: 
http://www.undocumentedmigrants.eu/londonmet/fms/MRSite/Research/UWT/UWT%20F
INAL%20REPORT%20Revised%2021%20November%202009mw.pdf. 
 
6
 A Joseph Rowntree Foundation-funded project by Markova and Black (2007), Sussex 
Centre for Migration Research, University of Sussex. Published report: 
http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/2053-immigration-community-cohesion.pdf.  
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before the interview began. The purpose of the Information Sheet was to ensure the 
voluntary participation, anonymity and confidentiality of the respondents. The information 
sheet is available in Appendix 2. Ethical approval to conduct the primary research was 
granted in July 2011. 
 
As soon as the ethical approval was granted, the pilot testing of the questionnaire was 
conducted in July 2011. Ten questionnaires were distributed in the pilot test. Results from 
the pilot showed no major problems with the questionnaire design; the respondents did not 
find any difficulties in answering the questions. Overall, the questions were well 
understood by the respondents (It is to be noted that the questionnaire had already been 
extensively tested in major studies that had used it previously). The questionnaire 
collection was then conducted over five months, from August to December 2011.  
 
The survey’s target sample was London-based migrants who work in low-paid, low-skilled 
sectors. The sample comprised 200 completed questionnaires. It was decided to use 
London as the (migrant) base for the sample simply because London has the largest 
proportion of migrant workers, compared to other cities in the UK. Statistics show that in 
2009, migrant workers constituted approximately 39% of London’s working-age 
population; this is significantly above the proportion of migrant workers in the UK as a 
whole, which stands at 14% (Wadsworth, 2010a). Moreover, statistics show that although 
the stock of migrants has risen across all regions over time, it has risen the most in London 
(Wadsworth, 2010b: R37). Migration has become more concentrated in certain areas over 
time,
7
 and 32% of migrants live in London (Wadsworth, 2010b); these factors also 
strengthened the decision to base the primary research in London. 
 
However, limiting the survey to London may have had some implications for the 
generation of evidence about the UK as a whole, as the characteristics of jobs, pay and 
migrants may differ across the country. Moreover, the characteristics of migrants in 
London may differ from those of migrants across the UK, which may constitute another 
limitation. Nevertheless, as the focus is on the National Minimum Wage, the variation 
                                               
7
 Wadsworth (2010b: R38) also suggests that recent migrants tend to live in areas where 
the proportions of earlier migrants are higher. 
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between the results of the study in London and conditions in other regions may be modest, 
as the National Minimum Wage applies nationally.  
 
Choosing London as the base for the questionnaire collection created further opportunities 
to access respondents, although access to migrants is sometimes problematic. This study 
defines London-based migrant workers as those who work in London and who were born 
outside the UK or to non-British parents. This includes migrants who have already gained 
permanent residency or British citizenship. There are difficulties with this definition of 
‘migrant’: for example, in the case of a person who moved to the UK at an early age and 
underwent all their education and socialisation here, the classification of that person as a 
‘migrant’ might be problematic. However, the approach taken in this study specifically 
targeted migrants who had not been brought up in the UK. The definition of ‘migrant 
workers’ is also problematic: for example, complications arise with migrants who are only 
working temporarily in the UK, migrants who intend to work in the short term only, those 
whose legal status does not permit them to take any work or allows them only limited 
hours of work, and those whose work is not reported in official statistics (or who work in 
the ‘underground’ economy).  
 
The sample was designed to be purposive, so as to present a distribution of migrants in 
terms of age, gender, country of birth and sector of employment. It is a limitation of this 
thesis that the samples do not fully represent the distribution of migrants in London (Table 
3.2 presents statistics on migrant distribution in London); however, the target sample of 
200 migrants did include a variety of migrants, according to its purposive design.  
 
The judgmental nature of the sample was motivated by the difficulty in accessing migrant 
groups in low-paid occupations and the simultaneous need to ensure a balanced 
representation of such groups in terms of their gender, skills, the proportion of those 
working at the minimum wage (or below) vs. those working above the minimum wage, 
sectors of low-paid, low skilled employment and legal status.  The main limitation of this 
type of a purposive survey strategy is that the sample produced is not representative of the 
target population. This is mainly caused by the inevitable subjectivity of the researcher and 
availability of the population group from which the sample is drawn (Black, 1999).  
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An important limitation of this study in terms of the variety of legal statuses is that student 
legal status may be over-represented in the sample. To some extent this is due to the fact 
that students were over-used as entry points when accessing the sample initially. My part-
time job teaching at a private College greatly facilitated my access to students, gaining 
their trust and support with my research. They were working in lower-paid sectors, doing 
minimum wage jobs.  
 
The element of convenience sampling at the beginning is acknowledged as a drawback of 
the overall sampling strategy. As a remedy, a control variable for the student legal status is 
included in the data analysis (see section 3.4 on method of analysis).  
 
Given the above considerations, the sample can only be considered as indicative of the 
London migrant population in low-skilled, low- paid jobs.  
 
Features Selected Comparisons 
1986 2006 
Foreign-born population
1
 1.17 million 2.23 million 
Migrant proportion in 
total population
2
 
17.6% 30.5% 
Dominant countries of 
origin
3
 
Six countries:  
Ireland, India, Kenya, 
Jamaica, Cyprus, 
Bangladesh 
Previous six countries + 
Nigeria, Poland, Sri Lanka, 
Ghana, South Africa, 
Pakistan, Somalia, USA, 
Turkey 
Origins by region in 1998–20054 
Western Europe 18% 
Central/Eastern Europe 14% 
Australia/New Zealand 9% 
North America 6% 
Caribbean 2% 
Central/South America 5% 
Middle East 4% 
South Asia 12% 
East Asia 10% 
Africa 19% 
Sectors of Employment in 
2005/6
5
 
Share of Employment 
Recent Migrants Previous Migrants 
Manufacturing 5% 25% 
Construction 9% 21% 
Transport and distribution 5% 31% 
85 
 
Hotels and catering 17% 42% 
Financial services 7% 25% 
Business services 6% 26% 
Administration, education 3% 23% 
Health 6% 33% 
Other services 7% 22% 
Total 5% 24% 
Age in 2002/3
6
 
<16 6.4% 
16-64 79.7% 
65+ 13.9% 
Gender in 2002/3
7
 
Female 52.4% 
Male 47.6% 
Ethnicity in 2002/3
8
 
White British 11.3% 
Other white 28.5% 
Mixed group 1.5% 
Indian 12.7% 
Pakistani 3.2% 
Bangladeshi 5.0% 
Other Asian 6.3% 
Black Caribbean 6.2% 
Black African 13.5% 
Chinese 2.3% 
Other 9.0% 
 
Sources: 1–5: Gordon et al. (2007: 13, 24, 48), Tables 2.1, 3.3 and 5.1; 6–8: DMAG (2005: 
137–163), Appendix G.  
Table 3.2 Migrant Distribution in London 
 
A number of procedures were established in order to overcome to a degree the limitations 
of the purposive sampling:  
 
a) Gender (for the sample to be gender-balanced). This is to ensure a fair inclusion of 
both male and female respondents in the sample. It has important implications for 
the empirical analysis, i.e., to avoid the sample to be skewed towards any of the 
genders. 
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b) Skills (for the sample to have a significant proportion of less-skilled workers). This 
is also to ensure a fair inclusion of less-skilled workers in the sample. Dustmann et 
al. (2007) show that migrants tend to be ‘downgraded’: skilled workers are indeed 
undertaking less-skilled jobs. In reality it proved very difficult to find less-skilled 
or less-educated migrants, and the majority of migrants in the sample were highly 
educated, even though they worked in low-skilled, low-paid jobs); 
 
c) Minimum-wage (or below) and above-minimum wage workers: at least 30% of the 
sample would be minimum-wage workers earning the October 2011 National 
Minimum Wage rate or below.  
As the primary research sought to compare workers on the minimum wage or 
below and workers earning above the minimum wage, it was decided at the 
beginning that 50% of the samples must be minimum wage workers, but in reality 
(ultimately during the pilot testing), it proved very difficult to access low – wage 
workers, therefore it was subsequently decided (at the supervisory meeting after the 
pilot testing) to change the target to 30%, i.e., at least 30% of the sample must hold 
jobs at the minimum-wage rate or below – a more feasible target. The figure of 
30% would allow adequate analysis of the two different groups, minimum-wage (or 
below) and above-minimum wage workers. A minimum-wage worker is defined as 
a worker who earned exactly the 2011 National Minimum Wage rate or less (≤ 
2011 National Minimum Wage); an above-minimum wage worker is defined as a 
worker who earned above the 2011 National Minimum Wage rate (> 2011 National 
Minimum Wage). 
 
d) Low-paid, low-skilled sectors 
In order to reach the target sample of workers in low-paid, low-skilled jobs, the 
primary research focused on particular low-paying sectors. These included the 
retail/shop/supermarket, sales, domestic-work, cleaning, care (elderly 
care/childcare), construction, hotel, restaurant/bar and factory sectors. They are 
described by the Low Pay Commission as low-paying industries with a visible 
proportion of minimum-wage jobs (see Low Pay Commission 2010: Figure 3.2). 
Moreover, some of these sectors also have significant proportions of migrant 
workers (see Table 3.3). The sample size of 200 respondents was thus also 
designed to include a variety of sectors and wage levels (point c).  
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e) Legal status: to have variety of migrant legal status in the sample. This has 
implication on determining which statuses require permission to work and which 
do not; and whether the permission to work determines the level of wage. 
 
Rank 2002 2008 
1 Mining of metal ores (39%) Clothing, fur manufacture (28%) 
2 Clothing, fur manufacture (19%) Mining of metal ores (25%) 
3 Hotels, restaurants (16%) Hotels, restaurants (23%) 
4 Computer, related activities (15%) Recycling (22%) 
5 
Research, development (14%) Private households with employees 
(21%) 
6 
Private households with employees 
(13%) 
Food, beverage manufacture (21%) 
7 Air transport (11%)  Computer, related activities (19%) 
8 Oil, gas extraction etc. (10%) Air transport (18%)  
9 Other business activities (10%) Other transport, travel (17%) 
10 Health, social work (10%)  Research, development (15%) 
Note: Sectors are based on the Standard Industrial Classification 92 ‘two-digit’ level. 
Source: Migration Advisory Committee Secretariat (2010: 8), Table 3. 
Table 3.3 Top 10 Sectors with Shares of Non-UK Born Workers, 2002 and 2008 
 
Accessing migrant communities is often challenging and sometimes problematic. 
Snowballing with multiple entry points was considered the most viable and ethically 
acceptable technique to access migrant communities. First, a diversity of contacts was used 
to secure access to the migrant communities. This combination of multiple entry points 
with the snowballing approach enabled access to a wide range of participants. Second, a 
tree or snowballing diagram was maintained to describe the way each interviewee was 
recruited. Appendix 3 presents the tree diagram in detail. 
 
In order to implement multiple entry points, I established extended networks, including 
gatekeepers, unions, migrant-based organisations and migrant communities. It was noted 
that some sectors are certainly more segmented than others. It was also found that some 
sectors were easier to access than others.  
 
The restaurant/bar and retail/shop/supermarket sectors were the sectors that offered the 
easiest access to migrant workers in this study. Access to these sectors came mainly from 
London Metropolitan University students, private college students, London Metropolitan 
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University colleagues, and my other colleagues. Students offered entry into the strongest 
networks in these sectors, as they provided access to their (migrant) co-workers. It is a 
limitation of this study that students were used particularly heavily as entry points to gain 
access respondents in these sectors. An implication of this is that there is a high proportion 
of migrant student in these sectors in the sample.  
 
In the hotel sector, the entry points were similar to those for the sectors listed above, but 
access was also gained through church communities. The care sector was found to be more 
segmented than the sectors mentioned above. Access to care workers was mainly gained 
through church communities and migrant communities.  
 
Domestic work (i.e. work in private houses) is another example of a highly segmented 
sector. In order to access migrant domestic workers, contact was established with a 
gatekeeper from an Indonesian domestic-worker community. I became involved in their 
meetings and activities, and through this interaction I was able to speak with some 
workers. Other contacts with domestic workers were gained through church communities. 
Domestic workers were also accessed through some ethnic events: for example, at one 
event organised by the Indonesian Embassy. 
 
In order to access cleaning workers, multiple entry points were also established. The first 
entry point was with the union Unite. I became involved in some Unite meetings with 
cleaner representatives at Canary Wharf. From the meetings with cleaner representatives, I 
was able to gain access to both night shift and day shift cleaners in the Canary Wharf 
buildings. The second entry point was through London Metropolitan University’s cleaners: 
I managed to meet the duty/day supervisor, and was able to speak with some cleaners. The 
third entry point was through cleaners at the Indonesian Embassy. Other access points to 
cleaners came through colleagues living in halls of residence: I managed to speak with 
cleaners at several halls of residence. There were also council cleaners I met in the street or 
park. 
 
The sectors in which it was most difficult to access migrant workers during this study were 
the construction and factory sectors. In these cases, extended networks and entry points 
had to be used. In the construction sector, the extended networks included the Latin 
American Workers’ Association, which connected me with some construction workers. 
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Through a colleague I was introduced to the owner of a small construction business, who 
contributed substantial ‘insight’ findings to the study. Other entry points included students 
who work side-by-side with construction workers. Another entry point was the site of a 
construction project near where I live. 
  
The factory sector presented similar difficulties in terms of access to migrant workers. A 
substantial entry point was through students who worked side-by-side with factory 
workers, or who had colleagues who worked in factories. From there I implemented 
snowballing to reach a number of factory workers. 
 
Despite the range of the sector distribution, there were also difficulties in reaching a 
balance between less-skilled and skilled workers. It was extremely difficult to find low-
skilled migrants. The majority of migrants who work in low-skilled, low-paid jobs are 
actually skilled migrants, at least according to their educational level. Although the 
definition of ‘skill’ is not homogenous, it was extremely difficult to find respondents with 
below-secondary levels of education, or respondents who lacked proficiency in English or 
prior work experience. The sample successfully included workers with low levels of 
education in the domestic-work and cleaning sectors, but the numbers were very few. In 
some cases, even though they had low levels of education or English proficiency, the 
workers did have previous work experience.  
 
The questionnaire was written in English, and the majority of the interviews were 
conducted in English; a small number of interviews were conducted in Indonesian. Almost 
all of the respondents could speak very basic English. I was able to get interpreters for only 
two interviews, both in Arabic, for which I had help from the gatekeeper and from another 
respondent who could speak Arabic. 
 
In an attempt to include a diversity of migrants’ legal statuses, the research aimed to 
include a proportion of undocumented workers. Accessing undocumented workers is often 
problematic. The majority of the undocumented workers in the sample worked in the 
‘underground’ economy, although a small number of them did work in a declared business. 
A different approach had to be implemented to access undocumented workers. The 
majority of the undocumented respondents were not willing to speak directly to me without 
being accompanied (or introduced) by either the gatekeeper or a trusted co-worker. The 
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entry points were therefore through gatekeepers and by using the snowballing approach 
with other respondents (whom I carefully and cautiously asked whether any of their co-
workers were undocumented).  
 
Overall, the primary research, which quantitatively analyses responses from 200 migrant 
workers is considered adequate to answer the second research question on how the 
minimum wage differently affects migrant workers.  
 
The next section presents the quantitative techniques used to analyse the data. The 
respondent profile, including the exact figures for the variables in the sample, is discussed 
in Chapter 5. 
 
3.3. Secondary Research: Method of Analysis 
As discussed above, the secondary research is devoted to the first research question, on the 
effects of the minimum wage on working hours, working arrangements, and particularly 
non-wage benefits. The secondary data consists of eight datasets from three major labour 
surveys in the UK: the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), the Workplace 
Employee Relations Survey (WERS) and the Labour Force Survey (LFS). The 
methodology used to analyse the data is positivist and quantitative. 
 
This section will discuss the method used to analyse the secondary data. Just one specific 
method was used: difference-in-difference (DID). This is one of the econometric 
techniques used to measure the changes or impacts due to a particular treatment during 
different periods of time. This model is widely used to detect the effects of policy changes 
(Meyer, 1995). The effect of changes in the minimum wage, in the US and UK for 
instance, has been extensively analysed using DID. 
  
Card and Krueger (1994) use DID to examine the impact of the New Jersey minimum-
wage increase in 1992 on employment in the fast-food industry. In their book Myth and 
Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage, Card and Krueger (1995) 
discuss in depth the DID method used in their studies. Their discussion covers the 
implementation of DID in minimum-wage studies, how to define the treatment group and 
the control group as required by DID, how to measure the effects, and how to interpret the 
outcome of DID.  
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Stewart (2003, 2004) also applies DID to investigate the effects on employment of the 
introduction of the UK’s National Minimum Wage in April 1999 and its subsequent 
increases in 2000 and 2001. Following the work of Stewart, many other studies have been 
conducted using similar DID methods. Dickens and Draca (2005) examine the impact of 
the 2003 National Minimum Wage increase on employment; Arulampalam et al. (2004) 
and Dickerson (2007) use DID to examine the impact of the UK National Minimum Wage 
on training provision. 
  
This research similarly follows the DID method of Card and Krueger (1994, 1995), with 
small modifications to accommodate the research questions. The modifications were made 
to the definitions of the treatment and control groups, and to the definitions of the outcome 
variables (i.e. what the minimum wage affects). Nevertheless, DID was generally applied 
for the computation of standard errors. 
 
In order to establish the DID estimation, two groups have to be defined: the treatment 
group and the control group. The treatment group (or affected group) is the group that is 
affected by the treatment or policy change. The control group (or non-affected group) is 
the group that is not affected by the treatment or policy change. In this thesis the treatment 
group is defined as the group of workers with earnings at or below the relevant National 
Minimum Wage, and the control group as the group of workers who earn above the 
relevant National Minimum Wage.  
 
To put it simply, DID involves exactly what its name would suggest: difference-in-
difference. DID can be explained as follows. Suppose Group 1 is the minimum-wage 
group (the treatment group), and the others (Group 0) are classified as the above-minimum 
wage group (the control group). To analyse how the minimum wage affects the specific 
outcome (Y), the DID model is: 
 
Yt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
Where Tt is the time dummy (1 for period A, 0 for period B), Gi is the group dummy (1 for 
the treatment group, 0 for the control group), Tt*Gi is the interaction between the time 
dummy and the group dummy, and Yt,i is the average outcome in group i and in time t. 
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â0 is the constant term, â1 is the treatment group specific effect (to account for the average 
permanent differences between treatment and control groups), â2 is the time trend of 
control and treatment groups.  
 
The regression approach is used as it is important to calculate the standard errors so it can 
be confidently concluded whether the difference-in-difference estimates are statistically 
different from zero. Nevertheless, the limitations of this approach must be acknowledged. 
The regression analysis does not include control variables using stratification of age, 
gender, region, occupation and industry. It is the limitation of the thesis that the regression 
treats all observations as if they have similar characteristics while in reality there should 
have been such stratification given that the ASHE and LFS do contain information on 
gender, age, region, occupation and industry.  
 
The DID estimator, which demonstrates whether there is any effect on outcome (which is 
what this study is looking for), is shown by coefficient â3. That is, coefficient â3 will show 
whether the impact of the minimum wage on non-wage benefits exists, and if so how large 
that effect is. The DID estimator (coefficient â3) estimates the difference between the 
change in outcome for the treatment group and the change in outcome for the control 
group. The DID estimator can be calculated as the difference of group means: 
 
 (μ11 – μ 01) – (μ 10 – μ 00) 
  
Where the first term is the change in outcome for the treatment group and the second term 
is the change in outcome for the control group (Manning, 2008). This can be used to 
further test the consistency of the DID OLS (ordinary least squares) model.  
 
There are three assumptions of the DID estimator (Albouy, 2008: 2): 
  
1. The model in the equation (the outcome) is correctly identified. 
2. The error term is on average zero; Albouy (2008) added that it is not a 
hard assumption given the constant term â put in. 
3. The error term is uncorrelated with the other variables in the equation. 
Albouy (2008) noted that this is the most critical assumption, which is 
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known as the parallel trends assumption. Manning (2008: 3) also added 
that the validity of DID estimator is based on the assumption that the 
underlying ‘trends’ in the outcome variable are the same for both the 
treatment and the control group. Manning (2008) also clarifies that this 
assumption is not testable using only two observations, but it is plausible 
when there are more than two observations. 
 
The limitation of the DID estimation in this thesis is that it may fail the assumption of the 
parallel trend, although it should be noted that the failure of the parallel trend assumption is 
the most common problem in estimating DID. It is often difficult and sometimes 
impossible to check this assumption as it is usually made of unobservable quantities 
(Albouy, 2008). One way to avoid this problem according to Albouy (2008: 4) is to get 
more data on other time periods before and after treatment. The ASHE and LFS datasets 
shown in this study provide two different time periods (long term and short term) to see if 
any different trend exists. However, it is the limitation of this study that no other control 
group exists which could provide additional underlying trend to satisfy the parallel trends 
assumption.  
 
This study also acknowledges as a limitation the fact that the estimation method does not 
account for the possible spill-over effects. Spill-over effects might occur if an increase of 
the minimum wage in one sector affects also other sectors, which are not minim wage. 
There is more evidence from the US market which suggests the existence of spill-over 
effects (see Katz and Krueger, 1992; Manning, 2003; Neumark et al., 2004), however, 
Stewart (2009: 5) points out that no such evidence has been found in the UK literature.  
 
The DID estimation method may not be vigorous as it does not control for gender, age, 
region, occupation, or industry. Given the complex nature of the datasets, time constraints, 
access limitations and the difficulties in identifying persuasive and valid instruments, the 
DID model in this thesis consists only of the basic equation approach with no further 
stratification or control variables. It is thus the limitation of the thesis that the model 
presented is not constructed as the most robust approach which may trigger econometric 
problems in estimating the impact of the minimum wage.  
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The research used Stata statistical software to run the DID estimation, alongside SPSS and 
Microsoft Excel to sort the data. As stated in Section 3.1, this study uses four datasets as 
the secondary data. The subsections below explain the outcome variables that the study 
expected to find, i.e. the (minimum wage’s) impact on working hours, non-wage benefits, 
and working arrangements. The next section also explains how the DID was translated into 
equations in order to meet these study expectations.  
 
3.3.1. Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) 
The ASHE datasets are: 
 
Dataset 1: ASHE 2009 and 2010 
Dataset 2: ASHE 1997 and 2010 
 
Table 3.4 describes the outcome variables – that is, the impacts of the minimum wage that 
this study hoped to find – for ASHE.  
 
Outcome 
Variable 
Description Data 
set  
Hourlywage (£) Wage per hour 1, 2 
Bpay (£) Basic weekly earnings 1, 2 
Bhr (hrs) Basic weekly paid hours worked 1, 2 
Ipayin (£) Incentive pay  1 
Spay (£) Additional premium payments for shift work and night or 
weekend work not treated as overtime 
1 
Anipay (£) Portion of gross annual earnings that comes from incentive 
payments 
1 
Ownpay (£) The amount of the employee’s contributions to pension 1 
Compay (£) The amount of the employer’s contributions to pension 1 
Ownperc (%) The percentage of the employee’s contributions to pension 1 
Comperc (%) The percentage of the employer’s contributions to pension 1 
Ovhrs (hrs) Average weekly paid overtime hours worked 1 
Ovpay (£) Average weekly overtime pay  1 
Othpay (£) Pay received for other reasons 1 
 
Table 3.4 ASHE Outcome Variables 
 
What is expected from the ASHE data is to find how the increase in the minimum wage in 
relevant years affects each outcome in Table 3.4. 
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The DID translates this expectation into an equation:  
 
Outcomet,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
where Tt is the time dummy (1 for period A, 0 for period B), Gi is the group dummy (1 for 
the treatment group, 0 for the control group), Tt*Gi is the interaction between the time 
dummy and the group dummy, and Outcomet,i is the expected outcome of the minimum 
wage at time t for group i.  
 
â0 is the constant term, â1 is the treatment group specific effect (to account for the average 
permanent differences between treatment and control groups), â2 is the time trend of 
control and treatment groups, and â3 is the DID estimator. 
 
For the Bhr outcome in Dataset 1, the DID estimation (â3) should be read as: 
 
What is the minimum wage’s effect on basic hourly wages  for the period 2009 to 
2010? 
 
Overall, the DID estimation should be read as follows, unless otherwise specified: 
What is the minimum wage’s effect on [outcome] for the period [year a] to [year 
b]? 
 
Appendix 4 shows in more detail how the secondary data were sorted and formulated. 
 
3.3.2. Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS) 
The WERS dataset is: 
 
Dataset 3: WERS Cross-Section of Employees, 1998 and 2004 
 
Table 3.5 describes the outcome variables that were expected to be found from WERS. 
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Outcome Variable Description 
Hourlywage (£) Wage per hour 
Hoursperweek (hrs) Total hours of work per week including overtime 
Overtimehrs (hrs) Overtime hours per week 
Basichrs (hrs) Basic hours per week excluding overtime 
Flexitime  If flexible working hours are available 
Jobshare  If job sharing (sharing a full-time job with someone else) is 
available 
Parental  If parental leave is available 
Workhome  If working at or from home in normal working hours is 
available 
Nursery  If a workplace nursery or help with the cost of childcare is 
available 
 
Table 3.5 WERS Outcome Variables 
 
3.3.3. Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
The LFS dataset is: 
 
Dataset 4: LFS Q1 2000 and Q1 2011 
 
Table 3.6 describes the outcome variables that are estimated from the LFS. 
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Outcome 
Variable 
Description 
Cameyr (year) Number of years since first arrived in the UK 
Conmpy (year) Number of years in current job 
Bushr (hour) Total usual hours of work excluding overtime 
Ed13wk  If respondent has been in job-related training or education in 
the last three months  
Netwk (£) Net weekly pay in main job 
Hourlypaid (£) Hourly wage 
Ernfilt  If last pay contained any additions to basic pay 
Bonuses  If receive bonuses 
Profitrelated  If receive profit-related pay 
Londonallw  If receive London or other regional allowance pay 
Standby  If receive stand-by or on-call allowance pay 
Shiftallw  If receive shift allowance pay 
Jobtrn  If respondent receives on-the-job training 
Tfee  If employer pays the training fee 
Trnlen  If respondent receives (only) less than a week of training 
 
Table 3.6 LFS Outcome Variables 
 
To conclude this section, the DID method of analysis is used to investigate the secondary 
data in relation to the first research question, on the impact of the minimum wage on 
working hours, working arrangements, and particularly non-wage benefits. The thesis also 
compares the results of the secondary research with those of the primary research, in order 
to establish whether the secondary research suggests similar findings to the primary 
research. 
 
3.4. Primary Research: Method of Analysis 
As discussed above, the secondary data alone is not sufficient to completely address all of 
the research questions: the realities for migrant workers in low-paid, low-skilled jobs and 
information on their non-wage benefits are rarely captured in public surveys or statistics. 
Primary research was therefore conducted, using survey questionnaires as a quantitative 
method. The aim of the primary research was to investigate the second research question, 
on how the minimum wage differently affects migrants. Hence the questionnaire was 
designed to address minimum-wage issues in relation to migration. 
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The second research question falls into three parts: 
 
a) What factors might explain why some migrants earn the minimum wage or below, while 
others earn above the minimum? 
In order to address this issue, variables of human capital were set which might explain 
migrants’ likelihood of earning the minimum wage or below. The variables include 
language proficiency, educational level and length of stay in the UK. The main technique 
used to understand the factors affecting migrants’ earning the minimum wage or below is 
logistic regression.  
 
Theoretically, logistic regression analysis was developed to address the limitations of the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression in which the OLS was subsequently found to be 
inappropriate to handle dichotomous outcomes due to their strict statistical assumptions, 
i.e. linearity, normality and continuity (Peng et al., 2002: 3). Logistic regression is 
generally suited for testing a relationship of a categorical dependent variable and one or 
more categorical or continuous independent variables. The logistic model predicts the logit 
of Y (the dependent or outcome variable) from X (the independent variable). The logit is 
the natural logarithm (ln) of the ratio of the probability of Y happening (i.e. a respondent 
earns the minimum wage or below) to the probability of Y not happening (i.e. a respondent 
earns above the minimum wage) (Peng et al., 2002: 4). The mathematical formula of the 
simple logistic regression model is: 
 
 ln(p/1-p) = α + βX, where p is the probability of the outcome (such as a respondent 
earns the minimum wage or below), α is the intercept, and β is the regression coefficient.  
 
Regression analysis is used mainly because regression reveals the causal relationship 
between the variables. The primary data in this study is cross-sectional; hence, no time 
series method is used. The regression equation in this particular investigation was formed 
on the basis of Chiswick’s studies of human capital and migrant performance. Chiswick 
(1978) suggests that post-migration experiences, including migrants’ ability to acquire the 
host country’s language and customs and their investment in post-school training, offer a 
higher rate of return for migrants. Chiswick and Miller (1998) point out the importance of 
the acquisition of the host country’s language, which relates to the economic benefit of an 
increase in earnings. Early studies by Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974), which lay the 
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foundations of the study of human capital in relation to earnings, also inform the regression 
equation. 
 
It has been suggested that some demographic factors may affect migrants’ likelihood of 
earning the minimum wage or below. These include age and gender. Factors other than 
human capital and demographics might also explain why some migrants earn the minimum 
wage or below. Therefore variables such as hours of work, union membership, legal status 
and employer’s ethnicity are also included in the regression equation. As students represent 
one-third of the sample, a control variable for student legal status is added. 
 
In this logistic regression, there are multiple independent variables with one dependent 
variable. Table 3.7 describes the variables included in the multiple logistic regression. The 
multiple logistic regression estimates which factors affect migrants’ likelihood of earning 
the minimum wage or below. It first uses a stepwise method to regress ten independent 
variables, as the number of independent variables included is limited by the valid samples. 
It then uses only significant variables identified in the stepwise, add the next three 
variables and run another logistic regression. 
 
The regression equation is as follows: 
 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Age + b2 Gender + b3 Length of stay + b4 English language  
+ b5 Educational level + b6 Hours of work + b7 Same ethnicity employer  
+ b8 Local ethnicity employer + b9 Union membership + b10 Work permit needed 
+ b11 Work Experiences + b12 Training + b13 Student  
 
 Dependent variable = Minimum Wage  
 
The following variables: Work Experiences, Training, and Student will be added at a later 
stage. 
 
It is acknowledged that the above model may be subject to endogeneity problems: 
endogeneity of explanatory variables is due to their joint determination with the outcome 
(Meyer, 1995: 152). In this case in particular, the outcome measured by the model is not a 
random outcome but fixed by the construction of the sampling. For instance, hours of work 
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might be a function of the minimum wage. Similarly, union membership might also 
depend on whether the worker is receiving the minimum wage or above the minimum 
wage. Thus test of endogeneity is performed on endogenous variables: hours of work and 
union membership. Test of endogeneity or simultaneity is simply a test to see if an 
endogeneous independent variable is correlated with the error term (Gujarati and Porter, 
2009). See section 5.1.1 for test of endogeneity (Hausman Specification test). 
 
 
Variable Description Sample 
Mean 
Values (a) 
Expected 
sign 
Minimum wage 
 
 
A dummy variable  
= 1 if respondent earns the National 
Minimum Wage or below,  
= 0 if respondent earns above the 
National Minimum Wage 
  
Age* A continuous variable (years) 32.320 
(10.025) 
- 
Gender A dummy variable  
= 1 if male, 0 = if female 
1.425 + 
Length of stay A continuous variable (years) 
 
5.826 
(6.922) 
_ 
English 
language 
 
 
A dummy variable  
= 1 if the spoken English has improved 
(from none to minimal, minimal to 
proficient, or proficient to fluent),  
= 0 otherwise 
1.203 - 
Educational 
level 
 
A dummy variable  
= 1 if education is above secondary 
level,  
= 0 if education is secondary level or 
below  
0.700 - 
Hours of work 
 
A continuous variable (hours of work 
per week) 
 
33.086 
(16.829) 
+ 
Same ethnicity 
employer  
 
A dummy variable  
= 1 if employer is of the same (migrant) 
ethnic origin as the worker,  
= 0 otherwise 
0.144 ? 
Local ethnicity 
employer 
 
A dummy variable  
= 1 if employer is of local 
(British/native) ethnic origin, 
= 0 otherwise 
0.585 ? 
Union 
membership 
A dummy variable  
= 1 if the worker is a member of a trade 
union, = 0 otherwise 
1.830 - 
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Work permit 
needed 
 
A dummy variable  
= 1 if the worker needs a permit to work, 
= 0 otherwise 
0.635 - 
Work 
Experience 
 
A dummy variable  
= 1 if the worker has work experience at 
home country or abroad, = 0 otherwise 
0.680 - 
Training 
 
A dummy variable  
= 1 if the worker receives training from 
employer, = 0 otherwise 
0.710 - 
Student 
 
A dummy variable  
= 1 if the worker has a student legal 
status, = 0 otherwise 
0.300 ? 
*Respondents’ age is considered when deciding which minimum wage rate is received.  
Notes: (a) The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations and these are reported for 
the continuous variables only. 
Table 3.7 Primary Data Variable Descriptions 
 
b) Does the minimum wage affect the non-wage benefits of migrant workers? 
This part of the second research question (question 2b) is particularly important, as it will 
constitute the study’s original contribution to the literature by examining whether the 
receipt of minimum wage affects migrants’ likelihood of receiving non-wage benefits. 
Logistic regression is used, with the main focus on minimum wage as independent variable 
and particular non-wage benefit as the dependent variable. Logistic regression is chosen 
because the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable with only two categories. 
Regression analysis is used to determine the causal relationship between variables. 
 
The regression is formed on the basis of the hypothesis that the minimum wage affects 
migrants’ likelihood of receiving non-wage benefits. Previous studies by Wessels (1980), 
Leighton and Mincer (1981), Hashimoto (1982), Royalty (2000) and Simon and Kaestner 
(2004) on the minimum wage’s effect on non-wage benefits drive the formation of the 
regression. The technique of logistic regression may differ from the techniques used in 
these previous studies. One reason for this is that the types of data analysed are dissimilar. 
The primary data used in this study is cross-sectional, and so only techniques that fit this 
type of data can be used. For example, cross-sectional data cannot be used to analyse the 
minimum wage’s effect across different periods of time; it can only be used to analyse the 
minimum wage’s effect at a particular point in time. 
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As this study is interested in testing the minimum wage’s effect on each non-wage benefit, 
a logistic regression equation has been specified for each of the non-wage benefits where 
the dependent variables are dummies (i.e. equal to 1 if a certain non-wage benefit is 
received, and to 0 otherwise). The model also includes control variables such as age, 
gender, and minimum wage sector (equal to 1 if respondent is in minimum wage 
sector/industry, and to 0 otherwise). Minimum wage sectors include restaurant/bar, 
retail/shop/supermarket, domestic work, cleaning, care, construction, hotel, factory work, 
and sales. Non-minimum wage sectors include teaching, administration, and other sectors 
not mentioned above. A control variable for student legal status is also included as students 
represent a third of the sample. The limitation of the logistic regressions is acknowledged 
that they might contain endogeneity as the non-wage benefits and minimum wage might be 
jointly determined. Hausman Specification test for endogeneity is performed (see Section 
5.2 for the test results).  
 
The dependent variables for Training, Meals, Accommodation/Housing, Holiday Pay, Paid 
Sick Leave, Health/Life Insurance, Pension Scheme, Bonuses from Work (as an 
approximation for Incentive Pay) are selected in view of the most significant non-wage 
benefits received by the respondents in the sample as well as the ones recorded in the 
secondary data sets utilised in Chapter 4.  
 
Dependent variable = Training (1 = if on-the-job training is received, 0 = 
otherwise)  
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender + b4 Minimum 
Wage sector + b5 Student 
 
 Dependent variable = Meals (1 = if meals at work are received, 0 = otherwise) 
  ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender + b4 Minimum  
         Wage sector + b5 Student 
  
Dependent variable = Accommodation/Housing (1 = if accommodation/ housing 
from work is received, 0 = otherwise)      
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender + b4 Minimum 
Wage sector + b5 Student  
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Dependent variable = Holiday Pay (1 = if holiday pay from work is received, 0 = 
otherwise)   
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender + b4 Minimum 
Wage sector + b5 Student 
  
Dependent variable = Paid Sick Leave (1 = if paid sick leave from work is 
received, 0 = otherwise)     
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender + b4 Minimum 
Wage sector + b5 Student 
 
Dependent variable = Health/Life Insurance from Work (1 = if health/life insurance 
from work is received, 0 = otherwise)    
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender + b4 Minimum 
Wage sector + b5 Student  
 
Dependent variable = Pension Scheme (1 = if pension scheme from work is 
offered, 0 = otherwise)    
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender + b4 Minimum 
Wage sector + b5 Student 
 
Dependent variable = Bonuses from Work (1 = if bonuses from work are received, 
0 = otherwise)    
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender + b4 Minimum 
Wage sector + b5 Student 
    
 
The above regression should be read as:  
 
Whether [the minimum wage, age, gender, work in minimum wage sector and 
student status] affect the likelihood of receiving [particular non-wage benefits].  
 
This research is also interested in variations in the non-wage benefits received across 
sectors, including whether there is an association between non-wage benefits and the 
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specific sectors where migrants tend to work. Pearson’s chi-square coefficient is used to 
examine the association (correlation) between non-wage benefits and sectors. 
 
Although the methodology is mainly quantitative, the questionnaire includes a number of 
open-ended questions which offer room for qualitative analysis, such as: 
 
Is there any benefit that you have received but which you no longer receive, or 
receive in a reduced or less frequent way? If yes, please explain. 
 
If yes [to the question above], do you know the reason why your employer does not 
provide it any more, or has reduced its value or frequency? 
 
Respondents are also free to present their concerns or arguments, in which cases I noted 
those arguments as part of the qualitative analysis. 
 
Again, the importance of the results generated in response to question 2b must be stressed, 
as these are expected to generate the study’s original research contribution on how the 
minimum wage affects the non-wage benefits of migrant workers. 
 
c) Do migrants in the low-skilled, low-paid sectors experience downgrading, and how is 
this linked to the duality of the labour market? 
The primary data is expected to produce evidence about whether the downgrading 
phenomenon suggested by Dustmann et al. (2007) exists. The data analysis also seeks 
evidence on any link between the minimum wage and labour market segmentation. 
Furthermore, it seeks evidence on the adverse effects of the minimum wage, in light of the 
suggestion that the minimum wage further drives the creation of secondary jobs, following 
Wessels (1980) on temporary and flexibilised work. 
 
This research is also interested in finding particular evidence on undocumented workers, 
following the work of McKay et al. (2011). It seeks evidence on the link between the 
minimum wage and migration status, as well as on the link between the minimum wage 
and the non-wage benefits of undocumented migrants. 
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To summarise, this study implements relevant statistical (quantitative) techniques to 
analyse the primary data. To address research question 2a, logistic regression is used to 
examine which factors affect migrants’ likelihood of earning the minimum wage or below. 
To address research question 2b, logistic regression, Pearson’s chi-square coefficient and 
the qualitative analysis of a number of interviews responses are used. Logistic regression is 
used to examine whether migrants’ minimum wage affects their likelihood of receiving 
non-wage benefits. Pearson’s chi-square coefficient is used to understand the association 
between non-wage benefits and particular low-paid sectors. Qualitative analysis is used to 
investigate migrants’ experiences in low-paid, low-skilled jobs, and particularly the non-
wage benefits they receive. To address research question 2c, descriptive statistics and a 
number of qualitative interviews are used in an attempt to link the minimum wage, labour 
market segmentation and the phenomenon of downgrading. I used SPSS statistics software 
to run the logistic regression and Pearson’s chi-square coefficient, and to produce the 
descriptive statistics. I used Microsoft Excel for data tabulation, data labelling and data 
sorting. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
This thesis uses positivist-quantitative methods to answer its research questions. The 
methodology mainly draws on statistics and econometric elaborations to explain social 
phenomena. Each research question has its own method of research and analysis.  
 
The first research question, on the minimum wage’s impact on non-wage benefits, working 
hours and working arrangements, is addressed using secondary research from three major 
public surveys in the UK: ASHE, WERS and the LFS. This thesis thus follows previous 
minimum-wage studies that utilise public surveys as part of their quantitative 
methodology, in particular Leighton and Mincer (1981), Hashimoto (1982), Lazear and 
Miller (1981), Simon and Kaestner (2004), Dustmann et al. (2007), Dickerson (2007) and 
Dickens et al. (2009). The method used to analyse the secondary data is DID, an 
econometric technique to analyse the effects of policy changes on affected and unaffected 
groups at two different times. DID is widely used in studies on the impact of the minimum 
wage, such as in the work of Card and Krueger (1994), Stewart (2003, 2004), 
Arulampalam et al. (2004) and Dickerson (2007). 
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The answer to the first research question is expected to make a contribution to the 
minimum-wage literature by testing the minimum wage’s impact on a wide range of non-
wage benefits, and by testing whether the minimum wage has any impact on the non-wage 
benefits of migrant workers. It is also expected to present evidence on the minimum 
wage’s adverse effects on non-wage benefits, working hours and working arrangements, 
following the work of Wessels (1980). Wessels points out that the minimum wage creates 
changes in the work environment, including the ability to lay off workers more readily 
when demand for output falls, which results in job instability (Wessels, 1980: 6). Evidence 
about the temporary and flexibilised nature of work is also anticipated, which will help to 
establish whether the minimum wage can be linked to the creation of secondary jobs. 
 
The second research question investigates how the minimum wage differently affects 
migrant workers. The primary research is designed to answer this research question. This 
research involved a face-to-face survey using questionnaires as a quantitative method. The 
target sample is 200 London-based migrant workers who work in low-paid, low-skilled 
sectors, such as the retail/shop/supermarket, sales, domestic-work, cleaning, care (elderly 
care/childcare), construction, hotel, restaurant/bar and factory sectors. This primary 
research follows previous minimum-wage studies by Card and Krueger (1994) and Allison 
et al. (2009), which utilise surveys as their method of primary research. It also follows 
previous migration studies by Markova and Black (2007) and McKay et al. (2011) on the 
design of surveys (questionnaires) for primary research purposes. 
  
There are three subquestions on the minimum wage’s effects on migration. The first seeks 
to investigate the factors that affect migrants’ likelihood of earning the minimum wage or 
below. To address this question, logistic regression is used to explain why some migrants 
earn the minimum wage or below while others earn above the minimum wage. The design 
of the regression follows previous work by Chiswick (1978) and Chiswick and Miller 
(1998) on the link between human capital and migrant performance. This part of the study 
will reveal whether human capital can explain why migrants earn the minimum wage or 
below. To some extent it will also reveal why the phenomenon of downgrading exists. 
 
The second subquestion seeks to investigate the minimum wage’s effect on migrants’ 
likelihood of receiving non-wage benefits. This part of the study is particularly important, 
as the evidence will constitute the original contribution of the thesis. Logistic regression is 
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used to test each of the non-wage benefits as a dependent variable, with the minimum wage 
as the independent variable. The primary research also provides data from a number of 
qualitative interview responses (to the open-ended questions in the questionnaire), which 
will help to establish whether there is any relationship between the minimum wage and the 
non-wage benefits of migrant workers. 
 
The third subquestion concerns the extent to which the minimum wage affects migrant 
workers in secondary-segment jobs. It is expected that the primary data will reveal whether 
the phenomenon of downgrading exists, following the work of Dustmann et al. (2007). It is 
also expected to reveal any link between the minimum wage and the duality of the labour 
market. This part of the study uses descriptive statistics, Pearson’s chi-square coefficient 
and the qualitative analysis of a number of qualitative interview questions to examine the 
downgrading phenomenon and the duality of the labour market. 
 
The third research question will be addressed in the final chapter of the thesis, which will 
present the implication of the findings for National Minimum Wage policy. It will offer 
evidence-based recommendations to improve the policy.  
 
To conclude this chapter, positivist-quantitative methodology is deemed to be adequate to 
enable the thesis to answer the research questions and make an original contribution by 
filling the gap in the minimum-wage literature. Only a few studies have been done in the 
UK to investigate the minimum wage’s impact on non-wage benefits. Very few studies 
have been done to examine the minimum wage’s impact on migration. Thanks to its 
positivist-quantitative methodology, this study might be the first of its kind to examine the 
minimum wage’s impact on the non-wage benefits of migrants in the UK.  
 
The next two chapters discuss the results of the secondary and primary research, starting 
with the secondary research analysis in Chapter 4, followed by the primary research 
analysis in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 4  
Secondary Research Analysis 
 
Employers may react to a minimum wage by reducing expenditures on fringe 
benefits, on training workers, and on providing pleasant working conditions. They 
may make workers work harder and make them come to work during hours of 
greater convenience for employers than for the workers themselves. They may also 
lay off workers more readily when business conditions worsen. 
(Wessels, 1980: 2) 
 
Wessels’ (1980) sharp argument above more or less sets out this thesis’ expectations of its 
secondary research findings. The secondary research presented in this chapter seeks to 
investigate the first research question, on whether the minimum wage has an impact on 
working hours, working arrangements and particularly non-wage benefits. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, this thesis’ methodology is positivist and quantitative, and it uses 
three public surveys in the UK as secondary data: the Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings (ASHE), the Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS) and the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS). This study follows previous studies on the minimum wage that also 
use ASHE, WERS and the LFS as datasets.
1
 In total, the secondary data uses eight datasets 
from the three main surveys. 
 
The method of analysing the secondary data is Difference-in-Difference (DID), an 
econometric technique to detect the effect of policy changes (Meyer, 1995). This follows 
earlier studies on the minimum wage which use DID as the method of analysis.
2
 The DID 
technique used in this research is similar to that presented in Card and Krueger (1995). 
 
The secondary research addresses several hypotheses to be tested in the analysis. The first 
is that the minimum wage has negative effects on non-wage benefits, following the work 
                                               
1
 See Low Pay Commission (2011), Dustman et al. (2007), Dickens et al. (2009), Draca et 
al. (2008) and Forth and Millward (2001). 
 
2
 See Card and Krueger (1994, 1995), Stewart (2003, 2004), Dickens and Draca (2005), 
Arulampalam et al. (2004) and Dickerson (2007).  
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of Wessels (1980), Leighton and Mincer (1981) and Hashimoto (1982). However, the 
findings show modest evidence that the minimum wage has adverse impacts on non-wage 
benefits. This confirms several studies in the UK which also show that the minimum wage 
has no effect on non-wage benefits: Dickerson (2007) finds no impact on training; Allison 
et al. (2009) find almost no effect on non-wage benefits. This study tests the minimum 
wage’s effect on a wide range of non-wage benefits, but only a few of the results appear to 
be significant.  
 
Second is the hypothesis that the minimum wage has negative effects on working hours, 
following the work of Wessels (1980), Stewart and Swaffield (2004) and Dickens et al. 
(2009). The evidence in this thesis shows that the minimum wage negatively affects 
working hours particularly on the overtime hours while the evidence for basic hours is 
mixed across different datasets. 
 
Third is the hypothesis that the minimum wage has a negative impact on working 
arrangements. Wessels (1980) argues that the minimum wage reduces workers’ utility and 
pushes them to work harder and with extra effort. Wessels (1980) also argues that the 
minimum wage is linked to a decline in job stability, because employers may lay off 
workers according to demand. The findings of this thesis show little evidence that the 
minimum wage adversely affects working arrangements. There is, however, some evidence 
of the minimum wage’s impact on migrant workers that may link the minimum wage to 
temporary and flexibilised jobs. 
 
Through the secondary research, this thesis aims to make an original contribution that 
addresses a gap in the literature. There is a paucity of UK literature that addresses the 
minimum wage’s effects on various non-wage benefits. The thesis therefore aims to make 
an original contribution by testing the minimum wage’s impact on the non-wage benefits 
of migrant workers: the findings show little evidence that the minimum wage adversely 
affects the non-wage benefits of migrants. The thesis also seeks to make an original 
contribution by testing a wide range of non-wage benefits that appear not to have been 
tested before: these findings show modest evidence that the minimum wage has a negative 
impact on non-wage benefits. Minimum wage has adverse effect only on additional pay, 
while on other non-wage benefits; it actually shows positive effects. 
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This chapter starts by presenting the results of the DID estimations. The analysis of the 
results is presented in Section 4.2. The analysis will discuss the evidence in relation to the 
research questions, whether the evidence supports or disproves the hypotheses, and how 
the analysis can be taken further. 
 
4.1. Secondary Research Findings: DID Results 
In order to analyse the secondary data, this thesis implements the DID technique. The 
function of DID is to explain the impact of policy changes, including changes in the 
minimum wage (the increase in the minimum wage over time). DID works by comparing 
two different groups (the treatment group and the control group) at two different times. In 
order to detect the effect of the minimum wage, DID requires the formation of a treatment 
group and a control group. The treatment group is defined as the group of workers who 
earn the National Minimum Wage or below; the control group is therefore the group of 
workers who earn above the National Minimum Wage. The DID estimation is then formed 
to detect any outcome (effect) of the minimum wage. The general DID estimation is as 
follows: 
 
Outcomet,i =  â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i  (Equation 4) 
 
where Tt is a time dummy (1 for period A, 0 for period B), Gi is a group dummy (1 for the 
treatment group, 0 for the control group), Tt*Gi is the interaction between the time dummy 
and the group dummy, and Outcomet,i is the expected outcome of the minimum wage at 
time t for group i. 
 
The DID estimation (â3) should be read as:  
 
What is the impact of the minimum wage on [outcome] from [year A] to [year B]? 
 
A central assumption of the DID model relates to parallel trends in the treatment and the 
control group. An important concern here is that the treatment group has potentially been 
affected by the influx of migrant workers in the last decade – an event that challenges the 
validity of the assumption for the current application. 
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It should be noted here that endogeneity issues naturally emerge between the minimum 
wage and variables such as hourly wages, overtime pay and working hours. 
 
The ASHE and LFS analysis presents a comparison over a shorter and longer time period. 
The shorter period is taken as difference within one year, simply to generate an immediate 
effect (year t+1) of the rise in the minimum wage. It is not unusual in minimum-wage 
studies to generate the minimum wage’s effect over a very short time period. Card and 
Krueger (1994), for instance, investigate the effect of the 1992 New Jersey minimum wage 
(introduced in April 1992) by detecting the effects two or three months before the change 
(February – March 1992) and comparing them to seven or eight months after the change 
(November – December 1992). Allison et al. (2009) examine the effect of the UK National 
Minimum Wage rise from 2007 to 2008 (a one-year period only). The longer time period, 
on the other hand, covers the minimum wage’s effect across a span of 10 years or more. 
 
This section will present the findings, i.e. the results of the DID estimation, from each 
dataset. The subsections will make an extensive statistical presentation of the DID results. 
The analysis of the findings is presented in Section 4.2 below. The DID estimation was run 
using Stata statistical software; all of the Stata results are presented in Appendix 5.  
 
Note: this work contains statistical data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
which is Crown Copyright. The use of the ONS statistical data in this work does not imply 
the endorsement of the ONS in relation to the interpretation or analysis of the statistical 
data. This work uses research datasets which may not exactly reproduce National Statistics 
aggregates. 
 
4.1.1. ASHE, 2009 and 2010 
The DID results from the first dataset are presented in Table 4.1. To read the table (this 
applies to all DID results tables):  
- The Outcome column shows the effect of the minimum wage. The outcome is 
shown by variable name. The description of variables is presented in Chapter 3 
(Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6). 
- The DID column shows the DID estimation (â3), that is whether the impact (of the 
minimum wage) exists on specific outcome.  
- Any significant impact on outcome is asterisked. 
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- This thesis uses 90% (p<0.1), 95% (p<0.05) and 99% (p<0.01) confidence levels. 
The significance of the results is tested by the p-value [p]; if p<0.1, the result is 
statistically significant at a 90% confidence level.  
 
Outcome 
(Average) 
Minimum Wage Above Minimum Wage DID 
2009 2010 2009 2010 
Hourlywage (£)
1 
5.314745 5.409361 13.11083 13.27875 -0.073304 
Bpay (£) 136.3789 137.4675 431.9682 435.9364 -2.8796 
Bhr (hrs) 26.09893 25.83484 32.1614 32.11783 -0.22052 
Ipayin (£) 9.112907 11.44016 5.844045 5.953103 2.218195** 
Spay (£) 0.889796 0.875611 5.329218 5.450441 -0.1354076 
Anipay (£) 517.1528 490.8065 1441.917 1409.484 6.0867 
Ownpay (£) 0.569235 0.836853 14.56326 14.89255 -0.0616721 
Compay (£) 1.906814 2.320928 37.98982 38.69847 -0.294536 
Ownperc  4.738024 5.308296 5.058301 5.14855 0.480023** 
Comperc  16.53584 16.16782 13.5155 13.52097 -0.37349 
Ovhrs (hrs) 0.882431 0.861212 1.054124 1.147075 -0.1141697** 
Ovpay (£) 6.021841 6.047095 13.70205 14.69127 -0.963966 
Othpay (£) 2.567516 2.101894 11.05926 11.17308 -0.579442 
Source: Office for National Statistics (ONS). 
1
The wages have not been adjusted for inflation. 
**Significant at p<0.05. 
Table 4.1 DID Results for ASHE, 2009 and 2010 
 
Table 4.1. shows three significant outcomes from the first dataset. The results should be 
read as follows: 
 
Incentive Pay 
 
The increase in the incentive pay between 1997 and 2010 is £2.22 more in the treatment 
group. There is a substantial positive impact of the minimum wage as the percentage 
increase of the incentive pay in the minimum wage group is 25.54% compared to the  
incentive pay increase of 1.87% for the control group. Minimum wage, therefore, increases 
the incentive pay by 23.67 percentage points. 
 
Employees’ contributions to pensions 
 
The increase of employee’s share of pension contributions is 48 percentage points more in 
the treatment than the control group. There is a negative impact of the minimum wage as 
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the percentage increase in the treatment group is 12.04% compared to just 1.78% for the 
control group. Minimum wage, therefore, increases the percentage of employee 
contributions to pensions by 10.25 percentage points. 
 
Overtime hours 
 
There is a decrease in the average weekly paid overtime hours in the minimum wage group 
but an increase in the control group. The absolute increase in the average weekly overtime 
hours between 1997 and 2010 is 0.11 hours less in the treatment than the control group. 
 
The percentage decrease in the treatment group is 2.40% compared to 8.82% of increase in 
the control group. Thus, the minimum wage has a fairly negative effect of 11.22 
percentage points on the weekly overtime hours of the minimum wage group. 
 
4.1.2. ASHE, 1997 and 2010 
The DID results for the second dataset are presented in Table 4.2.  
 
Outcome 
(Mean) 
Minimum Wage Above Minimum Wage DID 
1997 2010 1997 2010 
Hourly wage (£) 2.937196 5.409361 8.495907 13.27875 -2.310678*** 
Bpay (£) 81.07085 137.4675 290.4293 435.9364 -89.11045*** 
Bhr (hrs) 27.70141 25.83484 33.798 32.11783 -0.1864 
Ovhrs (hrs) 1.568491 0.861212 2.076526 1.147075 0.2221721*** 
Ovpay (£) 7.272167 6.047095 17.71825 14.69127 1.801908*** 
Source: ONS. 
***Significant at p<0.01. 
Table 4.2 DID Results for ASHE, 1997 and 2010 
 
Four outcomes are significant from the second dataset. The interpretation of the results is 
as follows: 
 
Hourly wages 
 
The increase in the hourly wage between 1997 and 2010 is £2.31 less in the treatment than 
the control group.  
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Nevertheless, there is a fairly positive impact of the minimum wage as the percentage 
increase of the nominal wage in the minimum wage group is 84.17% compared to an 
hourly wage increase of 56.30% for the control group. The minimum wage thus increases 
the hourly wage by 27.87 percentage points.  
 
Basic weekly earnings 
 
The minimum wage has slowed down the increase in the basic weekly earnings of the 
minimum wage group by £89.11 in the period 1997 and 2010.    
 
Nonetheless, the percentage increase in the basic weekly earnings in the treatment group is 
69.56% compared to 50.10% in the control group. Thus, the minimum wage has a fairly 
positive impact on the basic weekly earnings by 19.46 percentage points. 
 
Overtime hours 
 
The decrease in the average weekly paid overtime hours is 0.22 hours more in the 
treatment than the control group.  
 
The percentage decrease in the weekly overtime hours in the treatment group is 45.09% 
compared to 44.76% decrease for the control group. Therefore, the minimum wage has a 
slightly negative effect on the average weekly paid overtime hours of the minimum wage 
group by 0.33 percentage points. 
 
Overtime pay 
 
The minimum wage has a slightly more favourable effect on the reduction of overtime pay  
in the minimum wage group compared to the control group, 16.85% and 17.08% 
respectively (i.e., 0.23 percentage points). 
 
 
4.1.3. WERS Cross-Section of Employees, 1998 and 2004 
The DID results for the third dataset are presented in Table 4.3.  
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Outcome 
(Mean) 
Minimum Wage Above Minimum Wage   DID 
1998 2004 1998 2004 
Hourlywage (£) 2.914069 4.015426 8.027295 11.70391 -2.575258*** 
Hoursperweek 
(hrs) 
36.00321 33.29618 37.31001 36.38826 -1.78528*** 
Overtimehrs (hrs) 4.050026 3.508763 4.151488 3.605723 0.004502 
Basichrs (hrs) 32.10771 28.89435 33.28457 32.38928 -2.31807*** 
Flexitime  0.06441 0.4612701 0.1102185 0.4839439 0.0231347 
Jobshare  0.110954 0.318107 0.1849324 0.3151064 0.0769793*** 
Parental  0.212976 0.1334604 0.2895734 0.2005179 0.0095399 
Workhome  0.015985 0.059312 0.1223309 0.1775356 -0.0118777 
Nursery  0.025858 0.0769231 0.0408741 0.1013329 -0.0093937 
Source: ONS. 
***Significant at p<0.01. 
Table 4.3 DID Results for WERS Cross-Section of Employees, 1998 and 2004 
 
Four outcomes are significant from the third dataset. These are: 
 
Hourly wages  
 
The absolute increase in the hourly wage between 1998 (before the minimum wage was 
introduced) and 2010 (after the minimum wage was introduced) is £2.58 less in the 
treatment than the control group. There is a fairly negative impact of the minimum wage as 
the percentage increase in the nominal wage in the minimum wage group over this time 
period is 37.79% compared to an hourly wage increase of 45.80% for the control group. 
Minimum wage thus has a fairly negative effect on the hourly wage by 8.01 percentage 
points.  
 
Weekly working hours 
 
The absolute decrease in the total hours of work per week is 1.79 hours more in the 
treatment than the control group. The percentage decrease in the total weekly hours of 
work in the treatment group is 7.52% compared to 2.47% decrease in the control group. 
Therefore, the minimum wage has a fairly negative effect on the total hours of work per 
week by 5.05 percentage points.  
 
Basic hours per week 
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The absolute decrease in the basic hours per week is 2.32 hours more in the treatment than 
the control group between 1998 and 2004. The percentage decrease in the basic hours per 
week in the treatment group is 10.01% compared to 2.69% in the control group. Therefore, 
the minimum wage has a substantial negative effect on the basic hours per week by 7.32 
percentage points.  
 
Job sharing 
 
The increase in the proportion of job sharing available is 7.7 percentage points more in the 
treatment than the control group. The percentage increase in the treatment group is 186.70% 
compared to 70.39% increase in the control group. Thus, the minimum wage has a fairly 
positive impact, on the proportion of job sharing available to the minimum wage group 
(116.31 percentage points).  
 
4.1.4. LFS, Q1 2000 and Q1 2011  
The DID results are presented in Table 4.4. 
 
Outcome 
(Mean) 
Minimum Wage Above Minimum Wage DID 
2000 2011 2000 2011 
Cameyr (year) 36.00211 37.33356 37.85964 39.61468 -0.42359 
Conmpy (year) 4.888575 6.349239 8.246335 9.260941 0.446058 
Bushr (hour) 27.39235 30.33356 34.02773 33.54377 3.42517*** 
Ed13wk 0.194052 0.206993 0.303915 0.313073 0.0037822 
Jobtrn 0.470238 0.685393 0.461242 0.608635 0.0677621 
Tfee 0.358974 0.553192 0.66381 0.653086 0.204942*** 
Trnlen 0.169697 0.282486 0.377148 0.53464 -0.0447029 
Netwk (£) 83.01949 148.5182 246.5605 370.4037 -58.34449*** 
Hourlypaid (£) 3.058477 5.121865 8.103821 11.98716 -1.819951*** 
Ernfilt 0.126161 0.079912 0.308715 0.208838 0.0536287*** 
Bonuses 0.169697 0.175439 0.200387 0.190373 0.0157552 
Profitrelated 0.036364 0.017544 0.065265 0.022174 0.0242709 
Londonallw 0.048485 0.026316 0.082427 0.066522 -0.0062645 
Standby 0.012121 0.026316 0.032632 0.052461 -0.0056339 
Shiftallw 0.042424 0.026316 0.1095 0.106544 -0.0131529 
Source: ONS. 
**Significant at p<0.05. 
***Significant at p<0.01. 
Table 4.4 DID Results for LFS, Q1 2000 and Q1 2011 
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Several outcomes are significant:  
 
Basic hours of work  
 
The increase in the usual basic hours of work is 3.4 hours more in the treatment group than 
the control group, for the period between 2000 and 2011. The corresponding percentage 
increase is 10.74% in the minimum wage group while the control group experiences a 
minor decrease of 1.42%, generating a positive impact of the minimum wage on the usual 
basic hours of work (12.16 percentage points). 
 
Provision of training 
 
Between 2000 and 2011, the provision of training by employers had increased in the 
treatment group by 54.10% while it had decreased in the control group by 1.62%, 
generating a fairly positive impact of the minimum wage (55.72 percentage points).  
 
Weekly earnings 
 
The absolute increase in the net weekly earnings is £58.34 less in treatment than in the 
control group. Nevertheless, the corresponding percentage increase is 78.90% in the 
treatment group compared to 50.23% in the control group. The minimum wage, therefore, 
positively affects the net weekly earnings of the minimum wage group ( 28.67 percentage 
points). 
 
Hourly payment 
 
The minimum wage group experiences a reduction of £1.82 hourly earnings compared 
with above-the-minimum-wage group. However, those in the minimum wage group 
experience 67.46% increase in their hourly wages compared with above-the-minimum-
wage workers; their increase is 47.92%. Therefore, the minimum wage appears to have a 
positive impact on the hourly payment of the treatment group (19.54 percentage points). 
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Additional Pay (including bonuses) 
 
Less minimum wage workers (5.36 percentage points) receive additional pay compared 
with those earning above the minimum wage.  
 
The percentage decrease in the proportion of workers who receive additional pay is 
36.66% in the treatment group compared with 32.35% in the control group. Thus, the 
minimum wage has a slightly more negative impact on the additional pay of the minimum 
wage workers (4.31 percentage points). 
 
4.1. Secondary Data Analysis 
 
This section focuses on the discussion and analysis of the DID results presented in Section 
4.1. A summary of the results from the secondary data is given in Table 4.5. The 
subsections discuss the minimum wage’s impact on particular outcomes. 
 
 
Outcome DID 
 
Effect  
(in percentage 
points) 
Dataset 
Hours 
Paid weekly overtime 
hours 
-0.11 hours ↓11.22 ASHE, 2009–2010 
Paid weekly overtime 
hours 
0.22 hours ↓0.33 ASHE, 1997–2010 
Weekly total hours of 
work 
-1.79 hours ↓5.05 WERS, 1998–2004  
Weekly basic hours of 
work 
-2.32 hours ↓7.32 WERS, 1998–2004  
Usual hours of work 3.4 hours ↑12.16 LFS, Q1 2000–2011 
Earnings 
Hourly wage -£2.31  ↑ 27.87 ASHE, 1997–2010 
Basic weekly earnings -£89.11  ↑ 19.46 ASHE, 1997–2010 
Hourly wage -£2.58 ↓8.01 WERS, 1998–2004  
Hourly wage -£1.82  ↑19.54 LFS, Q1 2000–2011 
Net weekly earnings -£58.34   ↑28.67 LFS, Q1 2000–2011 
Non-wage benefits 
Incentive pay £2.22 ↑23.67 ASHE, 2009–2010 
Employee’s % 
contribution to pension 
48 percentage 
points 
↑10.25 ASHE, 2009–2010 
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Source: ONS. 
*Not minimum-wage effect but ethnicity effect. 
Table 4.5 Summary of Secondary Data Findings 
 
4.2.1. The National Minimum Wage’s Impact on Working Hours 
A negative impact of the National Minimum Wage on working hours was expected, 
following the evidence from Dickens et al. (2009), which suggests that an increase in the 
minimum wage that is not compensated by an increase in productivity will lead to a 
reduction in working hours. The findings of this thesis, however, show mixed results in 
relation to working hours. In LFS testing for 2000 to 2011, the increase in the minimum 
wage leads to an increase in hours of work by approximately three hours per week (an 
increase of 12 percentage points).  
 
However, using the ASHE and WERS datasets, the minimum wage shows some other 
negative effects. In the WERS survey with employees for 1998 to 2004, the minimum 
wage reduces the weekly total hours of work and basic hours of work by 1.79 and 2.32 
hours respectively, generating negative effects in the range of 5 to 7 percentage points. 
Overtime hours are also reduced by 0.11 hour per week or 11.22 percentage points in 
ASHE 2009 to 2010. The long-span ASHE has a smaller reduction of 0.33 percentage 
points in the overtime hours. These mixed results are interesting as they indicate that over 
longer period of time, the minimum wage tends to have a more positive effect, while in 
shorter periods the effects tends to be more negative. This may be because, over shorter 
periods, employers have little choice about taking urgent measures to reduce costs. This is 
also connected with unanticipated business fluctuations, during which employers demand 
more flexibility (in working hours) from workers. Wessels’ (1980) argument may also able 
to explain the short-term impact on working hours: employers may ask workers to come to 
Weekly overtime pay £1.8 ↑0.24 ASHE, 1997–2010 
Training paid for by 
employers 
20.49 
percentage 
points 
↑55.72 LFS, Q1 2000–2011 
Additional pay (on top 
of basic pay) 
5.36 
percentage 
points 
↓4.31 LFS, Q1 2000–2011 
Working arrangements 
Job-sharing availability 7.7 
percentage 
points 
↑116.31 WERS, 1998–2004  
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work at times that are more convenient and more profitable for employers, as a result of 
minimum-wage pressure on business stability. In longer term, the minimum wage affects 
working hours more positively. There are many possible explanations for this positive 
relationship in the long run, such as changes in macroeconomic circumstances. Further 
investigation is needed to test such possibilities. 
 
4.2.2. The National Minimum Wage’s Impact on Earnings 
This thesis investigates the impact of the minimum wage on earnings. It follows Wessels’ 
(1980) argument that the minimum wage leads to reductions in money wages. Wessels’ 
definition of money wages includes non-wage pay (such as commission or bonuses); 
however, this subsection discusses the impact on earnings only in terms of wages (basic 
earnings). The results show that minimum wage has a fairly positive impact on earnings. 
This result is found across AHSE and LFS surveys with a significant percentage increase. 
ASHE 1997–2010 yields an increase of 19.46 and 27.87 percentage points for weekly and 
hourly earnings respectively, while LFS 2000–2011 yields an increase of 28.67 and 19.54 
percentage points for weekly and hourly earnings 
 
The only negative effect of the minimum wage on earnings is derived from the WERS 
survey (8.01 percentage points). This effect, nevertheless, is smaller compared with ASHE 
and LFS datasets. 
 
4.2.3. The National Minimum Wage’s Impact on Non-Wage Benefits 
An adverse effect of the National Minimum Wage on non-wage benefits was anticipated. 
Evidence of any such adverse effect, however, is modest. Overall the evidence shows 
significant effects only on training, pensions, incentive pay, bonuses and overtime pay. 
There is no evidence on other non-wage benefits. 
 
Training  
It was expected that the minimum wage would be found to reduce training provision, as 
suggested by Leighton and Mincer (1981) and Hashimoto (1982). The results show that the 
National Minimum Wage only significantly affects one variable: the proportion of training 
paid for by employers. LFS data for 2000 to 2011 shows the proportion of training paid for 
by employers is 20.49 percentage points more in the treatment group (compared to the 
control group), which suggests the minimum wage is likely to have a more positive effect 
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on training (55.72 percentage points). This may be due to an increase in the use of general 
on-the-job training to which employers contribute (some of) the cost (Becker, 1964). A 
reduction in training as a negative effect of the minimum wage, however, is not evident in 
this secondary data.  
 
Pensions  
It was expected that the minimum wage would be found to reduce pension provision, as 
suggested by Royalty (2000). The findings show that the National Minimum Wage 
increases employees’ share of contributions to pensions. The ASHE data for 2009–2010 
shows that the employees’ share of contributions to pensions is 48 percentage points more 
in the minimum wage group compared to the above- minimum- wage group. This indicates 
a slightly negative result, as it suggests that it is the employees themselves (rather than the 
employers) who have to pay for their pensions. 
 
Incentive Pay, Additional Pay and Overtime Pay 
Following the work of Wessels (1980), it was expected that the minimum wage would be 
found to reduce non-wage earnings. Section 4.2.2 shows the overall positive effects on 
basic earnings and similar findings are found on other-than-basic earnings. The ASHE data 
shows that the incentive weekly pay is £2.22 (23.67 percentage points) more in the 
minimum wage group compared to the control group. Similarly, there is an increase of 
£1.80 (0.24 percentage points) in the minimum wage group compared to above-the- 
minimum-wage.  
 
The proportion of workers who receive additional pay, however, is reduced. According to 
the LFS data, the minimum wage is likely to have a more negative effect on the receipt of 
bonuses by minimum wage workers (4.31 percentage points). Additional pay includes 
bonuses, profit-related pay, the London allowance, regional allowances, shift allowances, 
unsociable-hours pay, and stand-by or on-call allowances, among others.  
 
The evidence suggests that the National Minimum Wage has an overall positive effect on 
basic earnings, incentive pay and overtime pay. The only reduction is in the proportion of 
workers who receive additional pay. In summary, there is little evidence to suggest that has 
minimum wage has adverse effects on the basic or other-than-basic earnings. Regarding 
the additional pay, nevertheless, the negative effect might reflect a connection between the 
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minimum wage and demands on workers for temporary and flexible work, as suggested by 
Wessels (1980). At least four components (out of 10) of additional pay are indicative of a 
demand for temporary/flexible work: payment for working unsociable hours, shift pay, 
overtime pay, and stand-by or on-call allowances. However, this indication is not 
confirmed when each of these components of additional pay is tested. Further investigation 
is therefore needed to confirm the argument. 
 
4.2.4. The National Minimum Wage’s Impact on Working Arrangements 
This study sought evidence that the minimum wage is linked to a demand for flexible and 
temporary workers, as suggested by Wessels (1980).  
 
Job-sharing availability 
Minimum wage workers appear to be more likely to have access to job sharing compared 
with those who are earning above the minimumm wage (this is evident from the WERS 
data set). This might reflect flexibility in working arrangements in a positive way, as job-
sharing is understood to be to the advantage of employees, and not of employers as 
Wessels (1980) suggests.  
 
4.2. Conclusion 
The aim of the secondary research was to investigate the first research question on whether 
the minimum wage has an impact on working hours, working arrangements, and especially 
non-wage benefits. 
 
The analysis of the secondary data has revealed that the minimum wage has an impact on 
only some non-wage benefits. The evidence suggests that the minimum wage increases the 
proportion of training that is paid for by employers; increases the proportion of employees’ 
pension contributions; increases weekly overtime pay; and increases incentive pay. The 
minimum wage adverse effect on non-wage benefits is only evident on (the reduction of) 
additional pay.  
 
Overall, there is insufficient evidence to confirm the hypothesis that the minimum wage 
reduces non-wage benefits.  The analysis has found that the minimum wage has some 
impact only on training, pensions provision, overtime pay, incentive pay and additional 
pay. No evidence has been found in relation to other non-wage benefits.  
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Nonetheless, the findings in relation to working hours confirm that the minimum wage has 
some adverse impact on the overtime hours; although for usual hours of work conflicting 
evidence appears across different datasets.  
 
The evidence on working arrangements shows that the minimum wage has a significant 
effect on the availability of job-sharing. The minimum wage increases the availability of 
job-sharing; however, there is insufficient evidence to show that job-sharing is connected 
to the temporary and flexible nature of secondary-segment jobs.  
 
To sum up, the secondary research analysis has provided an extensive investigation of the 
first research question, which sought to examine the minimum wage’s effects on non-wage 
benefits, working hours and working arrangements. The hypotheses to some extent have 
been confirmed in relation to the impact on working hours. It has been found that the 
minimum wage had an adverse effect on working hours, ultimately the overtime hours. 
However, the analysis found only modest evidence to confirm that the minimum wage 
adversely affects non-wage benefits. A wide range of non-wage benefits were tested, but 
only very few appear to be significant. Among these, only additional pay that was 
adversely affected by the minimum wage.  
 
Findings from the secondary research thus present modest evidence in relation to the 
minimum wage’s effects on non-wage benefits. The next chapter presents the primary 
research, which may yield interesting findings in relation to the minimum wage’s 
connection with the non-wage benefits of migrant workers. 
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Chapter 5 
Primary Research Analysis 
 
They never give you minimum wage, they never give holiday pay. There are five 
staffs in the kitchen and four waiters. Chef who controls the kitchen is too much 
rude; boss is also rude blaming staff without any reason. Boss says bad words, if 
boss do something wrong, boss will throw it to us [the staff]. When we want to 
break our fasting [i.e. for Ramadan, at around 8.50pm], the restaurant is in a busy 
environment, we never get chance to break our fast, boss does not allow us, even 
after we ask for it. 
 
This excerpt from an interview with a Bangladeshi restaurant worker illustrates the types 
of insight provided by the qualitative questions in the primary research. The primary 
research aims to answer the second research question on how the minimum wage 
differently affects migrant workers; it is therefore primarily designed to capture the reality 
of migrants in low-paid, low-skilled jobs. The hypothesis is that the minimum wage does 
affect migrants differently, and in particular that it affects migrants’ likelihood of receiving 
non-wage benefits.  
 
Four related substantive issues will be examined in this chapter. First, there are certain 
factors that might explain why migrants earn the minimum wage or below. In other words, 
certain factors are able to explain why some migrants in low-paid, low-skilled jobs earn the 
minimum wage or below, while other migrants earn above the minimum wage. Human 
capital is expected to affect migrants’ performance in the labour market (Becker, 1964; 
Mincer, 1974; Chiswick, 1978; Chiswick and Miller, 1998). However, the evidence shows 
that there are factors other than human capital that affect migrants’ likelihood of earning 
the minimum wage or below. 
 
Second, migrants to the UK have recently displayed some interesting phenomena. Recent 
migrants tend to be younger and more educated than non-migrants. Nonetheless, these 
younger and more educated migrants still earn the minimum wage or below, suffering 
downgrading (Dustmann et al., 2007). The primary research echoes the initial evidence by 
showing that migrants who work in low-paid, low-skilled jobs are skilled migrants in terms 
of their educational level, language proficiency and work experience. The majority of the 
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sample have an education above secondary level and a medium-to-fluent level of spoken 
English. Half of the sample have work experience in their home country. A third of the 
sample have experience of working in another foreign country. The phenomenon of 
downgrading is evident, as 43.5% of the sample earn the minimum wage or below. 
 
Third, it is hypothesised that the minimum wage adversely affects the non-wage benefits of 
migrants. The primary research tests to see whether the minimum wage is a significant 
predictor of migrants’ receipt of non-wage benefits. In other words, the hypothesis is that 
migrants who earn the minimum wage or below are less likely to receive non-wage 
benefits. The evidence shows that migrants who earn the minimum wage or below are less 
likely to receive some valuable non-wage benefits, such as training, holiday pay, paid sick 
leave, health/life insurance and pension schemes. However, they are more likely to receive 
meals and accommodation. . 
 
Fourth, it is hypothesised that the minimum wage to some extent drives the duality of the 
labour market, leading jobs to become temporary and flexibilised. There is a modest 
indication in the secondary research that the minimum wage may increase the demand for 
temporary/flexible working. However, the primary research shows no evidence that the 
minimum wage is connected to temporary or flexible work. 
  
This chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part primarily focuses on the factors 
that affect the likelihood of migrants receiving the minimum wage or below. As previously 
discussed, the methodology in this thesis is positivist-quantitative; hence quantitative 
techniques were used to conduct and analyse the primary research. Logistic regression is 
used to test variables that may explain why some migrants earn the minimum or below 
while others earn above the minimum. These include human capital, demographic, 
employment-related and migration-related variables. A substantial discussion is offered in 
order to analyse the minimum wage’s connections with these variables. The primary 
research also implements Pearson’s chi-square coefficient and descriptive statistics to 
extend the analysis. The first part aims to investigate which factors affect migrants’ 
minimum wage and whether human capital can explain the prevalence of migrants in low-
paid jobs. Thus the first part also aims to investigate whether the phenomenon of 
downgrading exists, and to establish the characteristics (profile) of migrants in low-paid, 
low-skilled jobs. 
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The second part mainly discusses how the minimum wage differently affects migrant 
workers, particularly in relation to migrants’ non-wage benefits. Logistic regression is used 
to test whether migrants who earn the minimum wage or below are less likely to receive 
non-wage benefits. This part extends the analysis of non-wage benefits by discussing non-
wage benefits in relation to each low-paying sector. It also includes a number of qualitative 
interviews to further explore the non-wage benefits received by migrants in low-paid, low-
skilled jobs. The importance of this part must be stressed, as this evidence is original to the 
thesis. Overall the primary research analysis is expected to produce evidence about how 
the minimum wage differently affects migrant workers, in the sense that migrants in low-
paid, low-skilled jobs might not get the statutory minimum wage or, even worse, might 
receive fewer non-wage benefits. 
 
5.1. What Factors Affect Migrant Workers’ Likelihood of Earning the Minimum 
Wage or Below? 
This section discusses factors which might significantly affect migrants’ likelihood of 
earning the minimum wage or below. In other words, it investigates why some migrants 
earn the minimum wage or below while other migrants earn above the minimum. The 
section starts by presenting the respondent profile from the questionnaires. 
 
5.1.1. The Respondent Profile 
As previously discussed, the primary research implemented a questionnaire survey of 200
1
 
London-based migrants who work in low-paid, low-skilled sectors. As noted in Chapter 3, 
the primary data collection sought to produce a purposive sample in terms of gender, skill, 
wage level (minimum wage or below, and above minimum wage), sector and legal status. 
Table 5.1 illustrates the respondent profile yielded by the primary research.  
 
In terms of gender, the sample secures a good balance of males to females: 115 (57.5%) 
males and 85 (42.5%) females. The sample also achieves a good balance in terms of the 
minimum wage. In order for a comparison between minimum-wage (or below) and above-
minimum wage workers to be possible, at least 30% of the sample had to earn the 
minimum wage or below. Minimum-wage workers were defined as workers earning at or 
below the 2011 National Minimum Wage (£4.98 per hour for 18–20-year-olds, and £6.08 
                                               
1 Two of them did not disclose their earnings. 
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per hour for workers aged 21+); above-minimum wage workers were defined as workers 
earning above the 2011 National Minimum Wage. In total there are 87 (43.5%) minimum-
wage workers and 111 (55.5%) above-minimum wage workers in the sample. Two 
respondents refused to disclose their earnings.  
 
In terms of skill, it was very challenging to find less-skilled workers, even among those 
working in low-skilled, low-paid jobs. The term ‘skill’ can be interpreted (and measured) 
in various ways. It was therefore decided to use educational level and work experience as 
measures of skill. In terms of educational level, it proved extremely difficult to have less-
educated workers in the sample. There are only 22 (11%) respondents with a below-
secondary level of education; of these, only six (3%) had no formal education. In total 
there are just 60 (30%) respondents with an educational level up to secondary level only. In 
other words, 70% of the respondents have an above-secondary level of education. 
 
When work experience is used as the measure of skill, the representation of less-
experienced workers in the sample is better. There were two questions in the questionnaire 
on the respondents’ work experience. First, the questionnaire asked whether respondents 
had work experience in their home country, and second it asked whether they had 
experience of working abroad (i.e. in a country other than either the UK or their home 
country). The total number of respondents who had experience of working abroad was 68 
(34%); the number of respondents with no experience abroad was 132 (66%). There were 
107 (53.5%) respondents with work experience in their home country, and 93 (46.5%) 
respondents with no work experience in their home country. However, it might be 
inappropriate to conclude that workers with no experience at home or abroad were less 
skilled, as they might have developed their experience in the host country (UK), or they 
might have developed their educational level or other human capital factors before taking 
any employment.  
 
The sample includes respondents from a variety of low-paid, low-skilled sectors, such as 
the retail, sales, domestic-work, cleaning, care, construction, hotel/restaurant and factory 
sectors. Some sectors are more represented in the sample than others; this is because they 
are less niche or segmented, and thus relatively easier to access.  
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It was difficult to include a wide variety of migrants with different legal statuses. 
Nevertheless, there are proportions of work permit holders, students, EU workers, 
permanent residents, British citizens and undocumented workers in the samples. 
 
Overall, it is a limitation of the primary research data that it under-represents some types of 
migrants, such as irregular migrants, and migrants with certain types of legal status, such 
as refugees. It also over-represents migrants with student status. The sample does not fully 
represent the ethnic distribution of migrants in London (Chapter 3, Table 3.2), since it is a 
purposive sample that includes migrant workers from a range of sectors in London.  
 
 
Migrant Demographic Characteristics Minimum-Wage 
Workers 
Above-Minimum 
Wage workers 
Age     
19–29 50 (57.5%) 54 (48.6%) 
30–39 25 (28.7%) 20 (18%) 
40–49 8 (9.2%) 24 (21.6%) 
Over 50 4 (4.6%) 13 (11.7%) 
Total 87 (100%) 111 (100%) 
Gender     
Male 51 (58.6%) 63 (56.8%) 
Female 36 (41.4%) 48 (43.2%) 
Total 
 
87 (100%) 111 (100%) 
Educational level*     
No formal education 1 (1.1%) 5 (4.5%) 
Primary 10 (11.5%) 6 (5.4%) 
Secondary 20 (23%) 18 (16.2%) 
College 13 (14.9%) 19 (17.1%) 
University 31 (35.6%) 30 (27%) 
Postgraduate 12 (13.8%) 33 (29.7%) 
Total 87 (100%) 111 (100%) 
Employer’s Ethnicity    
Same ethnic origin (as worker) 19 (22.9%) 9 (8.2%) 
Other (migrant) ethnic origin 30 (36.1%) 17 (15.5%) 
Local/British  
(incl. British companies) 
33 (39.8%) 79 (71.8%) 
Don’t know 1 (1.2%) 5 (4.5%) 
Total  
Valid N=193 (96.5%) 
83 (100%) 110 (100%) 
129 
 
Sector of current main job     
Retail/shop/supermarket 11 (12.6%) 22 (19.8%) 
Cleaning 5 (5.7%) 19 (17.1%) 
Care: elderly care/childcare 3 (3.4%) 6 (5.4%) 
Construction 3 (3.4%) 6 (5.4%) 
Hotel 3 (3.4%) 6 (5.4%) 
Restaurant/bar 30 (34.5%) 8 (7.2%) 
Administration 3 (3.4%) 7 (6.3%) 
Factory work 7 (8.0%) 3 (2.7%) 
Teaching 0 (0%) 5 (4.5%) 
Other 3 (3.4%) 19 (17.1%) 
Total 87 (100%) 111 (100%) 
Ethnicity     
White 4 (4.6%) 20 (18.0%) 
Mixed 0 (0%) 2 (1.8%) 
Asian 76 (87.4%) 65 (58.6%) 
Black 5 (5.7%) 20 (18.0%) 
Other 2 (2.3%) 4 (3.6%) 
Total 87 (100%) 111 (100%) 
Work permit needed 
Work permit needed 
No work permit needed 
Total 
 
72 (82.8%) 
15 (17.2%) 
87 (100%) 
 
55 (49.5%) 
56 (50.5%) 
111 (100%) 
*The educational qualifications represent censored outcomes as one third of the sample are 
students who have not completed their education. It is very likely therefore that the jobs 
they are currently doing will not necessarily be the jobs they will be doing post-
qualifications. 
Table 5.1 Profile of Respondents 
 
The main analysis in this section seeks to investigate the factors that determine migrants’ 
likelihood of earning the minimum wage or below, using logistic regression. The 
regression equation was formed in light of the human capital theory of Becker (1964) and 
Mincer (1974), which links human capital with wage levels. The equation also incorporates 
Chiswick’s (1978) theory of migrants’ performance in the labour market, including the 
length of stay in the host country and the acquisition of the host country’s language. 
Demographic variables and migration-related variables are also included in the equation.  
Student legal status is also included as a control variable. As there are multiple explanatory 
variables (thirteen variables) with limited valid samples (Valid N=158), the logistic 
regression equation is thus performed in two stages to satisfy the requirement of one 
explanatory variable per 15 observations. The first stage regresses ten explanatory 
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variables and the second one regresses the significant variables from the first stage plus 
three additional variables for work experience, training, and student legal status (see Table 
3.7 for description of the explanatory variables). 
 
 Dependent variable = Minimum Wage 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Age + b2 Gender + b3 Length of stay + b4 English language + 
b5 Educational level + b6 Hours of work + b7 Same ethnicity employer + b8 Local 
ethnicity employer + b9 Union membership + b10 Work permit needed  
(Equation 5.1a) 
 
Dependent variable = Minimum Wage 
ln(p/1-p) = a + any significant explanatory variables from Equation 5.1a + Work 
Experience + Training + Student 
(Equation 5.1b) 
 
Hausman Specification test is performed to examine whether an endogeneity problem 
exists between minimum wage and hours of work, and between minimum wage and union 
membership. Gujarati (2011) suggests to perform the Hausman Specification test and to 
find an instrumental variable as a ‘proxy’ for the suspected stochastic (endogeneous) 
variable. Three criteria are needed to find the valid instrument: first, the instrumental 
variable must be correlated with the stochastic variable; second, the instrumental variable 
must not be correlated with the error term; third, the instrumental variable must not be a 
regressor in the original model.  
 
It is decided to use More Than One Job variable (if a respondent has more than one job) as 
the instrument for Hours of Work. Both variables are significantly correlated (p<0.1). The 
variable Holiday Pay is used as an instrument for Union Membership; their correlation is 
significant at p<0.05. Heteroscedasticity corrected standard error is also used to get robust 
standard error. 
 
Hours of Work = a + b1 Age + b2 Gender + b3 Length of stay + b4 English language + b5 
Educational level + b6 Same ethnicity employer + b7 Local ethnicity employer + b8 Work 
permit needed + b9 More Than One Job + b10 Holiday Pay 
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From the above regression, the estimated residual (  ̂) is calculated.  
 Dependent variable = Minimum Wage 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Age + b2 Gender + b3 Length of stay + b4 English language + 
b5 Educational level + b6 Hours of work + b7 Same ethnicity employer + b8 Local 
ethnicity employer + b9 Union membership + b10 Work permit needed +   ̂ 
 
The  oefficient   ̂ is not statistically significant (z=0.29, p-value=0.769). Thus, there is no 
simultaneity problem between hours of work and minimum wage. 
 
To test for the possibility of simultaneity between the variables Union Membership and 
Minimum Wage, the reduced-form regression is used: 
Union Membership = a + b1 Age + b2 Gender + b3 Length of stay + b4 English 
language + b5 Educational level + b6 Same ethnicity employer + b7 Local ethnicity 
employer + b8 Work permit needed + b9 More Than One Job + b10 Holiday Pay 
 
From the above regression, the estimated residual   ̂ is calculated.  
The following equation is obtained:   
 
 Dependent variable = Minimum Wage 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Age + b2 Gender + b3 Length of stay + b4 English language + 
b5 Educational level + b6 Hours of work + b7 Same ethnicity employer + b8 Local 
ethnicity employer + b9 Union membership + b10 Work permit needed +   ̂ 
 
The  oefficient   ̂ is not statistically significant (z=-0.30, p-value=0.764). Thus, there is no 
simultaneity problem between Union Membership and Minimum Wage. 
 
The results from Hausman Specification test show no simultaneity problem in the logistic 
regression (Equation 5.1a). 
 
Table 5.2a presents the results of the logistic regression (Equation 5.1a). Regression 
Coefficients column presents the coefficients of the independent variables. The asterisk 
indicates the significant variables. Exp(B) column presents the odds ratios. Sig. shows the 
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significance level of the coefficients using p<0.1, p<0.05 and p<0.01 levels of significance. 
The SPSS output for Equation 5.1a is presented in Appendix 6. 
 
Variables in the 
equation 
Regression 
coefficients (B) 
Exp(B) Sig. 
Age - - 0.804 
Gender - - 0.374 
Length of stay - - 0.497 
English language 
 
- - 0.187 
Educational level 
 
- - 0.318 
Hours of work 
 
0.037*** 1.038 0.003 
Same ethnicity 
employer  
 
- - 0.607 
Local ethnicity 
employer 
 
-1.187*** 0.305 0.002 
Union membership - - 0.610 
Work permit needed 
 
1.536*** 4.646 0.000 
Valid N=158 (79%) 
Dependent variable: Minimum Wage 
***Significant at p<0.01  
Table 5.2a.The Effects on the Minimum Wage (Logistic Regression Equation 5.1a 
Results) 
 
The equation for the logistic model is: 
 
ln(p/1-p) = -1.850 + 0.037(Hours of work) - 1.187 (Local ethnicity employer) + 
1.536 (Work permit needed)   
 
Of the 10 independent variables tested in the regression, only three significantly affect 
migrants’ likelihood of earning the minimum wage or below (see Table 5.2a): Hours of 
work, Local ethnicity employer, and Work permit needed. These three variables will then 
be included in the next stage of the logistic regression analysis (Equation 5.1b). 
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Dependent variable = Minimum Wage 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Hours of Work + b2 Local Ethnicity Employer + b3 Work 
Permit Needed + b4 Work Experience + b5 Training + b6 Student 
(Equation 5.1b) 
 
Hausman Specification test is performed to check if the variable Training has any 
simultaneity with the Minimum Wage variable. The instrumental variable for Training is 
Minimum Wage Sector (if a respondent is in the minimum wage sector or not) as the two 
variable are significantly correlated (p-value of Pearson correlation 0.058). 
The reduced form regression based on the Hausman test is the following: 
 
Dependent variable = Training 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Hours of Work + b2 Local Ethnicity Employer + b3 Work 
Permit Needed + b4 Work Experience + b5 Student + b6 Minimum Wage Sector 
 
The estimated residual (  ̂) is calculated is included in the initial Equation 5.1b.  
 
Dependent variable = Minimum Wage 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Hours of Work + b2 Local Ethnicity Employer + b3 Work 
Permit Needed + b4 Work Experience + b5 Training + b6 Student +   ̂ 
 
The coefficient   ̂ is statistically significant at 10% level of significance (z=1.95, p-
value=0.051). Therefore, there is an endogeneity problem between the variables for 
Training and Minimum wage. 
 
In order to deal with the endogeneity problem in the model, Gujarati (2011) suggests the 
use of two-stage least squares (2SLS). The result from the 2SLS shows that no independent 
variable is significant (see Appendix 6 for ‘2SLS’ results). Hausman test is run to compare 
the efficiency of the IV coefficients and the least square coefficients. The results 
(Appendix 6) do not reject the null hypothesis that IV and least square estimates are 
statistically the same (p=99%, chi-square statistic= 0.36). This confirms that the IV 
estimation is less efficient (and thus the logistic regression is used instead). 
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The results of the logistic regression are shown in Table 5.2b, below (see Appendix 6 for 
the SPSS output).  
 
Variables in the 
equation 
Regression 
coefficients (B) 
Exp(B) Sig. 
Hours of work 
 
0.032*** 1.033 0.003 
Local ethnicity 
employer 
 
-1.032*** 0.356 0.002 
Work permit needed 
 
1.606*** 4.982 0.000 
Work Experience 
 
- - 0.431 
Training 
 
- - 0.698 
Student 
 
- - 0.226 
Valid N=193 (96.5%) 
Dependent variable: Minimum wage 
***Significant at p<0.01  
Table 5.2b.The Effects on the Minimum Wage (Logistic Regression Equation 5.1b 
Results) 
 
The adequacy of the logit model (Equation 5.1b) is tested using the Hosmer and 
Lemeshow (HL) goodness-of-fit test. It is found that HL= 18.897 with significance 0.015 
which shows that the null hypothesis is rejected and the logistic model of Equation 5.1b is 
not an adequate representation of the data.  
 
Equation 5.1a is estimated instead:   
 
ln(p/1-p) = -1.850 + 0.037(Hours of work) - 1.187 (Local ethnicity employer) + 
1.536 (Work permit needed)   
 
Equation 5.1a is tested for the Hosmer and Lemeshow (HL) goodness-of-fit test with HL= 
14.417 and significance 0.072, which shows that the null hypothesis is not rejected and 
therefore the logistic model (Equation 5.1a) adequately represents the data. Overall, 73.4 % 
of the cases were correctly predicted. The variables for Age, Gender, Length of stay, 
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English language, Educational level, Same ethnicity employer, and Union membership are 
not included in the final equation (see Appendix 6 on table ‘variables not in the equation’). 
 
Based on the significant value, at a 1% level of significance (see Table 5.2a): the hours of 
work, a local ethnicity employer, and the need for a work permit affect migrants’ 
likelihood of earning the minimum wage or below. Exp(B) is interpreted in terms of the 
change in odds. If the hours of work per week increase by one hour, migrant respondents 
are 1.038 times more likely to earn the minimum wage or below. Individuals requiring a 
work permit are 4.646 times more likely to earn the minimum wage or below, and, those 
whose employer is of British/native background, are 0.305 times less likely to earn the 
minimum wage or below.  
 
The next subsections discuss the interpretation of the other variables in the regression, 
including other relevant issues related to the minimum wage. 
 
5.1.2. Age and the Minimum Wage 
It was anticipated that age would significantly affect the level of wage, as the age-earnings 
profile (Becker, 1964) suggests that an increased investment in human capital will increase 
the worker’s age as well as their earnings. The regression results, however, do not show 
that age significantly affects the likelihood of earning the minimum wage (Table 5.2a, 
Significance = 0.804). Nevertheless, it is interesting to consider the age profile of the 
respondents. Table 5.1 shows a large proportion of workers under 30 years old who earn 
the minimum wage or below (57.5% in the minimum-wage group, and 25% in the total 
sample).  
 
5.1.3. Gender and the Minimum Wage 
The regression results also show no evidence that gender affects migrants’ likelihood of 
earning the minimum wage or below. 
 
5.1.4. Educational Level and the Minimum Wage 
It was anticipated that there would be a relationship between educational level and the 
minimum wage, as suggested by human capital theory. The regression results, however, 
show no evidence that educational level affects migrants’ likelihood of earning the 
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minimum wage or below. Nevertheless, it is interesting to look at the educational profile of 
the respondents. 
 
From Table 5.1, it is evident that the phenomenon of ‘downgrading’ may exist in the 
sample. Table 5.1 shows that in total there are 140 respondents (70% of the total sample) 
who have an above-secondary level of education. Of these, 56 respondents (28% of the 
total sample) earn the minimum wage or below. If we narrow the analysis to include only 
minimum-wage workers, the proportion of respondents who have an above-secondary 
level of education is 64.4% among minimum-wage workers. However, it is difficult to 
know whether the downgrading phenomenon is solely applied to migrants, or whether it 
also applies to natives and thus generates a universal phenomenon in the UK labour market. 
Given the purposive nature of the sample, and the lack of a group of non-migrants for 
comparison, the downgrading outcome of this study does not provide conclusive evidence 
 
It is interesting to note that five of the six respondents with no formal education earn above 
the minimum wage. Three of them work in the cleaning sector, with a strong union 
presence: the union supports cleaners in their area to enable them to earn the London 
Living Wage. The fourth respondent works in construction, and has more than 10 years’ 
experience in this sector. The fifth is a domestic worker: she has no legal immigration 
status (i.e. is undocumented), and she gained her current job through her connection with a 
colleague in the same occupation.  
 
These findings give a sense that human capital alone is not enough to explain why some 
migrants earn the minimum wage while other migrants earn above it. 
The next subsection discusses the results produced with other human capital variables. 
 
 
5.1.5. Human Capital and the Minimum Wage 
Apart from educational level, this subsection explores all the human capital variables used 
in the questionnaires. Some of the human capital variables are not included in the 
regression analysis, because the regression limits the number of independent variables that 
can be included. The analysis was therefore extended using Pearson’s chi-square 
coefficient to test whether there was an association between human capital and wage level. 
Table 5.3 presents the results of using Pearson’s chi-square coefficient. 
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Human Capital Profile Minimum-
Wage Workers 
Above-
Minimum 
Wage Workers 
Current level of spoken English     
None 0 (0%) 1 (0.9%) 
Minimum 1 (1.1%) 5 (4.5%) 
Medium/proficient 53 (60.9%) 44 (39.6%) 
Fluent 33 (37.9%) 61 (55%) 
Total (Valid N=198 or 99%) 87 (100%) 111 (100%) 
Chi-square = 10.081, p<5%     
If respondent has improved level of spoken 
English 
    
Yes 59 (81.9%) 69 (77.5%) 
No 13 (18.1%) 20 (22.5%) 
Total (Valid N=161 or 80.5%) 72 (100%) 89 (100%) 
Length of stay in the UK     
Less than two years 30 (34.5%) 24 (21.6%) 
Two to five years 35 (40.2%) 33 (29.7%) 
More than five years 22 (25.3%) 54 (48.6%) 
Total (Valid N=198 or 99%) 87 (100%) 111 (100%) 
Length of stay in current job     
Less than a year 26 (29.9%) 21 (18.9%) 
One to two years 37 (42.5%) 42 (37.8%) 
Two to five years 18 (20.7%) 27 (24.3%) 
Five to 10 years 5 (5.7%) 16 (14.4%) 
More than 10 years 1 (1.1%) 5 (4.5%) 
Total (Valid N=198 or 99%) 87 (100%) 111 (100%) 
Chi-square = 8.290, p<10%     
If respondent receives training from employer     
Yes 53 (60.9%) 87 (78.4%) 
No 34 (39.1%) 24 (21.6%) 
Total (Valid N=198 or 99%)  87 (100%) 111 (100%) 
Chi-square = 7.178, p<1%     
Country of highest education level obtained     
Home country 60 (69.8%) 56 (52.8%) 
Host country 23 (26.7%) 49 (46.2%) 
Other country where respondent has worked 
before 
2 (2.3%) 1 (0.9%) 
Somewhere else 1 (1.2%) 0 (0%) 
Total (Valid N=192 or 96%) 86 (100%) 106 (100%) 
Chi-square = 8.873, p<5%     
If respondent has work experience in home 
country 
    
138 
 
Yes 40 (46%) 66 (59.5%) 
No 47 (54%) 45 (40.5%) 
Total (Valid N=198 or 99%) 
Chi-square = 3.564, p<10% 
87 (100%) 
 
111 (100%) 
 
If respondent has work experience abroad     
Yes 25 (28.7%) 42 (37.8%) 
No 62 (71.3%) 69 (62.2%) 
Total (Valid N=198 or 99%) 87 (100%) 111 (100%) 
 
Table 5.3 Human Capital Factors and Wage Level 
 
5.1.6. English-Language Proficiency and the Minimum Wage 
Chiswick (1991) and Chiswick and Miller (1995) suggest that a proficiency in the host 
country’s language will increase the worker’s productivity, which in turn will lead to 
higher earnings. It was therefore expected that English-language proficiency would have 
some association with migrants’ wages. Pearson’s chi-square coefficient shows that the 
current level of spoken English has a positive association with migrants’ wage levels 
(Table 5.3, chi-square = 10.081, p<5%). However, the regression results do not confirm 
that there is a relationship between language improvement and the likelihood of earning 
the minimum wage or below. The regression tests whether there is a relationship between 
migrants’ improvements in their English-language skills (from their arrival in the UK to 
date) and their earnings. The results show no evidence of any such relationship.. 
 
Table 5.3 shows that the majority of respondents have a medium-to-fluent level of spoken 
English. Although no evidence was found of a relationship between English-language 
skills and migrants’ wages, it can cautiously be suggested that the profile of migrants’ 
language proficiency is indicative of downgrading: there is a significant proportion of 
migrants with medium-to-fluent proficiency in English (86 respondents, 43% of the total 
sample) who earn the minimum wage or below.  
 
5.1.7. Length of Stay in the UK and the Minimum Wage 
It was expected that the length of stay in the UK would affect migrants’ likelihood of 
earning the minimum wage or below, as suggested by human capital theory. Chiswick 
(1978) argues that the number of years since migration leads to the development of post-
migration experience, including the acquisition of the local language and customs, a 
familiarity with the nature of the labour market, and post-school training.  
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The regression results, however, show no evidence that length of stay in the UK affects 
migrants’ likelihood of earning the minimum wage or below. It is therefore not clear from 
this study whether recent migrants are more likely to be at the lower level of pay 
distribution.  
 
5.1.8. Length of Stay in the Current Job and the Minimum Wage 
The results from Pearson’s chi-square coefficient show a significant association between 
the length of stay in the current job and wage level (Table 5.3, chi-square = 8.290, p<10%). 
Table 5.3 shows that there are 54 respondents (27% of the total sample) who have been in 
their current jobs for less than two years, 30 of whom still earn the minimum. Among 
migrants who earn the minimum wage, 34.5% have been in their current job for less than 
two years. This study further argues that these shorter stays in workers’ current jobs reflect 
the demand for temporary workers in low-paid, low-skilled jobs. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to note that a small proportion of respondents (six respondents) have been in 
their current jobs for more than five years but still earn the minimum wage or below; this 
indicates that there might be factors other than human capital which determine migrants’ 
likelihood of earning the minimum wage. 
 
5.1.9. Training and the Minimum Wage 
It was expected that training would have some relationship with wages, as suggested in the 
early human capital theory of Becker (1964). The results show that training does have a 
significant association with wages (Table 5.3, chi-square = 7.178, p<1%), confirming this 
early human capital study. It is noted that training is the non-wage benefit that is most 
generally received by migrants in the sample: 71% (142 respondents) receive training from 
their employers. The most common type of training received is induction, followed by on-
the-job training and health and safety (see Table 5.4). It is noted that 31% of the 
respondents receive regular training, which mostly concerns health and safety or 
policy/regulations (for example, the Under 25 Challenge policy in relation to the sale of 
alcohol and cigarettes). This evidence generally confirms Dickerson’s (2007: 6, fn 2) 
argument that the amount of training provision in the UK – particularly in this study of 
low-paid, low-skilled jobs – is quite high, but that much of it is low-level training 
concerning induction and health and safety rather than the enhancement of productivity. It 
is also noted that the majority of training is paid for by employers. However, this might be 
not because of the importance of on-the-job training, as Becker (1964) suggests, but due to 
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legislation or collective bargaining, since training in low-paid, low-skilled jobs is directed 
more towards legislation (health and safety) than towards employee productivity. 
 
Training Frequency (of Total Sample)  
Type of training  
Induction 
(Valid N=198 or 99%) 
114 (57%) 
On-the-job training  
(Valid N=200 or 100%) 
104 (52%) 
Health and safety 
(Valid N=200 or 100%) 
92 (46%) 
Off-the-job training 
(Valid N=199 or 99.5%) 
11 (6%) 
Who pays for the training 
(Valid N=200 or 100%) 
  
Employer 113 (57%) 
Employee 3 (2%) 
Free (no payment needed) 26 (13%) 
Regular training received 
(Valid N=200 or 100%) 
62 (31%) 
Health and safety 20 (10%) 
Policy/regulations  8 (4%) 
Product/service update 11 (5.5%) 
Skills-related 
Other 
15 (7.5%) 
8 (4%) 
Frequency of regular training 
(Valid N=200 or 100%) 
  
Once a month 10 (5%) 
Once in three months 21 (11%) 
Once in six months 14 (7%) 
Once in a year 8 (4%) 
 
Table 5.4 Training Distribution 
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5.1.10. Work Experience and the Minimum Wage 
This study uses two measures of work experience in the questionnaire: first, whether the 
worker has experience of working abroad, and second, whether the worker has experience 
of working in their home country before coming to the UK. The results show that 53% of 
the respondents have work experience in their home country. The Pearson’s chi-square 
coefficient shows that work experience in the home country is significantly associated with 
migrants’ wage levels (Table 5.3, chi-square = 3.564, p<10%).  
 
Table 5.5 shows the last jobs in their home countries of migrants who earn the minimum 
wage or below. If work experience in the home country is used as the definition of skill, it 
is evident from the results that migrants who earn the minimum wage or below are being 
downgraded: the majority of them were in the upper levels of occupational distribution in 
their home country, but in the UK they are taking lower levels of work.  
 
The results also show that 33.5% of total respondents have experience of working abroad 
(i.e. in a country other than either the UK or their home country). Although working 
abroad has no significant association with the level of wage, it is evident that 25 
respondents (12.5% of total respondents) who have experience of working abroad still earn 
the minimum wage or below – another sign that migrants are downgraded. 
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Last Job in Home Country Number of Workers 
Administrator 1 
Airline staff 1 
Bank customer service agent 1 
Businessman 1 
Call centre agent  1 
Cardiovascular-thoracic technologist 1 
Cashier 1 
Civil engineer 1 
Computer engineer 1 
Consultant 1 
Dental assistant 1 
Doctor 1 
Domestic worker 1 
Electrician 1 
Estate agent 1 
Factory worker 3 
Housekeeper 1 
Insurance marketing manager 1 
IT product manager 1 
IT professional 1 
Journalist 1 
Lecturer 1 
Product designer 1 
Production supervisor 1 
Public relations consultant 1 
Retail worker (shoe company) 1 
Salesperson 3 
Schoolteacher  2 
Shopkeeper 2 
Steel industry worker 1 
Supermarket worker 1 
Translator 1 
Waiter 1 
Worker in family business 1 
Total (Valid N=200 or 100%) 40 
 
Table 5.5 The Last Job in the Home Country of Migrants Earning the Minimum 
Wage or Below 
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5.1.11. Low-Paying Sectors and the Minimum Wage 
Descriptive statistics from Table 5.1 can be used to analyse the minimum wage and low-
paying sectors. Table 5.1 shows that the sectors with the largest proportions of minimum-
wage workers are restaurant/bar work (30 out of 38 workers earning the minimum), 
followed by factory work (seven out of 10 workers earning the minimum) and domestic 
work (14 out of 21 workers earning the minimum). The three lowest-paid workers in the 
sample are restaurant workers earning wages less than £2.00 per hour. Two of these work 
10 hours a day, six days a week, to get paid as little as £100 per week (equivalent to £1.67 
per hour). The third works for 12 hours a day, six days a week, to get paid as little as £130 
per week (equivalent to £1.81 per hour). 
 
Domestic work falls into the category of minimum-wage jobs mainly because these jobs 
demand long working hours, while payment is made weekly or monthly. On average, the 
hours of work for domestic workers in the sample are 10 hours per day, and the majority of 
them are paid weekly or monthly. Meanwhile, in the factory and restaurant/bar sectors, 
wages are mostly set hourly, but disturbingly, some employers set the hourly wage below 
the National Minimum Wage. It is to be noted that there are 13 respondents who are paid 
hourly and whose hourly pay is clearly below even the October 2010 National Minimum 
Wage. They are eligible for the adult minimum-wage rate, and yet their hourly pay is 
below that rate, ranging from £4.50 to £5.90 per hour. This is evidence of non-compliance 
with National Minimum Wage legislation. Table 5.6 shows the distribution of workers in 
the sample by hourly wage. 
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Hourly Wage or 
Equivalent 
Proportion of Total 
Sample 
Description 
<£5.93 30.8% Below the 2010 Adult National 
Minimum Wage 
≤£5.93 35.9% Up to the 2010 Adult National 
Minimum Wage 
<£6.08 44.9% Below the 2011 Adult National 
Minimum Wage 
≤£6.08 43.5% Up to the 2011 Adult National 
Minimum Wage 
≤£6.69 56.6% Up to the 2011 Adult National 
Minimum Wage + 10% 
≤£7.30 67.7% Up to the 2011 Adult National 
Minimum Wage + 20% 
<£8.30 77.3% Below the 2011 London Living Wage 
 
Table 5.6 Hourly Wage Distribution 
 
5.1.12. Ethnicity and the Minimum Wage 
This study has limitations in terms of the variety of respondents’ ethnicities. The 
respondent profile (Table 5.1) to some extent leans towards Asian ethnicities. Therefore no 
tests were conducted to look for a link between ethnicity and the minimum wage, as the 
results might have been flawed. Nevertheless, it is worth considering the distribution of 
Asian ethnicities and their wage levels. Table 5.7 shows that Chinese, South-East Asian, 
Bangladeshi and Indian ethnic groups have the highest proportions of minimum-wage 
workers. These results are partly similar to figures produced by the Low Pay Commission 
(2011: 34), which show that among all ethnic groups, the Bangladeshi group has the 
highest proportion of workers earning the minimum wage or below (approximately 15% of 
Bangladeshi workers earned the 2011 Adult National Minimum Wage of £5.93 per hour, 
or below).  
 
5.1.13. Employer’s Ethnicity and the Minimum Wage 
The logistic regression (Table 5.2) shows that having an employer of local ethnicity 
significantly reduces migrants’ likelihood of earning the minimum wage or below: if the 
employer is from a local ethnic (British/native) background, the respondent is 0.305 times 
less likely to earn the minimum wage or below. 
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However, the regression results do not show any such relationship in the case of employers 
of the same ethnicity as the migrant workers (Table 5.2). There is insufficient evidence to 
say that workers whose employers share the same ethnicity tend to earn the minimum wage 
or below.  
 
Table 5.7 shows the distribution of employers’ ethnicity.  
 
Ethnicity Minimum-Wage 
Workers 
Above-Minimum Wage 
Workers 
Asian Ethnicity     
Asian British 0 (0%) 2 (3.1%) 
Asian Indian 15 (19.7%) 15 (23.1%) 
Asian Pakistani 3 (3.9%) 7 (10.8%) 
Asian Bangladeshi 15 (19.7%) 15 (23.1%) 
Asian South-East Asian 
Asian Chinese 
Asian Other  
Total 
Valid N=198 (99%) 
34 (44.7%) 
4 (5.3%) 
5 (6.6%) 
 76 (100%) 
16 (24.6%) 
1 (1.5%) 
9 (13.8%) 
65 (100%) 
Employer’s Ethnicity      
Same ethnic origin (as worker) 19 (22.9%) 9 (8.2%) 
Other (migrant) ethnic origin 30 (36.1%) 17 (15.5%) 
Local/British  
(incl. British companies) 
33 (39.8%) 79 (71.8%) 
Don’t know 1 (1.2%) 5 (4.5%) 
Total  
Valid N=193 (96.5%) 
83 (100%) 110 (100%) 
 
Table 5.7 Ethnicity and Wage Levels 
 
5.1.14. Hours of Work and the Minimum Wage 
The logistic regression (Table 5.2a) shows that their hours of work significantly affect 
migrants’ likelihood of earning the minimum wage or below. If hours of work per week 
increase by one hour, migrants are 1.038 times more likely to earn the minimum wage or 
below. Table 5.8 shows the evidence in detail. Workers who work 61–70 hours or more per 
week tend to earn the minimum wage or below. The majority of workers who work longer 
hours are in the domestic work sector. There are three domestic workers and one care 
worker who work 61–70 hours per week. There are three domestic workers and one 
restaurant worker who work 71–80 hours per week. The two workers who work the longest 
hours in the sample are also domestic workers, working 84 and 93.5 hours per week. The 
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former of the two works from 7am to 9pm, six days a week, for £250 per week (equivalent 
to £2.98 per hour); the latter works from 7am to midnight, five and a half days per week, 
for £240 per week (equivalent to £2.57 per hour). It is disturbing to see the reality of those 
who work very long hours and who, for that very reason, receive significantly below the 
minimum wage.  
 
Hours of Work per Week Minimum-Wage 
Workers 
Above-Minimum Wage 
Workers 
Up to 20 hours 27 (31%) 39 (35.1%) 
21–40 29 (33.3%) 55 (49.5%) 
41–50 7 (8%) 12 (10.8%) 
51–60 14 (16.1%) 4 (3.6%) 
61–70 
71–80 
81–90 
More than 90 
Total  
Valid N=198 (99%) 
Chi-square=22.320, p<1%  
4 (4.6%) 
4 (4.6%) 
1 (1.1%) 
1 (1.1%) 
87 (100%) 
 
1 (0.9%) 
0 (0%) 
0 (0%) 
0 (0%) 
111 (100%) 
 
 
Table 5.8 Hours of Work and Wage Levels 
 
5.1.15. The Minimum Wage and the London Living Wage 
It is interesting to relate the minimum wage with the London Living Wage, particularly 
because the primary research is targeted at workers in London. A significant proportion of 
migrant workers in the sample earn below the minimum wage, and the majority of 
migrants in the sample also earn below the London Living Wage. Table 5.6 shows that 
77.3% of total respondents earn below £8.30 per hour, which was the 2011 London Living 
Wage. 
 
The demand for a London Living Wage was introduced in April 2001 by London Citizens, 
an alliance of community organisations including faith groups, schools and union branches. 
Their main demand is that every worker should earn enough to provide their family with 
the essentials of living (Citizens UK, 2012). Numerous studies have been implemented 
since the campaign began, notably at Queen Mary, University of London (Queen Mary 
University of London, 2012). One of the studies focuses on London’s cleaning sector, with 
samples of cleaners from various workplaces, including subcontracted and agency workers. 
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The findings are mainly in line with the living-wage campaign, that is, they support the 
need for workers to earn a living wage. 
  
Although this study is not specifically designed to investigate whether its respondents earn 
a living wage, it is still interesting to observe the respondent profile in light of the 
argument for the living wage.  
 
In relation to living-wage research, Wills (2009) argues that many of the workers in 
London who earn well below the living wage are migrants who do not have access to the 
government benefit system. ‘They include international students, new arrivals from central 
and eastern Europe and irregular migrants who are not eligible to claim the in-work 
benefits that are available to their colleagues. Many of them have dependants and are the 
only working adult in the family’ (Wills, 2009: 38–39). Wills continues that even if they 
were paid the living wage – which is approximately 40% higher than the National 
Minimum Wage – these workers would never earn enough to provide their family with the 
essentials of living. ‘As a result, many work long hours, take up second or third jobs and 
share their accommodation with others’ (Wills, 2009: 39). 
 
This study’s findings in relation to hours of work suggest that some of the workers in the 
sample who work very long hours still do no earn enough to provide their families with the 
essentials of living, as their wages are still below the London Living Wage (and some are 
even below the National Minimum Wage). Furthermore, this study’s findings highlights 
that workers who work such long hours are marginalised through unfair employment 
practices, with unclear working hours and wages that are not set at an hourly rate. The 
findings also support Wills’ argument about multiple jobs: some workers in the sample 
have to take two or three jobs in order to support their families to a decent standard. This 
raises the issue migrants who have dependants and who might be the only working adults 
in the family. The next subsections provide a discussion of these issues. 
 
5.1.16. The Number of Jobs Held and the Minimum Wage 
It is suggested in the living-wage campaign that some workers have to work more than one 
job because they cannot otherwise earn enough to provide their families with the essentials 
of living. Although the results of this study show no significant association between the 
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number of jobs held and wage levels, it is interesting to consider the profile of migrant 
workers in the sample who have more than one job. 
 
Table 5.9 shows that there are 12 respondents earning the minimum wage or below who 
hold more than one job. Five of the 12 are workers whose main job is in the cleaning sector. 
This evidence supports Wills’ (2009) argument that some cleaners have to take more than 
one job simply to be able to provide their family with the essentials. Three of these five 
cleaners have additional jobs as cleaners in other workplaces; one of the five has another 
job as a domestic worker; the last has a job at a school canteen, serving food and tidying 
the canteen. Four of the 12 are restaurant workers. Two of the 12 are undocumented 
workers. Two of the 12 state that they even have three jobs: one works in two different 
workplaces as cleaner and also has a third job as carer; the other works in three different 
restaurants. This evidence supports the living-wage argument that some workers who earn 
the minimum wage or below have to work two or three jobs simply because they would not 
otherwise earn enough to provide themselves and their families with the essentials of life. 
 
Does the Respondent Have 
More Than One Job? 
If the Main Job is at the Minimum-Wage or 
Above-Minimum Wage Level 
Minimum Wage  Above Minimum Wage  
Yes 12 (13.8%)  19 (17.1%) 
No 
Total 
Valid N=198 (99%) 
75 (86.2%) 
87 (100%) 
 92 (82.9%) 
111 (100%) 
 
Table 5.9 Respondents with Multiple Jobs and Their Wage Levels 
 
5.1.17. Migrants with Dependent Children and the Minimum Wage 
The living-wage campaign points out that a worker might be the only working adult in the 
family, and that it is therefore necessary for that worker to be able to earn enough to 
provide their family with a decent standard of living. Although the results of this study 
show no evidence of any association between dependants and wage levels, Table 5.10 
shows that there is a proportion of workers with dependent children who earn the minimum 
wage or below (26 workers, 13% of the total sample). The majority of these are domestic 
workers (11 workers), followed by cleaners (four) and factory workers (three).  
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The survey also asks whether the respondent’s children are in the home country, the host 
country or elsewhere. Table 5.10 shows that seven of the respondents with children in the 
host country (the UK) earn the minimum wage or below. Six of the seven, according to 
their legal status, are eligible to access the benefit system; the seventh is on a student visa, 
and so has no access to public funds. One of the seven with dependent children in the UK 
is a cleaner; she explained that she has to work more than one job in order to support her 
son, who is about to enter university. This exactly reflects the living-wage campaign’s 
argument that some workers simply do not earn enough to provide their family with the 
essentials of living. 
 
In the sample there is also a proportion of migrants who have children in their home 
country and who earn the minimum wage or below (19 workers or 9.5% of the total sample, 
see Table 5.10). One might wonder whether these workers can support their families if 
they do not even achieve a minimum standard of living for themselves. 
 
 
Dependent Children Minimum-Wage 
Workers 
Above-Minimum 
Wage Workers 
Does the respondent have 
dependent children? 
    
Yes 26 (29.9%)  42 (37.8%) 
No 
Total (Valid N=198 or 99%) 
61 (70.1%) 
87 (100%) 
 69 (62.2%) 
111 (100%) 
Where do the dependent children 
live? 
    
Home country 19 (73.1%) 17 (40.5%) 
Host country 
Home and host country 
Elsewhere 
Total (Valid N=68 or 100%) 
7 (26.9 %) 
0 (0%) 
0 (0%) 
26 (100%) 
21 (50 %) 
2 (4.8%) 
2 (4.8%) 
42 (100%) 
 
Table 5.10 Respondents with Dependent Children and Wage Levels 
 
5.1.18. Union Membership and the Minimum Wage 
The regression results show no evidence that union membership affects migrants’ 
likelihood of earning the minimum wage or below. However, only a small proportion of 
migrants in the sample are members of a trade union: 34 respondents, or 17% of the total 
sample. Interestingly, there are 12 workers who have union membership but still earn the 
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minimum wage or below (Table 5.11). Nine of the 12 individuals are domestic workers. As 
noted above, there is a possibility of the marginalisation of domestic workers who work 
long hours; this may be because they have no formalised employment contracts in term of 
hours of work or wages. Nonetheless, it is surprising that their engagement with a union 
still has not freed them from the trap of unformalised working hours. If this state of affairs 
remains constant, migrant domestic workers will remain at the bottom end of the pay 
distribution. 
 
Respondent Profile Minimum-
Wage Workers 
Above-Minimum 
Wage Workers 
Union Membership     
Yes 12 (13.8%) 22 (19.8%) 
No 75 (86.2%) 89 (80.2%) 
Total (Valid N=198 or 99%) 87 (100%) 111 (100%) 
 
Table 5.11 Union Membership in Relation to Wages 
 
5.1.19. Legal Status and the Minimum Wage 
Legal status is one of the important variables to be examined for its relationship with wage 
levels, but for the most part it has not been well investigated in previous public surveys. 
This thesis therefore seeks to emphasise the importance of migrant legal status in relation 
to the minimum wage. The logistic regression confirms that there is a significant 
relationship between migrants’ legal (work-permit) status and the likelihood of earning the 
minimum wage or below. Interpretation of Table 5.2a reveals that workers who need a 
work permit in order to work are 4.646 times more likely to earn the minimum wage or 
below. 
 
In relation to the legality of entering the UK labour market, there is great pressure on 
employers to check the legal status of workers. Since February 2008 tough penalties have 
been in force for anyone caught employing workers with no right to work. According to 
the UK Border Agency’s official website, ‘the most severe penalties, including unlimited 
fines and prison sentences, are for employers that knowingly break the rules. But even 
those who unknowingly employ illegal migrants through less than diligent recruitment and 
employment practices, can face penalties of up to £10,000 for each illegal worker’ 
(UKBorder Agency, 2010).  
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The survey questionnaire asks whether workers have been asked by their employer to 
prove their legal status. It is no surprise that 187 (93.5%) of the 200 respondents have been 
asked by their employers to prove their legal status. Of these 187 respondents, 176 (94%) 
have been asked to prove it in their current jobs. There are 13 respondents who have never 
been asked to prove their legal status; nine of them are currently undocumented.  
 
The questionnaire also asks whether respondents have experienced any change in their 
legal status. Table 5.12 presents the proportion between changes in legal status and the 
level of wage. Table 5.13 describes the types of legal status in detail, and the changes in 
legal status: from first arrival in the UK to current legal status. Taken together, Tables 5.12 
and 5.13 suggests that a change in legal status, notably in the ability to access the labour 
market, might be associated with higher wages. The regression suggests that workers who 
need a work permit are four times more likely to earn the minimum wage or below.  
 
Has the Respondent Changed 
Legal Status? 
Minimum-Wage 
Workers 
Above-Minimum 
Wage Workers 
Yes 40 (46%)  50 (45%) 
No 
Total (Valid N=198 or 99%) 
47 (54%) 
87 (100%) 
61 (55%) 
111 (100%) 
 
Table 5.12 Legal Status Change and Wage Levels 
 
 
Changes in Legal Status 
(Status on First Arrival to  Current 
Status) 
Minimum-Wage 
Workers 
Above-Minimum 
Wage Workers 
Visitor/tourist  no visa (British 
passport) 
1 2 
Visitor/tourist  no visa (ILR) 4 4 
Visitor/tourist  asylum seeker 1 1 
Visitor/tourist  undocumented 7 2 
Visitor/tourist  student 1 0 
Work visa  no visa (ILR) 6 11 
Work visa  undocumented 2 1 
Work visa  no visa (British passport) 0 2 
Engaged/married  no visa (ILR) 1 0 
Student  work visa 12 12 
Student  no visa (British passport) 0 2 
Student  no visa (ILR) 0 1 
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Student  undocumented 3 1 
Dependant  no visa (British passport) 0 1 
Claimed asylum on arrival  no visa 
(British passport) 
0 5 
Claimed asylum on arrival  no visa 
(ILR) 
0 4 
Other  no visa (ILR) 1 1 
Other  undocumented 1 0 
Total (Valid N=90 or 100%) 40 50 
 
Table 5.13 Changes in Legal Status 
 
5.1.20. Undocumented Workers and the Minimum Wage 
For the purposes of the discussion of legal status, this study sought to include a proportion 
of undocumented workers in the sample. It is hypothesised that undocumented workers 
derive the least benefit from rises in the minimum wage. It is also hypothesised that 
because of their undocumented status, they will not receive the minimum wage, will 
receive fewer non-wage benefits, and will probably work in secondary jobs or in the 
underground economy, where their working conditions too will be inferior. It is their status 
that leads them to undertake the most precarious jobs with the lowest pay and the smallest 
number non-wage benefits. Table 5.14 describes the profile and job descriptions of the 
undocumented workers in the sample. In total there are 17 undocumented respondents (8.5% 
of the total sample). 
 
Table 5.14 shows that the working conditions of undocumented workers confirm the 
inferior characteristics of secondary-segment jobs: the work is temporary, flexibilised, 
precarious, unsecured and informal, and provides lower pay and fewer non-wage benefits. 
McKay et al.’s (2011) study of undocumented migrants argues that sanctions against 
employers who employ workers without permits paradoxically leads employers to further 
increase their exploitation of undocumented migrants. This study appears to confirm that 
low levels of pay, poor provision of non-wage benefits and inferior working conditions are 
used to offset the fines that employers have to pay for employing undocumented workers. 
As Bacon (2008) argues, it is workers rather than employers who have to bear the cost of 
such sanctions; and as McKay et al. (2011) argue, the burden of the risk of being raided by 
the authorities is also borne by the workers. Thus undocumented workers are the group of 
migrants who derive the least advantage from the minimum wage, as they face low pay, 
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fewer non-wage benefits, insecurity, flexibilisation and temporary work as a result of their 
undocumented status. 
 
Most of the undocumented migrants in the sample are at their most productive age. 
Thirteen out of the total of 17 undocumented workers earn less than the national minimum 
wage. Some even have to work more than one job and to work in different places, which 
confirm that their jobs are temporary and flexibilised. Some are in the most vulnerable 
positions. Two undocumented domestic workers rely on help from their colleagues to get 
jobs. One respondent is seeking help to resolve her undocumented status.  
 
I had an opportunity to speak with one employer who employs undocumented workers. He 
runs a small construction company, where he employs documented as well as 
undocumented workers. His justification for employing undocumented workers is that he is 
helping his community. He says that if someone from his community comes and asks him 
for a job, he cannot turn them away. This situation also applies to some undocumented 
respondents who work in restaurants. At first they had a legal status that allowed them to 
work; however, at some point their visas expired and they could not renew them. Their 
employers were aware of their situation, and continued to employ them on the grounds of 
solidarity. 
 
However, it might be argued that it is to the employers’ economic benefit to continue to 
utilise undocumented workers. It is to be noted that a small proportion of the 
undocumented workers in this study work in the legitimate economy, meaning that the 
businesses where they work are proper legal businesses. This exactly confirms Piore’s 
(1979) argument that the duality of the labour market can be seen even in a legitimate 
business: employers create a duality of jobs by employing documented as well as 
undocumented migrants. 
 
Gender, Age Profile and Job Description 
Male, 24 Has two jobs: distributing leaflets, and as a kitchen porter in a 
restaurant. 
Female, 44 Has a regular part-time job taking care of an empty house while 
the owner is overseas. Has irregular jobs as a domestic worker in 
various places; these jobs are usually provided by her colleague 
(another domestic worker). 
Male, 25 
 
Sells ethnic food door-to-door to companies, shops and colleges 
(the majority of staff in these places share a similar ethnic 
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background with the respondent). Cooks for approximately three 
hours to prepare the food, and then sells the food during 
lunchtimes from noon to 3pm. Makes approximately 55 boxes per 
day with a price of £2–3 per box. In the evening, he works in a 
restaurant (the owner of which is of the same ethnicity as the 
respondent) as a second chef, for eight hours per day, six days per 
week, for which he receives £150 per week; he has been working 
in this restaurant for three years. 
Female, 40 Works as a domestic worker in various houses; the jobs are 
provided by her colleague. Cannot speak English at all – the 
interview was conducted with another respondent acting as 
interpreter. Has previous work experience in Jeddah. Receives 
only bonuses and gifts as non-wage benefits. Never receives 
training, but receives above-minimum wage pay. Works only part-
time and has no formal education. 
Male, 22 Works in a restaurant in central London. 
Female, 29 Works in a formally established restaurant in central London as a 
waitress. 
Male, 30 Works in construction. 
Male, 32 Works in a street market. 
Female, 40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Works as a domestic worker. Was brought to the UK by her 
previous employer, who was a diplomat; the respondent then 
changed to another employer, and is now undocumented. Her 
situation is difficult. One NGO kept pushing her to apply for 
asylum-seeker status. This NGO – which claims to care for 
domestic workers’ rights – kept threatening that if she refused to 
sign the asylum application, the police would catch her. She 
signed the asylum application without clearly knowing what an 
asylum-seeker is. She is very reluctant to become an asylum 
seeker. Now her case is being processed in court. She is being 
asked a lot of questions by the Home Office, such as ‘Do you 
know what asylum is?’ and ‘Do you know that you can't work 
with an asylum visa?’ Her vulnerable position makes it difficult 
for her to seek help; some people even try to take advantage of 
her. She is still seeking help, and asked throughout the interview 
whether I could help her. She previously had a solicitor, and her 
solicitor argued a lot with the NGO’s solicitor. 
Male, 30 Works in a shop in East London. 
Female, 28 Works in a shop that sells clothes. This is a cash-in-hand job. Her 
employer is from the same ethnic background. Her current job is 
her first job, and her employer never asked about her legal status. 
Male, 49 Works as kitchen chef in a formally established restaurant in 
London. Never receives any training. Has extensive previous 
experience as a kitchen chef. 
Male, 24 Works in a catering agency that serves clients in various places. 
Only gets lunch during the day; no other non-wage benefits, no 
training. 
Male, 27 Works in a shop that sells clothes. This is a cash-in-hand job. His 
employer is from the same ethnic background. He has a second job 
in a catering agency. 
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Male, 26 Works as a domestic worker. 
Male, 37 Works in a street market. 
Female, 36 Works in a formally established restaurant in central London as a 
waitress. 
 
Table 5.14 Profile and Job Descriptions of Undocumented Migrants 
 
5.1.21. Students in Minimum-Wage Jobs 
Students in the sample represent a significant proportion of migrants who earn the 
minimum wage or below. There are 33 students (16.5% of the total sample) who earn the 
minimum wage or below. Students also fall into the category of those who undertake 
precarious jobs. Ongoing research led by the Working Lives Research Institute is 
investigating precarious work among students in Europe (Working Lives Research Institute, 
2012). According to this study, migrant students intend to stay in the host country for a 
limited time only. They therefore tend to undertake jobs of whatever kind is available at 
the time.  
 
It is thus a limitation of this thesis that it is unclear whether the jobs students are currently 
doing reflect the jobs they would hold if fully qualified and integrated in the labour market 
post-qualifications. Nevertheless, the results show that 12 respondents who earn the 
minimum wage or less are also holders of Post-Study Work visa, which gives graduates of 
UK institutions the right to seek employment in the UK for up to two years. These are 
students who had completed their education in the UK and they are still doing the jobs in 
the low-paid, low-skilled sectors. Thus, even though there are students in the sample who 
have not yet completed their education, there are others who have completed their 
education (and thus fully qualified to undertake skilled jobs) and who are still undertaking 
the low-paid, low-skilled jobs. This to some extent reflects Dustmann et al.’s (2007) 
argument that educated migrants are still concentrated at the lower end of the pay 
distribution. However, given the limitations of the purposive sampling and the lack of 
comparable information on non-migrants, it is difficult to confirm with certainty whether 
migrants experience downgrading at work.  
 
The results from the logistic regression (Equation 5.1b) using student as control variable 
shows that student status does not significantly affect the minimum wage (see Table 5.2b 
and Appendix 6 –for SPSS result). It is thus fair to say that, even though students constitute 
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a third of the sample, student legal status does not statistically bias the analysis of the 
factors affecting the minimum wage. 
 
5.2. The National Minimum Wage’s Effects on the Non-Wage Benefits of Migrants 
This second part of the analysis of the primary research is particularly important, as the 
evidence from this part will constitute the original contribution of this thesis to the 
minimum-wage literature. There is a paucity of literature that discusses the UK National 
Minimum Wage’s effect on the non-wage benefits of migrant workers. This study intends 
to fill this gap by providing original evidence from the UK labour market on the basis of 
primary data. 
 
It is hypothesised that the minimum wage is a significant predictor of migrants’ access to 
non-wage benefits. In relation to the second research question, it is hypothesised that the 
minimum wage affects migrants differently, such that migrants on the minimum wage or 
below are less likely to receive non-wage benefits. Evidence from this part of the chapter 
will also be used to return to the first research question on the adverse effects of the 
minimum wage on non-wage benefits, as evidence from secondary data was not enough to 
prove or disprove the hypothesis.  
 
Logistic regression is used to estimate the minimum wage’s effect on migrants’ likelihood 
of receiving non-wage benefits. Each non-wage benefit is tested in the regression 
estimation. The hypothesis is that respondents who earn the minimum wage or below are 
less likely to receive non-wage benefits. The regression should be read as showing whether 
the minimum wage is a significant predictor of migrants’ likelihood of receiving non-wage 
benefits.  
 
The logistic regression presented here is using the ‘reverse causality’: the minimum wage 
is now reversed, from being the dependent variable, to being an independent variable. The 
main purpose of this is to understand the effect of minimum wage on the non- wage 
benefits, that is, whether the (minimum) level of wage affects the provision of non-wage 
benefits. In this sense, the minimum wage acts as the explanatory variable. These logistic 
regressions therefore contain the possibility of endogeneity problems, for instance the 
provision of such non-wage benefits may increase the probability of being in a minimum 
wage job. Thus, test of endogeneity is required before undertaking the analysis.  
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Control variables such as age, gender, student legal status, employment in a minimum  
sector and the receipt of the minimum wage or not are included in the regression analysis.  
 
There are eight logistic regressions. A Hausman Specification test is performed to examine 
whether simultaneity (endogeneity) exists between Minimum wage and each of the non-
wage benefits and, between Minimum Wage Sector and each of the non-wage benefits. It 
is decided to use the Work Permit variable as the instrument for Minimum Wage (Pearson 
correlation=0.344, p<0.01); and, Same Ethnicity Employer as the instrument for Minimum 
Wage Sector (Pearson correlation=0.153; p<0.05). The result of the endogeneity test 
(Hausman Specification) is presented in Appendix 7 while the result of the logistic 
regressions is in Appendix 8. 
 
Dependent Variable = Training 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b Minimum wage + Age + Gender + Minimum Wage sector + 
Student 
 (Equation 5.2a)  
 
Hausman Specification test shows the existence of endogeneity problem between 
Minimum Wage Sector and Training (see Appendix 7). Two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
method is applied to solve the endogeneity issue, however the results show that no 
regressor coefficient is significant. This might be due to inefficient instruments chosen, as 
explained in Gujarati (2011). Durbin, Wu and Hausman test is performed as suggested by 
Gujarati (2011) showing that the IV (2SLS) method might be less efficient (see Appendix 
7). Thus, logistic regression is preferred instead of IV (2SLS).  
 
The forward stepwise method of logistic regression selects Minimum Wage and Student as 
the significant variables (see Appendix 8). The Omnibus tests of model coefficients 
(Appendix 8) show a chi-squared coefficient = 14.822, df = 2 and a significance value, 
p=0.001, meaning that the Minimum Wage and Student variables increase the predictive 
ability of the model. The overall percentage of the correctly predicted cases is 70.7%. The 
total valid samples is 198 observations (99%). Hosmer and Lemeshow test shows HL= 
0.871 with significance 0.647, so the null hypothesis that the model adequately predicts 
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group membership would not be rejected and the logistic model (Equation 5.2a) is an 
adequate representation of the data.  
  
Dependent Variable = Meals 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student 
 (Equation 5.2b) 
 
Hausman Specification test shows the existence of endogeneity issue between 
Minimum Wage Sector and Meals (see Appendix 7). 2SLS method is applied to solve it.  
However, the results show no significant explanatory variables. Durbin, Wu and Hausman 
test is then performed and it shows that the null hypothesis would not be rejected, that is, 
the IV and OLS estimates are statistically the same (see Appendix 7). The logistic 
regression is thus preferred as it is deemed to be more efficient than the IV (2SLS) method. 
 
The forward stepwise method of logistic regression chooses Minimum Wage and Age as 
the significant variables (see Appendix 8). The Omnibus tests of model coefficients 
(Appendix 8) show a chi-squared coefficient = 39.032, df = 2 and a significance value, 
p=0.000, meaning that the Minimum Wage and Age variables increase the predictive 
ability of the model. The overall percentage of the correctly predicted cases is 71.2%. The 
total valid samples is 198 (99%). Hosmer and Lemeshow test shows HL= 6.190 with 
significance 0.626, so the null hypothesis would not be rejected and the logistic model 
(Equation 5.2b) is an adequate representation of the data.   
 
 Dependent Variable = Accommodation/Housing 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student    
(Equation 5.2c) 
 
Hausman Specification test shows no endogeneity issue between Minimum Wage 
Sector and Accommodation/housing (see Appendix 7 for details). 
 
The forward stepwise method of logistic regression selects Minimum Wage and Gender as 
the significant variables (see Appendix 8). The Omnibus tests of model coefficients 
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(Appendix 8) show a chi-squared coefficient = 9.051, df = 2 and a significance value, 
p=0.011, indicating that the Minimum Wage and Gender increase the predictive ability of 
the model. The overall percentage of the correctly predicted cases is 90.4%. The total valid 
samples is 198 (99%). Hosmer and Lemeshow test shows HL= 4.447 with significance 
0.108. The null hypothesis would not be rejected and the logistic model (Equation 5.2c) is 
an adequate representation of the data.  
 
 Dependent Variable = Holiday Pay 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student       
(Equation 5.2d) 
 
To check for endogeneity problems, Hausman Specification test is conducted. The 
result in Appendix 7 shows that there is endogeneity between Minimum Wage and Holiday 
Pay. As a remedy, 2SLS method is conducted. These results (Appendix 7) show no 
significant explanatory variables. Durbin, Wu and Hausman test is then performed to test 
whether IV method or the OLS is more efficient. Hausman test shows that the null 
hypothesis would not be rejected and the IV and OLS estimates are statistically the same. It 
is thus decided to use logistic regression (the original regression) instead as it is deemed to 
be more efficient. 
  
The forward stepwise method of logistic regression chooses Minimum Wage and Gender 
as the significant variables (see Appendix 8). The Omnibus tests of model coefficients 
(Appendix 8) show a chi-squared coefficient = 15.283, df = 2 and a significance value, 
p=0.000, meaning that the Minimum Wage and Gender increase the predictive ability of 
the model. The overall percentage of the correctly predicted cases is 65.7%. The total valid 
samples is 198 (99%). Hosmer and Lemeshow test shows HL= 0.482 with significance 
0.786, indicating that the logistic model of Equation 5.2d is an adequate representation of 
the data.  
 
 Dependent Variable = Paid Sick Leave 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student 
 (Equation 5.2e) 
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In order to check for endogeneity between Minimum Wage and Paid Sick Leave, 
Hausman Specification test is performed (Appendix 7). The results show that there is 
endogeneity between Minimum Wage and Paid Sick Leave. As a remedy, 2SLS method is 
applied. The results (Appendix 7) however show no significant explanatory variables. 
Durbin, Wu and Hausman test is then used to test whether IV method or the OLS is more 
efficient (Appendix 7). The null hypothesis (least square and IV estimates are statistically 
the same) would not be rejected (chi-square= 0.27, p= 99.96%). Therefore, the original 
regression (the logistic regression) is chosen as it is more efficient than the IV method. 
 
The forward stepwise method of logistic regression chooses Minimum Wage as the 
significant variable (see Appendix 8). The Omnibus tests of model coefficients (Appendix 
8) show a chi-squared coefficient = 5.981, df = 1 and a significance value, p=0.014, 
meaning that the Minimum Wage variable increases the predictive ability of the model. 
The overall percentage of the correctly predicted cases is 69.2% (N=198, 99%).  
 
 Dependent Variable = Health/Life Insurance 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student     
(Equation 5.2f) 
 
 The endogeneity test shows no endogeneity issues (see Appendix 7). The forward 
stepwise method of logistic regression chooses Minimum Wage Sector as the significant 
variable (see Appendix 8). The Omnibus tests of model coefficients (Appendix 8) show a 
chi-squared coefficient = 5.577, df = 1 and a significance value, p=0.018, indicating that 
the Minimum Wage Sector variable increases the predictive power of the model. The 
overall percentage of the correctly predicted cases is 89.9% (N=198, 99%). 
 
 Dependent Variable = Pension Scheme 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student       
(Equation 5.2g) 
 
Endogeneity test shows no endogeneity issues in Equation 5.2g (see Appendix 7). The 
forward stepwise method of logistic regression chooses Minimum Wage as the significant 
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variable (see Appendix 8). The Omnibus tests of model coefficients (Appendix 8) show a 
chi-squared coefficient = 9.005 and a significance value, p=0.003. The Minimum Wage 
variable increases the predictive ability of the model. The overall percentage of the 
correctly predicted cases is 91.4% (N=198). 
 
 Dependent Variable = Bonus 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student        
(Equation 5.2h) 
 
There is endogeneity between Minimum Wage and Bonus (see Appendix 7 for the 
endogeneity test). 2SLS method is conducted to solve it .The logistic regression (the 
original regression) is used instead as it is deemed to be more efficient (see Appendix 7 for 
IV/2SLS and Hausman test). The stepwise method does not give satisfactory results, 
therefore the enter method is used instead (see Appendix 8). The Omnibus tests of model 
coefficients show a chi-squared coefficient = 4.727, df = 5 and a non-significance value, 
p=0.450, meaning that no variable increases the predictive ability of the model. 
  
 
Table 5.15a and Table 5.15b present the results of the logistic regressions. Only the 
significant variables are reported as the forward stepwise method is used. The SPSS results 
are presented in Appendix 8.  
 
Equa-
tion 
Dependent 
Variable  
Minimum  
Wage  
Coefficient 
Minimum 
Wage  
Exp(B) 
Minimum 
Wage Sector 
Coefficient 
Minimum 
W. Sector 
Exp (B)   
5.2a Training -1.008*** 0.365   
5.2b Meals 1.663*** 5.277   
5.2c Accommodation 1.165** 3.206   
5.2d Holiday pay -0.905*** 0.404   
5.2e Paid sick leave -0.779** 0.459   
5.2f Health/life insurance   -1.231** 0.292 
5.2g Pension scheme  -1.893** 0.151   
5.2h Bonuses     
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Each equation has a valid N=198 (99%) 
*Significant at p<0.1. 
**Significant at p<0.05. 
***Significant at p<0.01.  
Table 5.15a The Minimum Wage’s Effects on Non-Wage Benefits (Regression Results) 
 
Equa-
tion 
Dependent 
Variable  
Age  
(Coefficient) 
Gender 
(Coefficient) 
Student 
(Coefficient)   
5.2a Training   1.036*** 
5.2b Meals -0.046**   
5.2c Accommodation  0.984*  
5.2d Holiday pay  0.750**  
5.2e Paid sick leave    
5.2f Health/life insurance    
5.2g Pension scheme     
5.2h Bonuses    
Each equation has valid N=198 (99%) 
*Significant at p<0.1. 
**Significant at p<0.05. 
***Significant at p<0.01.  
Table 5.15b Control Variables’ Effects on Non-Wage Benefits (Regression Results) 
 
5.2.1. The Minimum Wage’s Effect on Access to Training 
The logistic regression shows that the minimum wage is a significant predictor of migrants’ 
likelihood to have access to training. When migrants earn the minimum wage or below, 
they are 0.365 times less likely to receive training. When migrants are student, they are 
also 2.818 times more likely to receive training. 
 
5.2.2. The Minimum Wage’s Effect on Access to Meals  
In relation to meals as a non-wage benefit, the minimum wage increases migrants’ 
likelihood of receiving meals. Migrants on the minimum wage or below are 5.277 times 
more likely to receive meals. The increasing of age by one year also makes migrants 0.955 
times less likely to receive meals. 
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5.2.3. The Minimum Wage’s Effect on Access to Accommodation 
The minimum wage is a significant predictor of migrants’ access to accommodation or 
housing. Migrants who earn the minimum wage or below are 3.206 times more likely to 
have access to accommodation/housing. From the primary data, it is noted that the majority 
of accommodation is received by live-in domestic workers. A few restaurant workers also 
receive accommodation, but according to face-to-face interviews with restaurant workers, 
the majority of the accommodation is substandard. This finding is consistent with French 
and Möhrke’s (2007) argument that in cases where the employer provides accommodation, 
it is in inferior condition, and workers’ wages are kept as low as possible. The evidence 
suggests that accommodation is used as an offset in order to pay workers below the 
minimum wage. Male migrants are 2.675 times more likely to receive accommodation.  
 
5.2.4. The Minimum Wage’s Effect on Access to Holiday Pay 
The evidence on holiday pay confirms the hypothesis that the minimum wage has an 
adverse effect on non-wage benefits. Migrants who earn the minimum wage or below are 
0.404 times less likely to receive holiday pay. Furthermore, male migrants are 2.118 times 
more likely to receive holiday pay. 
 
5.2.5. The Minimum Wage’s Effect on Access to Paid Sick Leave 
The logistic regression confirms that the minimum wage significantly affects migrants’ 
likelihood of receiving paid sick leave. Migrants who earn the minimum wage or below are 
0.459 times less likely to receive paid sick leave. 
 
5.2.6. The Minimum Wage’s Effect on Access to Health/Life Insurance 
The logistic regression shows that migrants who are in the minimum wage sector are 0.292 
times less likely to receive health/life insurance. 
 
5.2.7. The Minimum Wage’s Effect on Access to Pension Schemes 
The logistic regression shows that migrants on the minimum wage or below are 0.151 
times less likely to receive a pension scheme. 
 
5.2.8. The Minimum Wage’s Effect on Access to Bonuses 
Bonuses do not depend on the minimum wage. 
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5.3. Minimum Wage, Minimum Wage Sector, and Control Variables on Non-Wage 
Benefits 
 
5.3.1. Does the Minimum Wage Adversely Affect Migrants’ Access to Non-Wage 
Benefits? 
Overall the findings (particularly from Table 5.15a) suggest that the minimum wage 
adversely affects migrants’ access to non-wage benefits. Migrants who earn the minimum 
wage or below are less likely to receive training, holiday pay, paid sick leave, and a 
pension scheme. This evidence suggests that migrants are affected differently by the 
minimum wage, in particular in relation to the non-wage benefits they receive. 
 
There is also evidence that the minimum wage increases migrants’ likelihood of receiving 
particular non-wage benefits. Migrants on the minimum wage or below are more likely to 
receive meal and accommodation.  A careful examination suggests that the non-wage 
benefits that is more likely to be received by migrants on the minimum wage or below – 
meals – are probably less costly than those they are less likely to receive – training, holiday 
pay, paid sick leave, and pension schemes.  
 
Accommodation/housing, which is more likely to be received by migrants on the minimum 
wage or below, may be less costly for particular employers to provide. The evidence shows 
that the majority of accommodation is received by live-in domestic workers, and by some 
restaurant workers on very low wages. Indeed, some restaurant workers even pointed out 
that the accommodation provided is far from healthy or acceptable standards, with no 
central heating. Moreover, the provision of accommodation seems to be used by employers 
as an excuse to pay very low wages. One restaurant worker who receives accommodation 
is paid as little as £1.81 per hour; one live-in domestic worker is paid as little as £2.57 per 
hour. In total, three of the four restaurant workers who receive accommodation are paid 
below the National Minimum Wage, while nine of the 11 domestic workers who are live-in 
workers are paid below the National Minimum Wage. It is certainly evident that employers 
violate the National Minimum Wage policy when they provide accommodation.  
 
The accommodation offset laid down by the 2011 National Minimum Wage policy is £4.73 
per day, but workers’ wages are being pushed far below the offset level. Table 5.16 shows 
that workers earning below the minimum wage (even the highest paid of them) still do not 
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earn the statutory wage when the National Minimum Wage’s offset for accommodation is 
taken into account. Indeed, the figures reveal the extent to which employers violate the 
policy by providing accommodation while underpaying their workers: the discrepancy 
ranges from £25.30 to £279.40 per week. 
 
 Hous 
per 
Day 
Days 
per 
Week 
Weekly 
Wage 
 
(a) 
Weekly 
Accommodation 
Offset Allowed 
by the National 
Minimum Wage 
Weekly Wage 
According to the 
National 
Minimum Wage, 
Minus 
Accommodation 
(b) 
Difference 
 
(b) – (a) 
Lowest 
paid 
below the 
minimum 
wage 
12 6 £130 £28.40 £409.40 £279.40 
Highest 
paid 
below the 
minimum 
wage 
12 5.5 £350 £26.00 £375.30 £25.30 
 
Table 5.16 The Minimum Wage and Accommodation Offsets 
 
This confirms previous findings by Anderson et al. (2007) that employers utilise 
accommodation to pay workers below the statutory minimum wage. In their report to the 
Trades Union Congress (TUC), Anderson et al. (2007: 11) demonstrate that ‘it is unlikely 
that the proportion of those earning below the minimum wage can be explained by the 
accommodation offset.’ Evidence from this thesis also reveals the substandard condition of 
the accommodation provided, confirming Anderson et al.’s (2007) findings. It is therefore 
problematic that workers to whom employers provide accommodation are excluded from 
the minimum wage.
2
 
                                               
2
 The TUC guide to the National Minimum Wage clearly states that ‘people working and 
living within their employer’s family home, who are provided with free accommodation 
and meals and who share in the tasks and leisure activities of the household’ are not 
entitled to the National Minimum Wage (TUC, 2008). A UNISON factsheet similarly 
states that ‘workers who live in their employer’s home’ are excluded from the minimum 
wage (UNISON, 2012) 
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On the other hand, this study argues that the non-wage benefits that are less likely to be 
received by migrants on the minimum wage or below – training, holiday pay, paid sick 
leave, and pension schemes – would make greater contributions towards the improvement 
of workers’ living standards; moreover, they would also provide better value for money. 
To sum up, the minimum wage tends to reduce migrants’ likelihood of receiving the non-
wage benefits which are more costly and make a greater contribution to improving workers’ 
lives. 
 
5.3.2. Does the Minimum Wage Sector Adversely Affect Migrants’ Access to Non-
Wage Benefits? 
 
Table 5.15a shows that migrants who work in the minimum wage sectors are less likely to 
get access to health/life insurance. ,  
 
5.3.3. Do Age, Gender and Student Legal Status Significantly Affect Migrants’ Access 
to Non-Wage Benefits? 
Gender is the only significant determinant for access to accommodation and holiday pay. 
Male migrants are more likely to have access to accommodation and holiday pay. Age has 
a significant negative effect on meals. Moreover, students in the sample are more likely to 
receive training.  
 
5.4. The Proportion of Non-Wage Benefits Received 
It is evident that migrants in low-paid, low-skilled sectors generally receive fewer non-
wage benefits. Table 5.17 presents the statistics on the non-wage benefits received by the 
respondents. The most commonly received benefit is training, which is received by 71% of 
the total sample. The second most commonly received is holiday pay, which is received by 
only 59.5%. Other non-wage benefits represent smaller proportions: paid break time (38%), 
bonuses (36.5%), paid sick leave (31%), health/life insurance (10.5%), and pension 
schemes (8.5%). The provision of health/life insurance and pensions, for example, in low-
paid, low-skilled jobs is extremely low. 
 
 
 
 
167 
 
Non-Wage Benefits 
Received 
Whether the Respondent Earns the 
Minimum Wage or Above  
Total  
(% of Total 
Sample) Minimum Wage Above-
Minimum Wage 
Training*** 53 87 142 (71%) 
Meals*** 52 23 75 (37.5%) 
Accommodation/housing** 13 6 19 (9.5%) 
Holiday pay*** 41 76 119 (59.5%) 
Paid sick leave**  19 42 62 (31%) 
Health/life insurance* 5 15 21 (10.5%) 
Pension scheme** 2 15 17 (8.5%) 
Bonuses 36 36 73 (36.5%)  
 N=198 (99%). 
The minimum wage’s impact on non-wage benefits based on logistic regression results: 
*Significant at p<10%. 
**Significant at p<5% . 
***Significant at p<1%. 
Table 5.17 Non-Wage Benefits and Wage Levels 
 
5.5. Non-Wage Benefits by Sector 
This thesis is also interested in the non-wage benefits received in low-paid, low-skilled 
sectors. Pearson’s chi-square coefficient was used to analyse whether there is an 
association between particular sectors and particular non-wage benefits. Tables 5.18a and 
5.18b show the variations in non-wage benefits between the sectors. The results show that 
the majority of non-wage benefits are significantly associated with particular sectors. This 
means that the non-wage benefits received are associated with the sectors in which 
migrants work: for example, meals are mainly received by restaurant workers, while 
accommodation is mainly received by domestic workers. In other words, particular sectors 
provide particular non-wage benefits. This result supports the logistic regression findings 
discussed earlier (see Section 5.3b and Table 5.15a) about the effect of the minimum wage 
sector on non-wage benefits.  
 
This section will discuss in detail three sectors – the domestic-work, cleaning and 
restaurant sectors – and will argue that migrants in these sectors are more deprived in terms 
of the non-wage benefits they receive. In addition to some descriptive quantitative data, 
this section will also present a limited amount of qualitative analysis, drawing on the 
experiences of migrants in these particular sectors. 
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Non-Wage Benefits Sector 
Retail/Shops 
(n=34) 
Sales 
(n=8) 
Domestic 
Work 
(n=21) 
Cleaning 
(n=25) 
Care 
(n=9) 
Training*** 27 7 5 19 5 
Meals*** 9 1 16 0 1 
Accommodation/housing
*** 
0 0 11 1 1 
Holiday pay** 21 3 10 20 8 
Paid sick leave *** 14 0 4 11 5 
Health/life insurance 2 0 1 2 1 
Pension scheme*** 4 0 0 4 1 
Bonuses*** 13 4 18 4 3 
N=200 (100%) 
Non-wage benefits’ association with sectors based on Pearson’s chi-square coefficient:  
*Significant at p<10%. 
**Significant at p<5%. 
***Significant at p<1%. 
Table 5.18a Non-Wage Benefits by Sector 
 
Non-Wage Benefits Sector 
Construction 
(n=9) 
Hotel 
(n=9) 
Restaurant/ 
Bar 
(n=38) 
Admin-
istration 
(n=10) 
Factory 
(n=10) 
Teaching 
(n=5) 
Training*** 6 8 25 9 9 4 
Meals*** 1 5 35 1 1 0 
Accommodation*** 1 0 4 0 0 0 
Holiday pay** 2 6 18 8 6 4 
Paid sick leave *** 1 6 5 3 4 4 
Health/life insurance 1 1 2 1 3 2 
Pension scheme*** 0 1 0 1 1 3 
Bonuses*** 4 2 10 4 4 1 
N=200 (100%) 
Non-wage benefits’ association with sectors based on Pearson’s chi-square:  
**Significant at p<5%. 
***Significant at p<1%. 
Table 5.18b Non-Wage Benefits by Sector 
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5.5.1. Domestic Work 
The evidence shows that meals, bonuses and gifts are the most commonly received non-
wage benefits of domestic workers. Domestic work in the sample is the sector with the 
longest average hours of work: workers in this sector do on average 10 hours of work per 
day. The record for hours worked is also held by domestic workers: the longest hours of 
work reach 93.5 hours per week. Some domestic workers report that their work is not non-
stop; they have break times along the way. Paid break time is therefore commonly received 
by domestic workers. Half of domestic workers in the sample are live-in workers. They 
therefore receive accommodation from their employers. Approximately half of domestic 
workers receive holiday pay. Only five of the 21 domestic workers receive training. 
Among those who do not receive training, most report that they are used to the job and 
already know how to do it. None of the domestic workers receives a pension. A very low 
number receive health/life insurance or paid sick leave. 
 
5.5.2. Cleaning 
None of the cleaners receives meals during the day, although one cleaner said that coffee, 
tea and milk are available for free. None of the cleaners receives paid transport. The 
average age of cleaners in the sample is 44 years old; however, only four of the 25 cleaners 
receive a pension entitlement from their employers. Twenty-two of the 25 cleaners have 
children; of these 22, 10 have children in the UK. However, only one cleaner is in receipt 
of childcare benefit, and this cleaner reports that the childcare benefit has been reduced in 
monetary value. Only four of the 25 cleaners receive any bonuses. The same number 
receive gifts. Two cleaners do not receive any non-wage benefits other than training. 
Another two cleaners do not receive any non-wage benefits at all, not even training. Thus 
there are two cleaners in the sample who receive nothing other than wages. In total, six of 
the 25 cleaners do not receive training. One respondent commented on this: ‘No training 
because it is just cleaning; no needs training.’ One cleaner commented on working 
conditions: ‘The chemical used for toilet is too strong for my eyes.’ This demonstrates that 
there is a health and safety concern in cleaning work, and it is therefore a cause for concern 
that there are cleaners who never receive any training. It is also disturbing to note that only 
two of the 25 cleaners receive health/life insurance from their employers. 
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5.5.3. Restaurant Work 
The evidence shows an extremely high proportion of low-wage workers in the restaurant 
sector: 30 of the 38 restaurant workers earn the minimum wage or below. Three of them 
are the lowest-paid workers in the sample. A qualitative analysis was conducted of these 
lowest-paid workers’ experiences of non-wage benefits. One of the lowest-paid workers 
receives only £130 a week for working 12 hours a day, six days a week. This is as little as 
£1.81 per hour. This respondent receives a meal once a day; however, he reports that there 
is a separation between meals for staff and meals for customers/family staff (the owner’s 
family members also work in the restaurant). For example, there is ordinary rice for staff 
outside the family, but the rice given to customers is also given to family staff. Staff in this 
restaurant can have accommodation on the second floor of the restaurant building. 
However, the respondent states that the accommodation is in inferior condition and does 
not reach appropriate health and safety standards: for example, it has no heating, so it is 
extremely cold in the winter. It also has inferior sanitation facilities. This respondent also 
reports some serious problems during his one and a half years of working life:  
 
Sometimes boss does not pay money in time, a week late, one of the reasons is 
because the money had been used for boss’ father visit to [name of a country 
matching the employer’s ethnicity], this is not good because you should not mix 
personal matter and business matter. 
 
This respondent’s deprivation in terms of non-wage benefits is clearly illustrated in this 
example: 
 
They never give you minimum wage, they never give holiday pay. There are five 
staffs in the kitchen and four waiters. Chef who controls the kitchen is too much 
rude; boss is also rude blaming staffs without any reason. Boss says bad words, if 
boss do something wrong, boss will throw it to us [the staff]. When we want to 
break our fasting [i.e. for Ramadan, at around 8.50pm], the restaurant is in a busy 
environment, we never get chance to break our fast, boss does not allow us, even 
after we ask for it. 
 
This respondents’ experience suggests that some employers may see the provision of non-
wage benefits, no matter how substandard, as an excuse for non-compliance with the 
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minimum wage. When I asked the respondents why they had chosen jobs that offer very 
low wages and unacceptable working conditions, they answered that it was simply because 
the jobs offered free accommodation. This evidence might further support the findings that 
the minimum wage is offset (and violated) by the provision of less costly non-wage 
benefits. This qualitative evidence confirms the statistical evidence that the minimum wage 
to some extent increases the provision of less costly non-wage benefits such as meals and 
accommodation. 
 
For some respondents, their current jobs were not their first experience of this kind of work. 
It emerged from the qualitative interviews that at least two respondents had previously 
worked in similar jobs. One respondent said his previous restaurant job had paid £70 a 
week for 12 hours a day, six days a week: this is less than £1 an hour. He explained that 
most of the staff who worked there did not have work permits. The other respondent also 
spoke of a previous job in a takeaway restaurant which paid only £10 a day for 12–13 
hours’ work per day. Again, their reason for choosing these jobs was because the jobs 
offered free accommodation. This is in line with this thesis’ argument that employers 
violate the minimum wage by offering low-cost non-wage benefits. 
 
In the sample, there are four restaurant workers who receive accommodation. Three of 
these workers earn well below the minimum wage, earning £1.81, £3.75 and £4.63 per 
hour. I asked how the respondents were connected with the types of restaurant jobs that 
pay extremely low wages – in other words, how they got their jobs. Some respondents said 
that there was a job centre agent in their community who had a connection with the 
restaurants. As one of the respondents put it: ‘If we need jobs, we go to the job centre and 
ask for restaurant jobs and the job centre will call the restaurants to ask if there is any 
vacancy.’ When I further asked whether respondents had been asked to prove their legal 
status, some respondents stated: ‘Most likely they [the restaurants that offer extremely low 
wages] do not ask if workers have any paper. They will ask only if there is any sense that 
the immigration official is approaching the restaurant. …Because the job is cash-paying 
job so staffs do not pay NI, as well as the company does not pay tax.’ 
 
The responses confirm that migrants are being utilised for the economic benefit of 
employers. Employers clearly flout workers’ rights in the terms of the minimum wage, 
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non-wage benefits and fair working conditions. The next section will provide another 
qualitative analysis of the non-wage benefits of migrants. 
 
5.6. How Have Non-Wage Benefits Been Reduced? 
The survey asks whether there have been any reductions in the non-wage benefits received. 
However, there is no evidence that the minimum wage has any association with the 
reduction of non-wage benefits, as the Pearson’s chi-square coefficient is not significant. 
There are 30 migrant workers (15% of the total sample) who have had some reduction on 
their non-wage benefits (see Table 5.19). Eleven of them earn the minimum wage or below. 
 
The questionnaire asks the respondents what has been reduced, and asks why they think 
the reduction happened. Table 5.20 lists the reductions and the reasons suggested by the 
workers. The non-wage benefits that have been reduced, according to the responses, are 
performance-related incentives, pension provision, gifts, childcare benefit, holiday pay, 
cash in lieu of holiday, break times, meals, paid transport, and the provision of equipment 
that was previously free of charge.  
 
There are several findings of note. First, there is no response that clearly mentions the 
minimum wage as the reason for a reduction in non-wage benefits. However, the majority 
of workers mentioned cost-saving as the main reason for the reduction. Because workers’ 
wages are a part of labour costs, such a reduction might be indirectly linked with (an 
increase in) the minimum wage. However, this needs further investigation, perhaps from 
the employers’ point of view.  
 
Second, the reductions are not all about non-wage benefits. A few responses indicate 
reductions in staff numbers or working hours. Four responses suggest that there is a 
requirement for flexible or temporary work in their jobs, although there is no evidence that 
this is because of a rise in the minimum wage:  
 
Reduced hours if not many customers. 
(Retail/shop worker, female, 28) 
 
In quiet period, seasonal staffs are reduced. 
(Hotel worker, female, 30) 
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Now I have less shift, if it is getting more busy then they will call me.  
(Factory worker, male, 24) 
 
Now is a busy time, they will reduce people when the factory is not busy any more. 
(Factory worker, male, 28) 
 
Third, of the 30 respondents who had experienced a reduction, six (a fifth of them) 
commented that they had been required to put in extra effort at work. This is illustrated by 
the following six comments:  
 
 
Previously they have cleaning employees [from a separate contractor], now they do 
not hire them anymore, therefore we have to do cleaning on our own. 
(Retail worker, male, 33) 
 
Previously there are four staffs in a shift, now there are only three staffs in a shift. 
(Hotel worker, male, 25) 
 
No overtime any more, rushing to work faster. 
(Factory worker, male, 54) 
 
Overtime is no more paid. 
(Restaurant worker, male, 29) 
 
If work extra hours then will be paid as normal hours, not as overtime. 
(Factory worker, male, 27) 
 
It is difficult to get more break time, especially in busy hours, for example 
sometimes we work more than five hours but still get 10 minutes’ break; we never 
get chance to round it into six hours and get 30 minutes’ break. If work six hours or 
more then we never get chance to get 40 minutes’ break. 
(Coffee-chain worker, female, 23) 
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Has the Respondent Had a Reduction in 
Non-Wage Benefits? 
Minimum-Wage 
Workers 
Above-Minimum 
Wage Workers 
Yes 11 (12.6%)  19 (17.1%) 
No 
Total  
Valid N=198 (99%) 
76 (87.4%) 
87 (100%) 
 92 (82.9%) 
111 (100%) 
 
Table 5.19 Reductions in Non-Wage Benefits and Wage Levels 
 
 
What Has Been Reduced Reason (Worker’s View) 
‘Cut hours and overtime, usually work eight hours a day, now 
only six hours.’ 
‘Economic condition.’ 
‘Cut staffs, cut hours, cut incentives based on performance: 
previously if staffs perform well, they will receive incentives 
such as voucher to stay for free in hotel/hotel network, now 
there is no more performance-based incentives.’ 
‘Financial crisis.’ 
‘Pension and seasonal staffs.’ ‘In quiet period, seasonal 
staffs are reduced, 
financial/economic 
condition.’ 
‘Reduce hours.’ ‘Because as a low-cost 
hotel, they also 
implement a low-cost 
budget, and is also 
because of financial 
crisis.’ 
‘They will reduce people next year (2012).’ ‘Now is a busy time, they 
will reduce people when 
the factory is not busy any 
more.’ 
‘Working hours and staffs per shift, previously there are four 
staffs in a shift, now there are only three staffs in a shift.’ 
‘Recession, cost-cutting.’ 
‘Reduced hours if not many customers, depend on money the 
employers have.’ 
‘Depend on money they 
have.’ 
‘No overtime any more, rushing to work faster.’ ‘Cost-saving.’ 
‘Before, they give me scarf, perfume, something like that, but 
do not give me any more.’ 
‘I think they fed up.’ 
‘Child benefit is reduced, previously they give more.’  ‘Save money.’ 
‘Cut the working hours.’ ‘I think they do it because 
of my age, because I am 
old.’ 
‘Discount on product used to be 50% but applicable to 
managerial level only, now is 30% but applicable to all staffs.’ 
‘Flexibility to include all 
staffs, no cost reason.’ 
‘Holiday pay.’ ‘I do not know the 
reason.’ 
‘It is difficult to get more break time, especially in busy hours, 
for example sometimes we work more than five hours but still 
‘Save cost by saving 
break time, especially in 
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get 10 minutes’ break; we never get chance to round it into six 
hours and get 30 minutes’ break. If work six hours or more 
then we never get chance to get 40 minutes’ break.’ 
busy time.’ 
‘Less shift.’ ‘Now I have less shift, if 
it is getting more busy 
then they will call me.’ 
‘Meals before three times a day, now twice a day.’ ‘Not many customers and 
because of too many 
staffs.’ 
‘No overtime anymore.’ ‘Cost-saving.’ 
‘No overtime anymore.’ ‘Cost-saving.’ 
‘No overtime anymore.’ ‘Much cuts, no more 
funding as before.’ 
‘Overtime no more paid.’ ‘Cutting the budget.’ 
‘Overtime, if work extra hours then will be paid as normal 
hours, not as overtime.’ 
‘Recession, cost-cutting.’ 
‘Previously if we do not want to take holiday, we can convert 
it to cash, now we cannot do it anymore.’ 
‘Cost-saving.’ 
‘Previously they have cleaning employees [from a separate 
contractor], now they do not hire them anymore, therefore we 
have to do cleaning on our own.’ 
‘Cost-saving.’ 
‘Previously they pay money in hand and we receive less 
reduction of NI tax, now they pay money through bank and 
we receive more reduction of NI tax.’ 
‘They want to show their 
budget to government that 
they are paying less 
money to employees, so 
they should receive less 
tax.’ 
‘Reducing hours of work and number of employees.’ ‘Economic downturn, 
tough competition.’ 
‘Sometimes my working hours are reduced, especially when 
there are not many customers.’ 
‘Not many customers.’ 
‘They keep reducing working hours.’ ‘To save money.’ 
‘They reduce people.’ ‘Cost-saving.’ 
‘They reduce people.’ ‘Cost-saving.’ 
‘Transport payment was £1.50 per hour before, now it is only 
£1 per hour. They cut it one year earlier.’ 
‘Cost management.’ 
‘T-shirt has been charged £25 since June 2011, previously was 
free.’ 
‘Cost-saving.’ 
 
Table 5.20 Responses as to What Has Been Reduced and Why 
 
5.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the analysis of primary data collected from 200 London-based 
migrants who work in low-paid, low-skilled jobs. The evidence suggests that there is a 
significant proportion of skilled migrants who work in low-paid, low-skilled jobs. The 
majority of migrants in the sample have an above-secondary level of education. The 
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majority of the sample also has a medium-to-fluent level of spoken English. Half of the 
migrants in the sample have work experience in their home countries. A third of the 
migrants in the sample have work experience in other countries abroad. The fact that 43.5% 
of the sample earn the minimum wage or below may suggest that the phenomenon of 
downgrading exists. Skilled migrants are earning the minimum wage or below, and skilled 
migrants certainly undertake jobs in low-paid, low-skilled sectors. This follows Dustmann 
et al.’s (2007) findings on the downgrading of migrants.  
 
From the logistic regressions, it is evident that there are factors which explain migrants’ 
likelihood of earning the minimum wage or below. These factors may also be able to 
explain why the phenomenon of downgrading exists. The logistic regressions show just 
three significant factors which affect migrants’ likelihood of earning the minimum wage or 
below. The first factor is the hours of work per week. If the hours of work per week 
increase by one hour, migrants become 1.038 times more likely to earn the minimum wage 
or below. The second is the ethnicity of the employer. If the employer is of local 
(British/native) ethnicity, migrants are 0.305 times less likely to earn the minimum wage or 
below. The third is work permit status. If migrants need a permit to work, they are 4.646 
times more likely to earn the minimum wage or below. Human capital factors are clearly 
ruled out by the logistic regression. It is thus evident that there are factors other than 
human capital which explain migrants’ likelihood of earning the minimum wage or below. 
 
The evidence also shows that migrants are differently affected by the minimum wage. The 
logistic regressions suggest that the minimum wage adversely affects migrants’ likelihood 
of receiving some non-wage benefits. The results show that migrants on the minimum 
wage or below are less likely to receive training, holiday pay, paid sick leave, or a pension 
scheme. Migrants on the minimum wage sector are also less likely to receive health/life 
insurance. On the other hand, migrants on the minimum wage or below are more likely to 
receive meals and accommodation. This suggests that the minimum wage and the 
minimum wage sector adversely affects migrants’ likelihood of receiving non-wage 
benefits, in the sense that migrants on the minimum wage or below (or on the minimum 
wage sector) have less access to more-costly and valuable non-wage benefits, but have 
more access to less-costly non-wage benefits. Evidence also pointed out that 
accommodation/housing has been used as an offset for the minimum wage, and even 
worse, that accommodation/housing might be being used as an excuse for not paying 
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statutory wages. Evidence also says that migrants in minimum wage sector are indeed 
more exposed to changes (reduction) in their non-wage benefits. It is thus fair to say that 
the low paying sectors play a role to determine the reduction in some of non-wage benefits. 
 
A number of qualitative responses show that migrants have experienced some reductions in 
non-wage benefits; however, there is no evidence that the reductions are because of rises in 
the minimum wage. There is a little evidence from the qualitative analysis that migration is 
linked to temporary and flexible work. There is no evidence from the qualitative analysis 
that the minimum wage is linked to temporary or flexible work. There is a little evidence 
that migrants have to put in extra effort at work, but there is not enough evidence to say 
that this is because of any rise in the minimum wage. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
We need to enforce the laws we currently have on the protection of wages. It is one 
of the proudest achievements of the last Labour government that we introduced the 
national minimum wage… But unfortunately, too many people are not receiving its 
protection. We need to toughen up the enforcement of the minimum wage so that 
employers understand not paying it is a real risk.  
(Miliband, 2012) 
 
Indeed, many workers still do not receive the minimum wage. The survey conducted for 
this study shows that approximately 40% of the sample earn below the 2011 National 
Minimum Wage, while approximately 30% still earn below the 2010 National Minimum 
Wage. It is certainly time to toughen up the enforcement of the minimum wage. 
 
To conclude this thesis, let us first recall the three main arguments that reflect the purpose 
of the research as a whole. First is the argument that the minimum wage has adverse 
effects on the UK labour market. The increase in the minimum wage is simply an increase 
in labour costs. Thus necessary action will be taken to offset the minimum wage. 
According to this argument, the minimum wage is likely to affect the provision of non-
wage benefits and working hours. 
 
Second is the argument that the minimum wage differently affects migrant workers. 
Linking the minimum wage with migration, it is argued that the minimum wage adversely 
affects migrant workers in term of their non-wage benefits. Some migrants might derive 
the least benefit from any rise in the minimum wage: they might not receive the statutory 
wage or any non-wage benefits. Migrants on the minimum wage or below are less likely to 
receive some non-wage benefits.  
 
Third is the argument that the minimum wage is likely to drive the creation of secondary 
jobs.. It may reduce the length of stay of migrants in their current jobs: this might be an 
indication of the temporary and flexibilised effect of the minimum wage, although reasons 
other than the minimum wage may also explain the creation of secondary jobs. 
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6.1 Revisiting the Research Questions 
Three main research questions were constructed to address the topic of the thesis. 
  
1.  What are the minimum wage’s effects on non-wage benefits, working hours and 
working arrangements in the UK labour market? 
 
The first research question was designed to investigate the effects of the minimum wage on 
non-wage benefits, working hours and working arrangements. It was constructed on the 
basis of the neoclassical argument that extra costs will not be accepted unless they are 
accompanied by extra benefits (Menger, 1871; Cobb and Douglas, 1928). Thus an increase 
in minimum-wage costs must be compensated by an increase in worker productivity; 
otherwise employers will take any necessary action to reduce costs elsewhere. Simon and 
Kaestner (2003) make it clear that when the minimum wage rises, employers have two 
options: to reduce employment, or to reduce the non-wage portion of compensation. This 
thesis follows previous studies by Wessels (1980), Leighton and Mincer (1981), 
Hashimoto (1982) and Royalty (2000) on the adverse effects of the minimum wage on 
non-wage benefits; by Wessels (1980) on the minimum wage’s effects on working 
arrangements; and by Card and Krueger (1994, 1995) on the minimum wage’s effect on 
working hours and employment. Chapter 4, which analyses secondary research from three 
major labour surveys in the UK, is devoted to the first research question. Chapter 4 
examines the minimum wage’s effects on non-wage benefits, working hours and working 
arrangements in the UK labour market. 
 
2. What are the differentiated effects of the minimum wage on migrant workers in 
terms of their wages and non-wage benefits?  
2a. What are the factors affecting migrants earning the minimum wage or below? 
2b. What are the minimum wage’s effects on the non-wage benefits of migrants? 
2c. Do migrants in low-skilled, low-paid sectors display any interesting phenomena? 
 
The second research questions focus the investigation on the minimum wage in relation to 
migration. Limited studies have been conducted in the UK to address the minimum wage’s 
effects on migrant workers. Dustmann et al. (2007) and French and Möhrke (2007) are 
among the very few to address the minimum wage’s effects on migration. Building from 
Dustmann et al.’s (2007) findings, Chapter 5 uses primary research to investigate whether 
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the phenomenon of downgrading exists, i.e. whether skilled migrants are undertaking low-
skilled, low-paid jobs. Chapter 5 also examines the factors affecting migrants earning the 
minimum wage or below, in other words, which factors are able to explain why 
downgrading occurs. Human capital, demographic features, migration and employment-
related variables are tested to establish whether they can explain migrants’ likelihood of 
earning the minimum wage or below. Chapter 5 also discusses the minimum wage’s effect 
on migrants’ likelihood of receiving non-wage benefits. It tests whether migrants on the 
minimum wage or below are less likely to receive particular non-wage benefits. In 
conjunction with Chapter 5, Chapter 4 also discusses how the minimum wage differently 
affects migrant workers, using secondary data. 
 
3. What are the implications of the research findings for the National Minimum Wage 
policy?  
 
The empirical evidence from the secondary and primary research will produce evidence-
based recommendations for possible improvements to the National Minimum Wage policy. 
The recommendations section of this chapter (Section 6.4. below) will set out some 
evidence-based recommendations to answer the third research question. 
 
6.2 Re-examining the Methodology 
Secondary and primary research was conducted to answer the research questions. The main 
methodology for analysing both secondary and primary data was quantitative and positivist. 
The secondary data drew from three major public surveys in the UK that had information 
on wages, non-wage benefits and working environments. The three public surveys were the 
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 
(WERS) and the Labour Force Survey (LFS). The secondary research was designed to 
answer the research questions on the minimum wage’s impact on non-wage benefits, 
working hours and working arrangements, and particularly on how the minimum wage 
affects non-wage benefits. The difference-in-difference method was applied following 
previous studies (see Card and Krueger, 1994, 1995; Stewart, 2003, 2004; Arulampalam et 
al., 2004; Dickerson, 2007). The secondary research was designed to investigate the first 
research question and also part of the second.  
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The primary research was conducted by means of a face-to-face questionnaire survey with 
200 London-based migrants who work in low-paid, low-skilled jobs. It was mainly 
designed to answer the second research question on how the minimum wage differently 
affects migrant workers, and in particular on how the minimum wage affects migrants’ 
likelihood of receiving non-wage benefits. The questionnaire targeted important variables 
on wages, working hours, non-wage benefits, human capital, and migration-related 
variables. The main technique of analysis was logistic regression, first to examine the 
factors affecting migrants earning the minimum wage or below, and second, to examine 
the minimum wage’s effect on migrants’ likelihood of receiving non-wage benefits. 
Pearson’s chi-squared correlation and a number of qualitative interviews were also used to 
support the analysis. 
 
6.3 Restating the Contributions 
Overall, the contributions of this thesis are mainly to the UK minimum-wage literature. 
First, it has uncovered some evidence that the minimum wage adversely affects the UK 
labour market; however, there is no evidence that the minimum wage reduces the provision 
of non-wage benefits. Some adverse effects have been found on working hours 
(particularly overtime hours) and additional pay. There is also a possible link to temporary 
and flexible work, although the evidence for this is inconclusive. The minimum wage is 
also a significant predictor of migrants’ likelihood of receiving non-wage benefits: 
migrants who earn the minimum wage or below are less likely to receive certain valuable 
non-wage benefits. The secondary and primary research findings are complementary in 
their answers to the research questions. 
 
6.3.1. Secondary Research 
The secondary research contributes significant findings on the adverse effects of the 
minimum wage. The secondary data suggests that the minimum wage adversely affects 
overtime hours and additional pay (pay on top of basic pay). The minimum wage reduces 
overtime hours by 0.33 to 11.22 percentage points. The minimum wage reduces additional 
pay by 4.31 percentage points. It also increases the availability of job-sharing by 7.7%, 
although it is unclear whether job-sharing contributes (adversely) to the flexible and 
temporary working arrangements.  
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The secondary research tests the minimum wage’s effects on a wide range of non-wage 
benefits, although the findings show insufficient evidence to say that the minimum wage 
adversely affects non-wage benefits. The secondary data shows that the minimum wage 
increases training paid for by employers; it also increases employees’ contributions to 
pensions; and it increases incentive pay, and overtime pay. No evidence was found in 
relation to other non-wage benefits.  
 
6.3.2. Primary Research 
The primary research answers the research questions on how the minimum wage 
differently affects migrant workers. First, the primary research investigates whether 
downgrading occurs in the primary research sample. The majority of migrants in the 
sample have an above-secondary level of education and a medium-to-fluent level of 
spoken English. Half of the sample have work experience in their home country, and the 
analysis has shown that they undertake downgraded occupations in the UK. A third of the 
sample also have experience of working abroad. The fact that 43.5% of the sample earn the 
2011 National Minimum Wage or below (and approximately 30% of the sample earn 
below the 2010 National Minimum Wage) suggests the existence of signs of the 
phenomenon of downgrading, which chimes with the work of Dustmann et al. (2007). This 
needs to be justified further as the primary research does not control for non-migrants in 
order to test whether the downgrading also exists generally in the UK labour market. 
 
Second, the primary research identifies factors which may affect migrants’ likelihood of 
earning the minimum wage or below (including human capital, demographic, employment 
and migration-related variables). The evidence shows that an increase in the hours of work 
and the need for a work permit increase migrants’ likelihood of earning the minimum wage 
or below. It also shows that if the employer is of local ethnic (British/native) origin, 
migrants are less likely to earn the minimum wage or below. 
 
Third, the primary research examines how the minimum wage differently affects migrant 
workers in terms of their non-wage benefits. The logistic regressions test whether the 
minimum wage is a significant predictor of migrants’ likelihood of receiving non-wage 
benefits. The evidence shows that migrants who earn the minimum wage or below are less 
likely to receive training, holiday pay, paid sick leave, and a pension scheme. Migrants 
who earn the minimum wage or below, however, are more likely to receive meals and 
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accommodation. It is evident that the minimum wage to some extent reduces migrants’ 
likelihood of receiving particular valuable non-wage benefits, but increases their likelihood 
of receiving less costly non-wage benefits. It is also evident that accommodation/housing 
has been used as an offset to avoid paying the statutory minimum wage: 12 of the 19 
migrants who receive accommodation are being paid below the minimum wage, in some 
cases well below. 
 
Fourth, it is clear from the qualitative analysis that 30 respondents have experienced a 
reduction in non-wage benefits, working hours or shifts. However, there is no evidence that 
these reductions are because of any rise in the minimum wage. Four of these 30 
respondents comment that their jobs are linked with a demand for temporary or flexible 
working. Six of the 30 comment that they have to work harder. However, there is no direct 
evidence that the minimum wage is the cause of these conditions. The majority of the 
respondents mention cost-saving as the reason for the lowering of benefits or working 
conditions. 
 
6.4. Recommending Policy Improvements 
This thesis presents substantial findings which have implications for the National 
Minimum Wage policy. It is evident that the National Minimum Wage policy adversely 
affects the UK labour market, particularly migrant workers. The evidence-based 
recommendations aim simply to eliminate the adverse effects of the National Minimum 
Wage, and in particular to implement a policy which will be fair to all workers. Drawing 
on the evidence generated by the secondary and primary research, this thesis makes 
evidence-based recommendations as follows. 
 
First, the National Minimum Wage policy should not provide any accommodation offset. 
There should be no non-wage benefits that can offset the National Minimum Wage. The 
minimum wage and non-wage benefits should be treated as workers’ rights; neither one 
should be used to offset (or conflict with) the other. The National Minimum Wage and 
non-wage benefits should be regulated separately. Thus employers should provide both 
statutory wages and non-wage benefits. The evidence clearly shows that accommodation 
benefits are being used by employers to avoid paying the National Minimum Wage. It is 
evident that some domestic workers and restaurant workers who live in employer-provided 
accommodation are being paid far below the National Minimum Wage. In fact none of 
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these workers, who are paid below the minimum, gets the statutory accommodation offset 
suggested by the policy. Therefore this thesis recommends that the National Minimum 
Wage policy should remove the accommodation offset. 
 
Second, the National Minimum Wage should protect workers who work long hours. The 
evidence shows that some workers who are paid weekly or monthly perform excessive 
hours of work, but the minimum wage fails to cover these long hours. It is also evident that 
hours of work is a significant factor determining workers’ likelihood of earning the 
minimum wage or below. The evidence shows that workers who work excessive hours are 
paid below the National Minimum Wage. This thesis therefore recommends that the 
National Minimum Wage policy should ensure that workers who are paid weekly or 
monthly receive the equivalent of statutory hourly pay, particularly workers in low-paid, 
low-skilled jobs and workers who live in employer-provided accommodation. In either 
case, it will be necessary to work closely with local authorities or unions to ensure the clear 
statement of working hours in employment contracts. 
 
Third, the National Minimum Wage should be enforced in all forms of employment, 
regardless of the employer’s ethnicity. Evidence shows that workers whose employers are 
of local/native ethnicity have less of a tendency to earn the minimum wage or below. 
Although there is no evidence that employers of non-local ethnicity are more likely to pay 
lower wages, the employer’s ethnicity should not create any differences in relation to the 
minimum wage. The minimum wage should be applied by all employers, regardless of 
ethnicity. 
  
Fourth, in conjunction with the first recommendation, the National Minimum Wage should 
not make any difference to migrants’ likelihood of accessing non-wage benefits. A 
worker’s likelihood of receiving non-wage benefits should not be determined by their 
wages. Workers on the minimum wage or below are less likely to receive valuable non-
wage benefits such as training, holiday pay, paid sick leave, and pension schemes. It is 
again a matter of the enforcement of labour standards: both the National Minimum Wage 
and the rights of workers to receive statutory non-wage benefits (such as training and 
holiday pay) must be enforced. 
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Fifth, the National Minimum Wage should be enforced at the maximum level, so that there 
are no differential effects on workers who work long hours, workers who receive 
accommodation benefits, workers whose employers are of a particular ethnicity, or 
workers’ access to non-wage benefits, or workers’ legal status. This recommendation 
supports Miliband’s (2012) plan to double the fines for employers who do not pay the 
minimum wage, and to have HM Revenue and Customs closely monitor the enforcement. 
The enforcement of the National Minimum Wage should not be misdirected by any 
immigration policy agenda. This study supports Anderson’s argument (2010) that public 
concern about low pay, job security and job quality should not be misled with rhetoric 
about protecting British jobs. The National Minimum Wage should be enforced in relation 
to every employer and every worker, regardless of their ethnicity, nationality or legal status. 
 
6.5. Recapping the Originality of the Thesis  
This thesis represents an original contribution to the UK minimum-wage literature. It fills a 
gap in the UK literature by discussing the impact of the minimum wage on non-wage 
benefits. Since the National Minimum Wage policy came into force in April 1999, there 
have been plenty of studies to investigate the impact of the National Minimum Wage; 
however, few of these studies discuss its impact on non-wage benefits. Dickerson (2007), 
Allison et al. (2009) and Melis et al. (2009) are among the few that discuss the minimum 
wage’s impact on non-wage benefits. 
 
This thesis should be considered pioneering in testing the impact of the National Minimum 
Wage on a wide range of non-wage benefits. Sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 of Chapter 3 
discuss the wide range of non-wage benefits involved in the secondary research, while 
Section 3.4 discusses the range of non-wage benefits that are particularly commonly 
received in low-paid, low-skilled jobs; these are explored in the primary research. The 
results of the secondary research (Table 4.5) on non-wage benefits might be the first of 
their kind in describing the minimum wage’s impact on non-wage benefits in the UK 
labour market. The evidence shows that the minimum wage increases incentive pay, 
employees’ contributions to pensions, training paid for by employers, and weekly overtime 
pay. The minimum wage is only evident to reduce additional pay. Therefore, overall, there 
is not enough evidence to suggest that minimum wage reduces non-wage benefits.  
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There is also a paucity of UK literature that discusses the National Minimum Wage’s 
impact on migration. This study investigates the minimum wage’s impact on non-wage 
benefits and no other study has been done to date that links this issue with migrant workers. 
Dustmann et al. (2007) and French and Möhrke (2007) are among the very few that link 
the National Minimum Wage with migration. Dustmann et al. (2007), however, does not 
discuss the minimum wage’s impact on non-wage benefits, while French and Möhrke 
(2007), although they do discuss some non-wage benefits, do not stress the impact of the 
minimum wage on non-wage benefits. Thus this study might be the first to investigate the 
minimum wage’s impact on the non-wage benefits of migrant workers. The evidence 
presented in Section 5.2 of Chapter 5, particularly in Table 5.15a, constitutes some of the 
most original evidence uncovered in this thesis. The evidence shows that migrants who 
earn the minimum wage or below are less likely to receive training, holiday pay, paid sick 
leave, or a pension scheme, but are more likely to receive meals and accommodation. 
 
This study might also be the first to suggest factors other than human capital that might 
explain the likelihood of migrants earning the minimum wage or below. The findings 
presented in Section 5.1 of Chapter 5, particularly in Table 5.2a, also constitute some of 
the particularly original findings in this thesis. They show that hours of work per week, an 
employer of local ethnic background, and the need for a work permit, all affect migrants’ 
likelihood of earning the minimum wage or below. 
  
6.6. Reconsidering the Limitations 
 
This thesis acknowledges the econometric problems that appear in some applications of 
quantitative methods. The Difference-in-Difference (DID) has limitation on the possible 
existence of parallel trends in the treatment and control group alongside the potential spill-
over effects from the treatment to the control group. The DID outcomes that are modelled 
are actually more complex in terms of the determination process than a bivariate analysis 
allows. In many cases, it is acknowledged that selection and endogeneity issues have 
emerged. 
 
Second, it is the limitation of the thesis that the secondary research analysis is not stratified 
by any demographic characteristics, even though the nationally representative surveys (the 
ASHE, the WERS, and the LFS) contain information on age, gender, region, occupation, 
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and industry. The DID model, therefore, is not stratified and has no control variables. 
Hence, it is acknowledged that the DID results are far from robust and tend to be difficult 
to interpret.  
 
Third, it is a drawback of this thesis that the primary data survey is not representative of 
migrants in London, and does not represent the distribution of migrants in the UK. Thus 
there might be a grounded generalisation in the primary research in relation to the 
minimum wage’s impact on the UK labour market as a whole. It should be noted that the 
purposive (judgemental) nature of the survey does not allow for any generalisations to be 
made about all migrants in the UK labour market. It is also a limitation that the sample 
does not offer a representative picture of low-skilled, low-paid migrants. For instance, the 
sample does not represent migrants from all low-paid, low-skilled sectors, irregular 
migrants, or migrants with certain legal statuses. 
 
Fourth, the primary research analysis through the logistic regressions may still contain 
endogeneity issues even though particular effort has been made to detect and resolve them.  
 
Fifth, students are overrepresented in the migrant sample. Although this thesis argues that 
students are in reality involved in low-paid low-skilled jobs, the result might somehow be 
biased and should not be used to generalise about the characteristics of all migrants in low-
paid, low-skilled jobs. As a remedy, a control variable for student legal status was 
introduced in the logistic regressions. 
 
Sixth, it is a limitation of the thesis that it does not constitute a comparative study between 
migrants and non-migrants: in particular, the primary research does not control for non-
migrants. It does not explain whether migrants and non-migrants are differently affected by 
the minimum wage. However, at certain points the thesis does argue that the minimum 
wage does not affect all workers in the same way, and so some of the differential effects on 
migrant workers are made evident. 
 
Seventh, this thesis rests mainly on responses from workers (or employees) in both its 
primary and secondary data; this constitutes a limitation, in that it does not capture 
employers’ points of view. Consequently, the thesis might have made some grounded 
assumptions as if workers’ responses were interchangeable with employers’. This may be a 
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particular limitation on the primary research, since the survey asks whether there has been 
any reduction in non-wage benefits and, if so, the reasons behind that reduction. 
 
Eighth, the thesis has limitations in terms of the grounded assumptions it makes about 
indications of flexibility and temporary working. It is assumed that some variables, 
particularly in the secondary data, such as shift allowances, additional pay, and stand-by or 
on-call allowances, are linked to flexible and temporary working: this certainly needs 
further investigation.  
 
Finally, there are limitations to the methodology, as the qualitative approach has not been 
fully accommodated – although this thesis argues that its main, quantitative-positivist 
methodology is deemed to be adequate to answer the research questions. Nonetheless, it 
must be acknowledged that the primary research could have done more to explore the 
qualitative aspects of the minimum wage’s effects on migrant workers. 
 
6.7. The Future Research Agenda  
This thesis has contributed to the development of the UK minimum-wage literature. It has 
also left room for further investigation in related areas. I therefore propose an agenda for 
future research in order to shape the debate on the minimum wage and migration, and in 
particular to draw out the implications of this thesis’ findings for the National Minimum 
Wage policy.   
 
6.7.1. Minimum-Wage Research 
- The primary research from this study could be extended to sample employers’ 
responses, particularly in order to determine the minimum wage’s effects on non-
wage benefits and migration. The employers might range from small entrepreneurs 
to large-scale businesses, and include formal, informal, agency and subcontracting 
employers. The methodology could also be extended to accommodate the 
qualitative approach to investigate the minimum wage’s impact on non-wage 
benefits and migration. Ipsos MORI and Community Links (2012) is an example of 
research on the minimum wage that uses a qualitative approach with employers.  
 
- Further research should be carried out to determine the extent of accommodation 
offsets of the minimum wage. Research with live-in workers – particularly 
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restaurant and domestic workers, among whom this study made specific findings – 
should be conducted to examine whether workers are being paid the statutory offset 
suggested by the minimum wage policy. The evidence found should then be 
evaluated to establish whether it supports this study’s recommendation to remove 
the accommodation offset. 
 
- Further research should also address the minimum wage’s effects on workers who 
work long hours. In particular, it should investigate workers in minimum-wage jobs 
who are paid on a weekly or monthly basis. It should examine whether workers 
who work long hours and are paid weekly or monthly are exempted from the 
minimum wage, and if so, what the implications of this are for the minimum-wage 
policy. 
 
- Further research should be conducted to investigate the adverse effects of the 
minimum wage on temporary and flexibilised work. There is not enough evidence 
from this thesis to conclude that the minimum wage is linked with temporary and 
flexible working. However, there are some indications that the minimum wage 
might be linked with flexible and temporary work, as suggested by Wessels (1980). 
Thus further investigation is needed, which will involve the selection of relevant 
variables that represent temporary/flexible work and/or the conduct of primary 
research that incorporates employers’ point of view. 
 
- Further research should be carried out to determine whether the minimum wage 
adversely affects the utilisation of workers, as suggested by Wessels (1980): that is, 
to investigate whether workers have to work harder, faster or with extra effort 
because of increases in the minimum wage. This will include the determination of 
variables that define and describe worker utilisation, and the design of a detailed 
technique of analysis (quantitative and/or qualitative) to examine the relationship 
between the minimum wage and worker utilisation. 
 
6.7.2. Migration Studies 
- Future studies could contribute to debates in migration studies by extending this 
study’s primary research to include non-migrant workers. The impact of 
immigration on low-paid, low-skilled jobs in the UK has been under-researched, 
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especially in relation to less-skilled natives. Dustmann et al. (2005, 2007), 
Manacorda et al. (2006, 2012), Wadsworth (2010a, 2010b), Lucchino et al. (2012) 
and the Migration Advisory Committee (2012) are among the few studies that 
investigate immigration’s impact on the UK labour market. These studies, however, 
do not focus specifically on low-skilled, low-paid jobs, or on natives who undertake 
such jobs. Thus there is still a gap the analysis of immigration’s impact on less-
skilled natives or natives who undertake low-paid, low-skilled jobs. 
 
- Future studies could also extend this thesis’ primary research to examine the profile 
and characteristics of non-migrants who undertake low-paid, low-skilled jobs. 
Future studies might examine whether a downgrading phenomenon occurs for non-
migrants, so as to establish a robust finding whether it applies to the UK labour 
market in general. Under recent conditions in particular, with extensive 
unemployment figures, it is worth analysing whether natives too are being deskilled.  
 
- The scope of the study could therefore also be extended to examine unemployment 
figures in the UK – for instance, in relation to graduate unemployment and youth 
unemployment. Such research could investigate the relationship between 
immigration, UK unemployment and the minimum wage. 
 
6.8. Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of this study was to answer the question: how does the minimum wage affect 
the non-wage benefits of migrants? The answer is that the minimum wage does not 
adversely affect non-wage benefits per se, but it does adversely affect migrants’ likelihood 
of receiving them. 
 
There is not enough evidence to conclude that the minimum wage adversely affects non-
wage benefits. Nonetheless, it is clear that migrants who earn the minimum wage or below 
are less likely to receive valuable non-wage benefits. Migrants on the minimum wage or 
below are less likely to receive training, holiday pay, paid sick leave, and a pension 
scheme. 
 
There is one non-wage benefit that has been used as an offset for the minimum wage: 
accommodation. The evidence shows that the offset is far below what the National 
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Minimum Wage suggests. At the time of writing, the National Minimum Wage policy still 
allows the use of accommodation to offset statutory wages. This thesis argues that no non-
wage benefits should be used to exempt employers from paying the National Minimum 
Wage. 
 
Migrants who work longer hours and who need a work permit are more likely to earn the 
minimum wage or below. Migrants whose employers are of local ethnicity, on the other 
hand, are less likely to earn the minimum wage or below. 
 
This investigation of the effects of the National Minimum Wage on the UK labour market 
has no other purpose than to make evidence-based recommendations for possible 
improvements to the policy. 
 
Finally, the practical usefulness of the research findings to policymakers, policy advisors, 
unions, local authorities and members of the public, including workers in low-paid, low-
skilled jobs, must be emphasised. The findings may be taken as suggestions for all those 
who hope to improve the working lives of those at the lowest level of income distribution. 
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Appendix 1 
Questionnaire 
 
This research is part of a doctoral dissertation that aims to contribute to the development of 
an evidence base for public policy on the impact of non-wage benefits on minimum wages 
in relation to migrant workers. The information collected will be used solely for the 
purposes of this research, and remains strictly confidential. No names or any other forms of 
identification of the respondent appear in the questionnaire. 
 
1. Date of interview 
 
2. Place of interview 
 
3. What is your gender? 
□  Male 
□  Female 
 
4. What is your ethnic group? 
 
□  White: British 
□  White: Irish 
□  White: other western European (Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, France, Monaco, Switzerland, 
Liechtenstein, Australia) 
□  White: southern European (Turkey, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain) 
□  White: new EU member states (Cyprus, Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, 
 Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) 
□  White: non-EU eastern European (Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Serbia-
Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Ukraine, Russia, Moldova) 
 
□  Mixed: white and black Caribbean 
□  Mixed: white and black African 
□  Mixed: white and Asian 
□  Mixed: other mixed background (please specify) 
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□  Asian: British 
□  Asian: Indian 
□  Asian: Pakistani 
□  Asian: Bangladeshi 
□  Asian: south-east Asian 
□  Asian: Chinese 
□  Asian: other Asian (please specify) 
 
□  Black: British 
□  Black: Caribbean 
□  Black: African 
□  Black: other black (please specify) 
 
□  Middle Eastern 
□  Other (please specify) 
 
5. What is your country of birth? 
 
6. What is your nationality? 
 
7. What is your native language? 
 
8. What is your age? 
 
9. Do you have any dependent children of your own? 
□  Yes 
□  No 
 
10. If yes to Q9, where do your children live? 
□  Home country 
□  Host country 
□  Both home and host countries 
□  Elsewhere 
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11. When did you first arrive in the UK (month/year)? 
 
12. What was your last job in your home country? 
 
13. Had you ever worked abroad before you came to the UK? 
□  Yes 
□  No 
 
14. When you first arrived in the UK, what was the level of your spoken English? 
□  None 
□  Minimal 
□  Proficient 
□  Fluent 
 
15. What is the level of your spoken English now? 
□  None 
□  Minimal 
□  Proficient 
□  Fluent 
 
16. Do you have more than one job right now? 
□  Yes (please specify how many) 
□  No 
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17. What is the industry of your current main job? 
□  Agricultural 
□  Retail/shop/supermarket 
□  Sales 
□  Domestic work/cleaning 
□  Caregiving: elderly care/childcare 
□  Construction 
□  Hotel 
□  Restaurant/bar 
□  Administration 
□  Factory work 
□  Teaching 
□  Other (please specify) 
 
18. If yes to Q16, what is the industry of your other job? 
□  Agricultural 
□  Retail/shop/supermarket 
□  Sales 
□  Domestic work/cleaning 
□  Caregiving: elderly care/childcare 
□  Construction 
□  Hotel 
□  Restaurant/bar 
□  Administration 
□  Factory work 
□  Teaching 
□  Other (please specify) 
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The following questions refer to your current main job: 
 
19. How long have you been in your current main job (since month/year)? 
 
20. What is the nationality of your current main employer? 
□  My ethnic community 
□  Other migrant community 
□  Local person 
□  Other (please specify) 
□  Don’t know 
 
21. How do you get paid in your current main job? 
□  Per hour 
□  Per day 
□  Per week 
□  Per month 
□  Other (please specify) 
 
22. Please answer according to Q21: 
a.  If per hour, how much is your hourly pay? 
b.  If per day, how much is your daily pay? 
c.  If per week, how much is your weekly pay? 
d.  If per month, how much is your monthly pay? 
 
23. How many hours, on average, do you work in a day? 
 
24. How many days, on average, do you work in a week? 
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25. Do you get any of the following from your current main employer? 
□  Meals 
□  Housing/accommodation 
□  Holiday pay 
□  Paid sick leave  
□  Health/life insurance 
□  Pension scheme 
□  Transport paid 
□  Bonuses 
□  Gifts  
□  Discounts on products 
□  Paid rest (meal periods, break time, set-up time, wash-up time) 
□  Counselling/employee assistance programme 
□  Childcare vouchers 
□  Bicycle loans 
□  Other (please specify) 
 
26. Can you tell me how often you receive the benefits (e.g. meals received once in a day, 
etc.)? 
□  Meals 
□  Housing/accommodation 
□  Holiday pay 
□  Paid sick leave  
□  Health/life insurance 
□  Pension scheme 
□  Transport paid 
□  Bonuses 
□  Gifts  
□  Discounts on products 
□  Paid rest (meal periods, break time, set-up time, wash-up time) 
□  Counselling/employee assistance programme 
□  Childcare vouchers 
□  Bicycle loans 
□  Other (please specify) 
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27. Is there any benefit that you did receive but no longer receive, or that you receive in a 
reduced or less frequent way? 
□  Yes (please explain) 
□  No 
 
28. If yes to Q27, do you know the reason why your employer does not provide it any 
more, or has reduced the value or the frequency? 
□  Yes (please explain) 
□  No 
 
29. Have you received any training from your current main employer? 
□  Yes 
□  No 
 
30. If yes to Q29, what did you receive as training? 
□  Induction/introduction or welcome training 
□  On-the-job training 
□  Health and safety training 
□  Off-the-job training  
□  Other (please specify) 
□  No, I have never received training 
 
31. Did the employer pay you for attending those training sessions? 
□  Yes 
□  No, the employer did not pay me, I attended the training for free 
□  No, I paid myself 
 
32. Do you receive any regular training? 
□  Yes (please specify the training) 
□  No 
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33. If yes to Q32, how often do you receive the training? 
□  Once a month 
□  Once every three months 
□  Once every six months 
□  Other (please specify) 
 
34. Are you a member of a trade union? 
□  Yes 
□  No 
 
35. What is your highest level of education? 
□  No formal education 
□  Primary 
□  Secondary (high-school diploma or at least five GCSE passes) 
□  College (advanced diploma) 
□  University 
□  Postgraduate 
 
36. Where did you complete the highest level of your education? 
□  Home country 
□  Host country 
□  Other country in which you previously worked  
□  Somewhere else (please explain) 
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37. What type of visa did you first enter the UK on (tick one only)?  
□  Visitor/tourist 
□  Work permit holder 
□  Self-employed 
□  Au pair 
□  Engagement/marriage  
□  Student 
□  Dependant  
□  No visa required  
□  Arrived and claimed asylum 
□  Clandestine 
□  Other (please specify) 
 
38. Since starting work in the UK, have you ever been asked to prove your legal status? 
 □ Yes  
 □  No  
 
39. If yes to Q38, was it at your last job? 
 □  Yes  
 □  No  
 
40. Have you changed your immigration status since arrival? 
 □  Yes  
 □  No  
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41. If yes to Q40, what is your current immigration status (tick one only)? 
□  Visitor/tourist 
□  Work permit holder 
□  Self-employed 
□  Au pair 
□  Engagement/marriage  
□  Student 
□  Dependant 
□  No permit required  
□  Asylum seeker 
□  Refugee 
□  Undocumented 
□  Other (please specify) 
 
Thank you! 
 
217 
 
Appendix 2 
Information Sheet 
 
YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THE RESEARCH 
 
Dear Participant 
 
You are invited to be in a research study on the minimum wage in the UK. Please read this 
sheet and ask any questions you may have before taking part in the questionnaire. 
 
This study is being conducted by Maria Elfani, Research Student at London Metropolitan 
University. The study is on ‘The Impact of the National Minimum Wage on the Non-Wage 
Benefits of Labour Migrants: Evidence from the UK’. If you have any further questions, 
you can contact me by email:  
 
Confidentiality 
Your contribution to the questionnaire will be strictly confidential. You will not be 
identified in any way, and your questionnaire will be filed by number alone. Only the 
researcher will have access to the information you provide. The responses will be securely 
stored, and they will only be used for the purposes of this study. 
 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. If you decide to participate, you are free to not 
answer any question. You may also withdraw at any point without giving any reason.  
 
Your participation is greatly appreciated. It is hoped that the research will contribute to 
improving the position of migrant workers in the UK.  
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP. 
 
 
Maria Elfani 
London Metropolitan University 
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Appendix 3 
Sample Recruitment Tree 
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Appendix 4 
Secondary Data Sorting and Formulation 
 
This appendix explains how the study sorted the secondary data, formed the treatment and 
control groups, and formed the DID estimations for each dataset. 
 
1. ASHE 2009 and 2010 
Total observation is 348,618 respondents. Respondents in 2009 are marked as the 
treatment group if their hourly wage is less than or equal to: 
£3.57 for 16–17-year-olds (2009 National Minimum Wage (NMW) rate) 
£4.83 for 18–21-year-olds (2009 NMW rate) 
£5.80 for 22+-year-olds (2009 NMW rate) 
Otherwise they are in the control group. 
 
Respondents in 2010 are marked as the treatment group if their hourly wage is less than or 
equal to: 
£3.64 for 16–17-year-olds (2010 NMW rate) 
£4.92 for 18–21-year-olds (2010 NMW rate) 
£5.93 for 21+-year-olds 2010 (NMW rate) 
Otherwise they are in the control group. 
 
The following variables explain the possible outcomes that this study would like to find 
from the ASHE dataset: 
Hourlywage = Wage per hour 
Bpay = Basic weekly earnings 
Bhr = Basic weekly paid hours worked 
Ipayin = Incentive pay  
Sppay = Additional premium payments for shift work and night or weekend work not 
treated as overtime 
Anipay = Portion of gross annual earnings that comes from incentive payments 
Ownpay = Amount of employee’s contribution to pension 
Compay = Amount of employer’s contribution to pension 
Ownperc = Percentage of employee’s contribution to pension 
Comperc = Percentage of employer’s contributions to pension 
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Ovhrs = Average weekly paid overtime hours worked 
Ovpay = Average weekly overtime pay  
Othpay = Pay received for other reasons 
 
Hourly wage is bpay divided by bhr. Exclude respondents who answer bpay=0 and bhr=0. 
Total eligible sample is 346,544 respondents.  
 
DID estimations for the first dataset: 
 
Hourlywaget,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Bpayt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Bhrt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Ipayint,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Sppayt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Anipayt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Ownpayt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Compayt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Ownperct,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Compert,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Ovhrst,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Ovpayt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Othpayt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
where Tt is a time dummy (1 for period A, 0 for period B), Gi is a group dummy (1 for the 
treatment group, 0 for the control group), Tt*Gi is the interaction of the time dummy and 
the group dummy, and Outcomet,i is the expected outcome of the minimum wage at time t 
for group i. Coefficient â3, the DID estimator, show whether the impact of the minimum 
wage exists, and if so how large that effect is. 
 
2. ASHE 1997 and 2010 
The second dataset is used to examine the impact across a wider interval, between 1997 
(when the first ASHE was introduced) and 2010 (the latest ASHE). However, the variables 
for 1997 are not as complete as those for 2010. Therefore the outcomes (effects) that could 
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be examined are fewer. The DID estimations explain which outcomes the study is looking 
for. 
 
Total observation is 329,081 respondents. Respondents in 1997 are marked as the 
treatment group if their hourly wage is less than or equal to: 
£3.00 for 16–21-year-olds (1999 NMW rate) 
£3.60 for 22+-year-olds (1999 NMW rate) 
Otherwise they are in the control group. 
 
Respondents in 2010 are marked as the treatment group if their hourly wage is less than or 
equal to: 
£3.64 for 16–17-year-olds (2010 NMW rate) 
£4.92 for 18–21-year-olds (2010 NMW rate) 
£5.93 for 21+-year-olds 2010 (NMW rate) 
Otherwise they are in the control group. 
 
Hourly wage is bpay (basic weekly earnings) divided by bhr (basic paid hours). Exclude 
respondents who answer bpay=0 and bhr=0. Total eligible sample is 315,911. 
 
DID estimations for the second dataset: 
 
Hourlywaget,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Bpayt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Bhrt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Ovhrst,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Ovpayt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
3. WERS Cross-Section of Employees 1998 and 2004 
Total observation is 50,691 respondents. Respondents in 1998 are marked as the treatment 
group if their hourly wage is less than or equal to: 
£3.00 for 16–21-year-olds (1999 NMW rate) 
£3.60 for 22+-year-olds (1999 NMW rate) 
Otherwise they are in the control group. 
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Hourly wage is question d11 ‘How much do you get paid (per week) for your job here, 
before tax and other deductions are taken out?’ divided by question a3 ‘How many hours 
do you usually work each week, including any overtime or extra hours?’ 
 
Since the answer to question d11 is within a range, the average is used. 
 
£50 or less per week or £2,600 or less per year = £50 
 £51 – £80 per week or £2,601 – £4,160 per year, average = £65.50 
£81 – £140 per week or £4,161 – £7,280 per year, average = £110.50 
£141 – £180 per week or £7,281 – £9,360 per year, average = £160.50 
£181 – £220 per week or £9,361 – £11,440 per year, average = £200.50 
£221 – £260 per week or £11,441 – £13,520 per year, average = £240.50  
£261 – £310 per week or £13,521 – £16,120 per year, average = £285.50  
£311 – £360 per week or £16,121 – £18,720 per year, average = £335.50 
£361 – £430 per week or £18,721 – £22,360 per year, average = £395.50 
£431 – £540 per week or £22,361 – £28,080 per year, average = £485.50 
£541 – £680 per week or £28,081 – £35,360 per year, average = £610.50 
£681 or more per week or £35,361 or more per year, average = £775.50 
 
The variable age is also defined within a range; therefore the average age is used. 
 
Age Average Age 
Less than 20  20  
20–24  22  
25–29  27  
30–39  35 
40–49  45  
50–59  55  
60 or more  60  
 
For ages less than 20 years, use the 16–21-year-olds’ NMW rate; otherwise use the adult 
rate. Exclude respondents who did not answer questions d11 and a3.  
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Respondents in 2004 are marked as the treatment group if their hourly wage is less than or 
equal to: 
£3.00 for 16–17-year-olds (2004 NMW rate) 
£4.10 for 18–21-year-olds (2004 NMW rate) 
£4.85 for 22+-year-olds (2004 NMW rate) 
Otherwise they are in the control group. 
 
Hourly wage is question e15 ‘How much do you get paid (per week) for your job here, 
before tax and other deductions are taken out?’ divided by question a3 ‘How many hours 
do you usually work each week, including any overtime or extra hours?’ 
 
If question e15 is unanswered, check question e16 ‘How much do you get paid per hour, 
before tax and other deductions are taken out?’ 
 
Since the answer to question e15 is within a range, the average is used. 
 
£50 or less per week or £2,600 or less per year = £50 
 £51 – £80 per week or £2,601 – £4,160 per year, average = £65.50 
£81 – £110 per week or £4,161 – £5,720 per year, average = £95.50 
£111 – £140 per week or £5,721 – £7,280 per year, average = £125.50 
£141 – £180 per week or £7,281 – £9,360 per year, average = £160.50 
£181 – £220 per week or £9,361 – £11,440 per year, average = £200.50 
£221 – £260 per week or £11,441 – £13,520 per year, average = £240.50 
£261 – £310 per week or £13,521 – £16,120 per year, average = £285.50  
£311 – £360 per week or £16,121 – £18,720 per year, average = £335.50 
£361 – £430 per week or £18,721 – £22,360 per year, average = £395.50 
£431 – £540 per week or £22,361 – £28,080 per year, average = £485.50 
£541 – £680 per week or £28,081– £35,360 per year, average = £610.50 
£681 – £870 per week or £35,361 – £45,240 per year, average = £775.50 
£871 or more per week or £45,241 or more per year = £871 
 
The variable age is also defined within a range; therefore the average age is used. 
 
233 
 
Age Average Age 
16–17 17  
18–19 19  
20–21  21 
22–29  26  
30–39  35  
40–49  45  
50–59 55  
60–64 62  
65 or more 65  
 
Exclude respondents who did not answer questions e15, a3 or e16. Total eligible sample is 
48,675. 
 
The outcomes that the third dataset would like to find – that is, what the effects of the 
minimum wage are on – are the following variables: 
Hourlywage = Wage per hour 
Hoursperweek = Total hours of work per week including overtime 
Overtimehrs = Overtime hours per week 
Basichrs = Basic hours per week excluding overtime 
Flexitime = If flexible working hours are available 
Jobshare = If job sharing (sharing a full-time job with someone else) is available 
Parental = If parental leave is available 
Workhome = If working at or from home during normal working hours is available 
Nursery = If a workplace nursery or help with the cost of childcare is available 
Belowdegree = Proportion of employees with an education below degree level 
 
DID estimations for the third dataset: 
 
Hourlywaget,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Hoursperweekt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Overtimehrst,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Basichrst,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Flexitimet,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Jobsharet,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Parentalt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
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Workhomet,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Nurseryt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Belowdegreet,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
4. LFS Q1 2000 and Q1 2011  
The seventh dataset is the LFS with a wider timespan comparison. The purpose is to 
examine whether the minimum wage’s impact is greater if the time span is wider. Total 
observation is 249,901. Exclude respondents whose age is under 16 years. Include only 
respondents who are currently in paid work: only include them if the variable wrking 
(whether they did paid work in the reference week) = 1 (yes). Exclude respondents who 
answer wrking = 2 (no) or who did not answer the wrking question.  
 
Respondents in 2000 are marked as the treatment group if their hourly wage is less than or 
equal to: 
£3.20 for 16–21-year-olds (2000 NMW rate) 
£3.70 for 22+-year-olds (2000 NMW rate) 
Otherwise they are in the control group. 
 
Respondents in 2011 are marked as the treatment group if their hourly wage is less than or 
equal to: 
£3.68 for 16–17-year-olds (2011 NMW rate) 
£4.98 for 18–21-year-olds (2011 NMW rate) 
£6.08 for 21+-year-olds (2011 NMW rate) 
Otherwise they are in the control group. 
 
To count the hourly wage, use hrrate (basic hourly rate). If there is no information on 
hrrate, then divide the variable netwk (net weekly pay in main job) by bacthr (basic actual 
hours in main job per week). If there is no answer to netwk or bacthr, use hourpay (average 
gross hourly pay). If there is no answer to hrrate, netwk, bacthr or hourpay, then exclude 
the respondent. Total eligible sample is 26,057. 
 
DID estimations for the seventh dataset: 
 
Cameyrt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
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Eth01t,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Conmpyt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Bushrt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i  
Ed13wkt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Jobtrnt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Tfeet,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Trnlent,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Netwkt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Hourlypaidt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Ernfiltt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Bonusest,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Profitrelatedt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Londonallwt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Standbyt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Shiftallwt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
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Appendix 5 
Stata Results of DID Estimations 
 
This work contains statistical data from the ONS which is Crown Copyright. The use of 
ONS statistical data in this work does not imply the endorsement of the ONS in relation to 
the interpretation or analysis of the statistical data. This work uses research datasets which 
may not exactly reproduce National Statistics aggregates. 
 
Note: from the Stata results, variable x represents variable Gi in the DID model, variable t 
represents variable Tt , and variable xt represents variable Tt*Gi  in the DID model. Thus 
coefficient of variable xt in Stata result represents coefficient â3 in DID model. This applies 
to all the Stata results. 
 
ASHE 2009 and 2010 
Hourlywaget,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Bpayt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     13.11083   .0259289   505.64   0.000     13.06001    13.16165
          xt    -.0733033    .155815    -0.47   0.638    -.3786963    .2320896
           t     .1679187   .0366683     4.58   0.000       .09605    .2397874
           x    -7.796085   .1144531   -68.12   0.000     -8.02041    -7.57176
                                                                              
  hourlywage        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    39237493.1346543  113.225467           Root MSE      =  10.488
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0285
    Residual    38117040.4346540  109.993191           R-squared     =  0.0286
       Model    1120452.78     3   373484.26           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,346540) = 3395.52
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =  346544
                                                                              
       _cons     431.9682   .9037475   477.97   0.000     430.1969    433.7396
          xt    -2.879584   5.430901    -0.53   0.596    -13.52399    7.764823
           t     3.968199   1.278065     3.10   0.002      1.46323    6.473169
           x    -295.5894   3.989239   -74.10   0.000    -303.4082   -287.7706
                                                                              
        bpay        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    4.7917e+10346543   138271.55           Root MSE      =  365.55
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0336
    Residual    4.6307e+10346540   133625.94           R-squared     =  0.0336
       Model    1.6103e+09     3   536768237           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,346540) = 4016.95
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =  346544
237 
 
Bhrt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i  
 
Ipayint,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Sppayt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Anipayt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Ownpayt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons      32.1614   .0281535  1142.36   0.000     32.10622    32.21658
          xt    -.2205271   .1691833    -1.30   0.192    -.5521214    .1110672
           t    -.0435645   .0398142    -1.09   0.274    -.1215992    .0344703
           x    -6.062466   .1242727   -48.78   0.000    -6.306037   -5.818896
                                                                              
         bhr        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    45636250.2346543  131.690007           Root MSE      =  11.388
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0153
    Residual    44938166.1346540  129.676707           R-squared     =  0.0153
       Model     698084.19     3   232694.73           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,346540) = 1794.42
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =  346544
                                                                              
       _cons     5.844045   .1779284    32.84   0.000      5.49531    6.192779
          xt     2.218194   1.069227     2.07   0.038     .1225396    4.313848
           t     .1090582   .2516234     0.43   0.665    -.3841162    .6022327
           x     3.268862   .7853952     4.16   0.000      1.72951    4.808214
                                                                              
      ipayin        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1.7953e+09346543  5180.57897           Root MSE      =  71.969
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0002
    Residual    1.7949e+09346540  5179.49165           R-squared     =  0.0002
       Model    392341.281     3  130780.427           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,346540) =   25.25
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =  346544
                                                                              
       _cons     5.329218   .0591226    90.14   0.000      5.21334    5.445097
          xt    -.1354072    .355286    -0.38   0.703    -.8317574    .5609429
           t     .1212226   .0836102     1.45   0.147    -.0426508    .2850961
           x    -4.439422   .2609734   -17.01   0.000    -4.950923   -3.927922
                                                                              
       sppay        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     198550403346543  572.945934           Root MSE      =  23.914
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0019
    Residual     198178512346540  571.877739           R-squared     =  0.0019
       Model    371890.822     3  123963.607           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,346540) =  216.77
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =  346544
                                                                              
       _cons     1441.917   47.62115    30.28   0.000     1348.581    1535.253
          xt     6.086763   286.1704     0.02   0.983    -554.7988    566.9724
           t    -32.43305   67.34504    -0.48   0.630    -164.4274    99.56126
           x    -924.7645   210.2049    -4.40   0.000     -1336.76    -512.769
                                                                              
      anipay        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1.2859e+14346543   371061078           Root MSE      =   19262
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0001
    Residual    1.2857e+14346540   371019201           R-squared     =  0.0001
       Model    1.5625e+10     3  5.2084e+09           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,346540) =   14.04
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =  346544
                                                                              
       _cons     14.56326   .1313176   110.90   0.000     14.30589    14.82064
          xt    -.0616711   .7891136    -0.08   0.938    -1.608311    1.484969
           t      .329289   .1857091     1.77   0.076    -.0346955    .6932735
           x    -13.99403   .5796147   -24.14   0.000    -15.13006     -12.858
                                                                              
      ownpay        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     980999769346492  2831.23353           Root MSE      =  53.112
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0037
    Residual     977408340346489  2820.89284           R-squared     =  0.0037
       Model    3591429.51     3  1197143.17           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,346489) =  424.38
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =  346493
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Compayt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Ownperct,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Compert,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
%Femalet,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     37.98982   .2299416   165.22   0.000     37.53914     38.4405
          xt    -.2945349   1.381705    -0.21   0.831    -3.002637    2.413567
           t     .7086486   .3251851     2.18   0.029     .0712952    1.346002
           x      -36.083   1.014902   -35.55   0.000    -38.07218   -34.09383
                                                                              
      compay        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    3.0205e+09346473  8717.87031           Root MSE      =  92.999
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0079
    Residual    2.9965e+09346470   8648.7803           R-squared     =  0.0079
       Model    23963769.8     3  7987923.26           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,346470) =  923.59
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =  346474
                                                                              
       _cons     5.058301   .0131984   383.25   0.000     5.032433     5.08417
          xt     .4800234   .1910982     2.51   0.012     .1054752    .8545717
           t     .0902485    .018738     4.82   0.000     .0535224    .1269747
           x    -.3202773   .1430231    -2.24   0.025    -.6005995   -.0399551
                                                                              
     ownperc        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    2399532.53166139  14.4429215           Root MSE      =     3.8
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0002
    Residual    2399064.43166136  14.4403647           R-squared     =  0.0002
       Model    468.107031     3  156.035677           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,166136) =   10.81
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =  166140
                                                                              
       _cons      13.5155   .0299966   450.57   0.000     13.45671    13.57429
          xt    -.3734914   .4348297    -0.86   0.390    -1.225748    .4787654
           t     .0054718   .0425848     0.13   0.898    -.0779936    .0889371
           x     3.020339    .325226     9.29   0.000     2.382903    3.657775
                                                                              
     comperc        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    12396981.3166092  74.6392441           Root MSE      =  8.6351
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0010
    Residual    12384276.5166089  74.5640982           R-squared     =  0.0010
       Model    12704.8206     3   4234.9402           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,166089) =   56.80
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =  166093
                                                                              
       _cons     1.508939    .001234  1222.81   0.000     1.506521    1.511358
          xt    -.0089097   .0074154    -1.20   0.230    -.0234437    .0056243
           t     .0014783   .0017451     0.85   0.397     -.001942    .0048986
           x     .1139283    .005447    20.92   0.000     .1032524    .1246041
                                                                              
      female        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total      86549.88346543   .24975221           Root MSE      =  .49913
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0025
    Residual    86332.0469346540  .249125778           R-squared     =  0.0025
       Model    217.833061     3  72.6110205           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,346540) =  291.46
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =  346544
239 
 
Ovhrst,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
Ovpayt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Othpayt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
ASHE 1997 and 2010 
Hourlywaget,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     1.054124    .009174   114.90   0.000     1.036143    1.072105
          xt    -.1141693   .0551296    -2.07   0.038    -.2222217   -.0061169
           t     .0929506   .0129738     7.16   0.000     .0675225    .1183788
           x    -.1716934   .0404951    -4.24   0.000    -.2510627   -.0923241
                                                                              
       ovhrs        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    4773336.37346543  13.7741532           Root MSE      =  3.7107
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0003
    Residual    4771665.15346540  13.7694498           R-squared     =  0.0004
       Model    1671.21851     3  557.072836           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,346540) =   40.46
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =  346544
                                                                              
       _cons     13.70205   .1300137   105.39   0.000     13.44722    13.95687
          xt    -.9639642   .7812927    -1.23   0.217    -2.495275    .5673468
           t     .9892181   .1838632     5.38   0.000     .6288516    1.349585
           x    -7.680206   .5738944   -13.38   0.000    -8.805023    -6.55539
                                                                              
       ovpay        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     959653593346543  2769.21939           Root MSE      =  52.588
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0013
    Residual     958358481346540  2765.50609           R-squared     =  0.0013
       Model    1295111.98     3  431703.994           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,346540) =  156.10
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =  346544
                                                                              
       _cons     11.05926   .1213348    91.15   0.000     10.82145    11.29707
          xt    -.5794451   .7291385    -0.79   0.427    -2.008535    .8496452
           t     .1138229   .1715896     0.66   0.507    -.2224877    .4501336
           x    -8.491744   .5355848   -15.86   0.000    -9.541474   -7.442013
                                                                              
      othpay        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     836096082346543   2412.6763           Root MSE      =  49.078
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0017
    Residual     834680942346540  2408.61356           R-squared     =  0.0017
       Model    1415140.05     3  471713.352           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,346540) =  195.84
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =  346544
                                                                              
       _cons     8.495907   .0246739   344.33   0.000     8.447547    8.544268
          xt    -2.310677   .1242961   -18.59   0.000    -2.554294    -2.06706
           t     4.782841   .0330615   144.66   0.000     4.718042    4.847641
           x    -5.558711   .0860041   -64.63   0.000    -5.727277   -5.390146
                                                                              
  hourlywage        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total      27747372315910  87.8331551           Root MSE      =  8.9014
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0979
    Residual    25030956.6315907  79.2352072           R-squared     =  0.0979
       Model    2716415.42     3  905471.808           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,315907) =11427.64
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =  315911
240 
 
Bpayt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Bhrt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Ovhrst,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Ovpayt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
WERS Cross-Section of Employees 1998 and 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     290.4293   .8588547   338.16   0.000      288.746    292.1126
          xt    -89.11049   4.326536   -20.60   0.000    -97.59037    -80.6306
           t     145.5071   1.150816   126.44   0.000     143.2516    147.7627
           x    -209.3585   2.993655   -69.93   0.000    -215.2259    -203.491
                                                                              
        bpay        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    3.3312e+10315910  105449.103           Root MSE      =  309.84
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0896
    Residual    3.0328e+10315907  96002.7355           R-squared     =  0.0896
       Model    2.9845e+09     3   994829942           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,315907) =10362.52
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =  315911
                                                                              
       _cons       33.798   .0305639  1105.81   0.000      33.7381    33.85791
          xt     -.186401   .1539676    -1.21   0.226     -.488173     .115371
           t    -1.680172   .0409539   -41.03   0.000    -1.760441   -1.599904
           x    -6.096593   .1065346   -57.23   0.000    -6.305397   -5.887788
                                                                              
         bhr        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    39383767.6315910  124.667683           Root MSE      =  11.026
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0248
    Residual      38407915315907  121.579816           R-squared     =  0.0248
       Model    975852.584     3  325284.195           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,315907) = 2675.48
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =  315911
                                                                              
       _cons     2.076526   .0129388   160.49   0.000     2.051166    2.101885
          xt     .2221716   .0651801     3.41   0.001     .0944205    .3499227
           t    -.9294509   .0173373   -53.61   0.000    -.9634314   -.8954703
           x    -.5080343      .0451   -11.26   0.000     -.596429   -.4196396
                                                                              
       ovhrs        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    6950782.35315910  22.0024132           Root MSE      =  4.6678
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0097
    Residual    6883227.95315907  21.7887795           R-squared     =  0.0097
       Model    67554.3943     3  22518.1314           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,315907) = 1033.47
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =  315911
                                                                              
       _cons     17.71825   .1358827   130.39   0.000     17.45193    17.98458
          xt     1.801917   .6845177     2.63   0.008     .4602819    3.143552
           t    -3.026989    .182075   -16.62   0.000    -3.383851   -2.670128
           x    -10.44609   .4736376   -22.06   0.000     -11.3744   -9.517771
                                                                              
       ovpay        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     761625541315910  2410.89406           Root MSE      =  49.021
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0032
    Residual     759157112315907  2403.10317           R-squared     =  0.0032
       Model     2468428.6     3  822809.533           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,315907) =  342.39
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =  315911
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Hourlywaget,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Hoursperweekt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Overtimehrst,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Basichrst,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Flexitimet,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     8.027295   .0768037   104.52   0.000     7.876759    8.177832
          xt    -2.575261   .3863396    -6.67   0.000    -3.332491    -1.81803
           t     3.676618   .1144553    32.12   0.000     3.452284    3.900951
           x    -5.113226   .2682114   -19.06   0.000    -5.638924   -4.587529
                                                                              
  hourlywage        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    7313630.42 48674  150.257436           Root MSE      =  12.004
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0410
    Residual    7013301.05 48671  144.096095           R-squared     =  0.0411
       Model     300329.37     3   100109.79           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3, 48671) =  694.74
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   48675
                                                                              
       _cons     37.31001   .0787281   473.91   0.000     37.15571    37.46432
          xt    -1.785268   .3990882    -4.47   0.000    -2.567486    -1.00305
           t    -.9217551   .1177897    -7.83   0.000    -1.152624   -.6908858
           x    -1.306805   .2749316    -4.75   0.000    -1.845674   -.7679356
                                                                              
hoursperweek        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    7351447.52 48325  152.125143           Root MSE      =  12.305
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0047
    Residual    7316306.22 48322  151.407355           R-squared     =  0.0048
       Model    35141.2962     3  11713.7654           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3, 48322) =   77.37
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   48326
                                                                              
       _cons     4.151488   .0407507   101.88   0.000     4.071616     4.23136
          xt     .0045034   .2014479     0.02   0.982    -.3903376    .3993443
           t    -.5457655   .0593256    -9.20   0.000    -.6620445   -.4294865
           x    -.1014625   .1436321    -0.71   0.480    -.3829836    .1800585
                                                                              
 overtimehrs        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1726961.61 46381   37.234247           Root MSE      =   6.096
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0020
    Residual     1723469.2 46378  37.1613524           R-squared     =  0.0020
       Model    3492.40855     3  1164.13618           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3, 46378) =   31.33
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   46382
                                                                              
       _cons     33.28457   .0743475   447.69   0.000     33.13884    33.43029
          xt    -2.318066    .367531    -6.31   0.000    -3.038432   -1.597699
           t      -.89529   .1082363    -8.27   0.000    -1.107435   -.6831451
           x    -1.176857    .262049    -4.49   0.000    -1.690477   -.6632371
                                                                              
    basichrs        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    5776665.43 46381    124.5481           Root MSE      =  11.122
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0068
    Residual     5736748.9 46378  123.695478           R-squared     =  0.0069
       Model    39916.5312     3  13305.5104           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3, 46378) =  107.57
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   46382
                                                                              
       _cons     .1102185   .0025537    43.16   0.000     .1052132    .1152239
          xt     .0231347   .0141197     1.64   0.101    -.0045401    .0508095
           t     .3737254   .0040457    92.38   0.000     .3657958     .381655
           x    -.0458086   .0089545    -5.12   0.000    -.0633595   -.0282576
                                                                              
   flexitime        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    8290.41788 43497  .190597464           Root MSE      =  .39583
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1780
    Residual    6814.56535 43494  .156678286           R-squared     =  0.1780
       Model    1475.85253     3  491.950843           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3, 43494) = 3139.88
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   43498
242 
 
Jobsharet,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Parentalt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Workhomet,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Nurseryt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .1849324   .0026645    69.41   0.000       .17971    .1901548
          xt     .0769792   .0154889     4.97   0.000     .0466206    .1073378
           t     .1301741   .0045383    28.68   0.000     .1212789    .1390693
           x     -.073978   .0093428    -7.92   0.000    -.0922901   -.0556658
                                                                              
    jobshare        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    7003.75269 40014  .175032556           Root MSE      =  .41299
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0255
    Residual    6824.34447 40011  .170561707           R-squared     =  0.0256
       Model    179.408223     3  59.8027411           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3, 40011) =  350.62
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   40015
                                                                              
       _cons     .2895734   .0027989   103.46   0.000     .2840875    .2950593
          xt     .0095398   .0171214     0.56   0.577    -.0240185    .0430982
           t    -.0890554    .005024   -17.73   0.000    -.0989027   -.0792082
           x    -.0765973   .0098142    -7.80   0.000    -.0958334   -.0573613
                                                                              
    parental        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    7233.59929 38012  .190297782           Root MSE      =  .43383
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0110
    Residual    7153.55263 38009   .18820681           R-squared     =  0.0111
       Model    80.0466681     3  26.6822227           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3, 38009) =  141.77
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   38013
                                                                              
       _cons     .1223309   .0021936    55.77   0.000     .1180315    .1266303
          xt    -.0118777   .0116023    -1.02   0.306    -.0346183     .010863
           t     .0552047     .00342    16.14   0.000     .0485014     .061908
           x    -.1063459   .0076917   -13.83   0.000    -.1214218   -.0912701
                                                                              
    workhome        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    5232.76457 44628  .117252948           Root MSE      =     .34
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0141
    Residual    5158.76121 44625  .115602492           R-squared     =  0.0141
       Model    74.0033649     3  24.6677883           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3, 44625) =  213.38
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   44629
                                                                              
       _cons     .0408741   .0015217    26.86   0.000     .0378916    .0438566
          xt    -.0093938   .0090008    -1.04   0.297    -.0270356    .0082481
           t     .0604588   .0026042    23.22   0.000     .0553544    .0655632
           x    -.0150161   .0053356    -2.81   0.005     -.025474   -.0045582
                                                                              
     nursery        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    2244.58668 39762  .056450548           Root MSE      =  .23586
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0146
    Residual    2211.71117 39759  .055627938           R-squared     =  0.0146
       Model    32.8755029     3   10.958501           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3, 39759) =  197.00
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   39763
243 
 
Belowdegreet,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
LFS Q1 2000 and Q1 2011  
 
Cameyrt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Conmpyt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Bushrt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .6608151   .0025437   259.78   0.000     .6558293    .6658008
          xt    -.1983497   .0131428   -15.09   0.000    -.2241099   -.1725896
           t     .2957575   .0035801    82.61   0.000     .2887404    .3027745
           x     .2346958   .0101579    23.10   0.000      .214786    .2546055
                                                                              
 belowdegree        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     6203.9736 42267  .146780552           Root MSE      =  .35349
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1487
    Residual    5281.00311 42264  .124952752           R-squared     =  0.1488
       Model    922.970489     3   307.65683           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3, 42264) = 2462.19
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   42268
                                                                              
       _cons     37.85964   .1177268   321.59   0.000     37.62889    38.09039
          xt    -.4235939   .5542564    -0.76   0.445    -1.509967    .6627792
           t     1.755043   .1876721     9.35   0.000     1.387196    2.122891
           x    -1.857527   .3888764    -4.78   0.000    -2.619747   -1.095308
                                                                              
      cameyr        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    5105382.88 26055  195.946378           Root MSE      =  13.961
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0052
    Residual    5078089.05 26052  194.921275           R-squared     =  0.0053
       Model    27293.8351     3  9097.94504           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3, 26052) =   46.67
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   26056
                                                                              
       _cons     8.246335   .0703636   117.20   0.000     8.108418    8.384251
          xt     .4460572   .3312763     1.35   0.178    -.2032625    1.095377
           t     1.014607   .1121649     9.05   0.000     .7947572    1.234456
           x    -3.357759   .2323951   -14.45   0.000    -3.813266   -2.902252
                                                                              
      conmpy        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1840951.32 26030  70.7242151           Root MSE      =  8.3404
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0164
    Residual    1810491.69 26027  69.5620581           R-squared     =  0.0165
       Model    30459.6325     3  10153.2108           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3, 26027) =  145.96
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   26031
                                                                              
       _cons     34.02773    .097695   348.31   0.000     33.83624    34.21921
          xt     3.425175   .4606073     7.44   0.000     2.522359    4.327991
           t    -.4839612   .1557852    -3.11   0.002    -.7893088   -.1786136
           x    -6.635375   .3230774   -20.54   0.000    -7.268625   -6.002125
                                                                              
       bushr        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    3547600.05 25974  136.582739           Root MSE      =  11.572
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0196
    Residual    3477688.82 25971   133.90662           R-squared     =  0.0197
       Model    69911.2315     3  23303.7438           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3, 25971) =  174.03
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   25975
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Ed13wkt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Jobtrnt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Tfeet,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Trnlent,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .3039145   .0038552    78.83   0.000     .2963581     .311471
          xt     .0037822   .0183541     0.21   0.837    -.0321928    .0397572
           t     .0091587   .0061459     1.49   0.136    -.0028876     .021205
           x    -.1098625   .0129997    -8.45   0.000    -.1353427   -.0843823
                                                                              
      ed13wk        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    5370.67154 25771  .208399812           Root MSE      =  .45531
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0053
    Residual    5341.85218 25768  .207305658           R-squared     =  0.0054
       Model    28.8193579     3  9.60645264           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3, 25768) =   46.34
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   25772
                                                                              
       _cons      .461242   .0102171    45.14   0.000      .441211    .4812729
          xt      .067762    .055627     1.22   0.223    -.0412969     .176821
           t     .1473931   .0165568     8.90   0.000     .1149328    .1798534
           x     .0089961   .0394368     0.23   0.820    -.0683213    .0863135
                                                                              
      jobtrn        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1027.12655  4116  .249544837           Root MSE      =  .49371
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0232
    Residual    1002.52854  4113  .243746301           R-squared     =  0.0239
       Model    24.5980124     3  8.19933748           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,  4113) =   33.64
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    4117
                                                                              
       _cons     .6638095   .0146821    45.21   0.000     .6350159    .6926032
          xt     .2049402   .0761889     2.69   0.007     .0555235     .354357
           t    -.0107231   .0222486    -0.48   0.630    -.0543557    .0329095
           x    -.3048352   .0558337    -5.46   0.000    -.4143326   -.1953377
                                                                              
        tfee        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    466.612205  2031  .229745054           Root MSE      =  .47576
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0148
    Residual    459.024806  2028  .226343593           R-squared     =  0.0163
       Model    7.58739837     3  2.52913279           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,  2028) =   11.17
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    2032
                                                                              
       _cons     .3771478    .010043    37.55   0.000     .3574581    .3968374
          xt    -.0447029   .0549073    -0.81   0.416     -.152351    .0629452
           t     .1574918   .0162842     9.67   0.000      .125566    .1894177
           x    -.2074508   .0390374    -5.31   0.000    -.2839853   -.1309163
                                                                              
      trnlen        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    998.262991  4098  .243597606           Root MSE      =  .48457
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0361
    Residual    961.523792  4095  .234804345           R-squared     =  0.0368
       Model    36.7391993     3  12.2463998           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,  4095) =   52.16
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    4099
245 
 
 
Netwkt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Hourlypaidt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Ernfiltt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Bonusest,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     246.5605   1.698751   145.14   0.000     243.2309    249.8901
          xt    -58.34449   7.997672    -7.30   0.000    -74.02037   -42.66861
           t     123.8432   2.707945    45.73   0.000     118.5355    129.1509
           x     -163.541   5.611333   -29.14   0.000    -174.5395   -152.5425
                                                                              
       netwk        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1.2273e+09 26056  47100.9112           Root MSE      =  201.46
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1383
    Residual    1.0574e+09 26053  40585.2494           R-squared     =  0.1384
       Model     169893840     3  56631280.1           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3, 26053) = 1395.37
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   26057
                                                                              
       _cons     8.103821    .065818   123.12   0.000     7.974814    8.232828
          xt    -1.819956   .3098695    -5.87   0.000    -2.427317   -1.212594
           t     3.883344   .1049192    37.01   0.000     3.677697    4.088992
           x    -5.045344   .2174109   -23.21   0.000    -5.471481   -4.619207
                                                                              
  hourlypaid        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1751875.46 26056  67.2350113           Root MSE      =  7.8055
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0938
    Residual    1587290.79 26053  60.9254517           R-squared     =  0.0939
       Model    164584.661     3  54861.5537           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3, 26053) =  900.47
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   26057
                                                                              
       _cons     .3087153   .0037106    83.20   0.000     .3014422    .3159883
          xt     .0536287   .0176322     3.04   0.002     .0190685    .0881888
           t    -.0998776   .0058902   -16.96   0.000    -.1114227   -.0883326
           x    -.1825543   .0124745   -14.63   0.000     -.207005   -.1581035
                                                                              
     ernfilt        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    4650.21598 24723  .188092707           Root MSE      =  .42809
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0257
    Residual    4530.25035 24720  .183262554           R-squared     =  0.0258
       Model    119.965639     3  39.9885462           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3, 24720) =  218.20
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   24724
                                                                              
       _cons     .2003868   .0061749    32.45   0.000     .1882819    .2124916
          xt     .0157552   .0496298     0.32   0.751    -.0815362    .1130467
           t    -.0100136   .0111103    -0.90   0.367    -.0317937    .0117665
           x    -.0306898   .0315298    -0.97   0.330     -.092499    .0311194
                                                                              
     bonuses        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    987.908061  6264  .157712015           Root MSE      =  .39716
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0002
    Residual    987.607737  6261  .157739616           R-squared     =  0.0003
       Model    .300324032     3  .100108011           Prob > F      =  0.5926
                                                       F(  3,  6261) =    0.63
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    6265
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Profitrelatedt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Londonallwt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Standbyt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
 
Shiftallwt,i = â0 + â1*Tt + â2*Gi + â3*(Tt*Gi) + ℮t,i 
 
The source of all results is the Office for National Statistics, Crown Copyright. 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0652647   .0034045    19.17   0.000     .0585907    .0719387
          xt     .0242708   .0273632     0.89   0.375    -.0293706    .0779121
           t    -.0430905   .0061257    -7.03   0.000    -.0550989   -.0310822
           x     -.028901   .0173838    -1.66   0.096    -.0629793    .0051772
                                                                              
profitrela~d        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    302.757223  6264   .04833289           Root MSE      =  .21898
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0079
    Residual    300.216126  6261  .047950188           R-squared     =  0.0084
       Model    2.54109711     3  .847032369           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,  6261) =   17.66
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    6265
                                                                              
       _cons     .0824269   .0041133    20.04   0.000     .0743634    .0904904
          xt    -.0062646   .0330604    -0.19   0.850    -.0710743    .0585451
           t    -.0159044    .007401    -2.15   0.032     -.030413   -.0013959
           x     -.033942   .0210032    -1.62   0.106    -.0751156    .0072315
                                                                              
  londonallw        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    438.986433  6264  .070080848           Root MSE      =  .26457
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0012
    Residual    438.243347  6261  .069995743           R-squared     =  0.0017
       Model    .743085269     3   .24769509           Prob > F      =  0.0140
                                                       F(  3,  6261) =    3.54
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    6265
                                                                              
       _cons     .0326323    .002963    11.01   0.000     .0268238    .0384409
          xt    -.0056339   .0238149    -0.24   0.813    -.0523192    .0410514
           t     .0198284   .0053313     3.72   0.000     .0093773    .0302796
           x    -.0205111   .0151296    -1.36   0.175    -.0501703     .009148
                                                                              
     standby        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    228.034477  6264  .036403971           Root MSE      =  .19058
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0023
    Residual    227.402747  6261  .036320515           R-squared     =  0.0028
       Model    .631729847     3  .210576616           Prob > F      =  0.0006
                                                       F(  3,  6261) =    5.80
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    6265
                                                                              
       _cons     .1094996   .0047688    22.96   0.000     .1001512     .118848
          xt    -.0131529   .0383283    -0.34   0.731    -.0882895    .0619837
           t    -.0029556   .0085803    -0.34   0.731     -.019776    .0138649
           x    -.0670754   .0243499    -2.75   0.006    -.1148096   -.0193412
                                                                              
   shiftallw        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     590.47087  6264  .094264187           Root MSE      =  .30672
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0020
    Residual    589.031564  6261   .09407947           R-squared     =  0.0024
       Model    1.43930607     3   .47976869           Prob > F      =  0.0016
                                                       F(  3,  6261) =    5.10
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    6265
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Appendix 6 
Output of Equation 5.1a and Equation 5.1b 
 
Equation 5.1a 
Dependent variable = Minimum Wage 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Age + b2 Gender + b3 Length of stay + b4 English language + 
b5 Educational level + b6 Hours of work + b7 Same ethnicity employer + b8 Local 
ethnicity employer + b9 Union membership + b10 Work permit needed   
 
 
 
 
Block 0: Beginning Block 
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Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 
Variables Student 2.592 1 .107 
Overall Statistics 2.592 1 .107 
 
 
Block 2: Method = Forward Stepwise (Conditional) 
 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 
Step 21.724 1 .000 
Block 21.724 1 .000 
Model 21.724 1 .000 
Step 2 
Step 10.592 1 .001 
Block 32.317 2 .000 
Model 32.317 2 .000 
Step 3 
Step 10.285 1 .001 
Block 42.602 3 .000 
Model 42.602 3 .000 
 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 195.255
a
 .128 .172 
2 184.663
b
 .185 .248 
3 174.378
b
 .236 .317 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
b. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 .000 0 . 
2 .196 2 .907 
3 14.417 8 .072 
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Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 If respondent is in minimum wage 
or above minimum wage = Above 
Minimum Wage 
If respondent is in minimum wage 
or above minimum wage = 
Minimum Wage 
Total 
Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 
1 66 66.000 27 27.000 93 
2 22 22.000 43 43.000 65 
Step 2 
1 37 37.546 8 7.454 45 
2 29 28.454 19 19.546 48 
3 8 7.454 5 5.546 13 
4 14 14.546 38 37.454 52 
Step 3 
1 11 13.294 4 1.706 15 
2 20 17.356 1 3.644 21 
3 11 12.312 5 3.688 16 
4 12 11.152 4 4.848 16 
5 13 9.737 3 6.263 16 
6 5 8.009 11 7.991 16 
7 7 6.958 10 10.042 17 
8 4 4.997 11 10.003 15 
9 5 3.172 11 12.828 16 
10 0 1.013 10 8.987 10 
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Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) result for Equation 5.1b 
 
 
 
Hausman Test for Instrumental Variable (IV) Validity 
 
 
  
 
Equation 5.1b 
Dependent variable = Minimum Wage 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Hours of Work + b2 Local Ethnicity Employer + b3 Work 
Permit Needed + b4 Work Experience + b5 Training + b6 Student 
 
               Student MinimumWageSector
Instruments:   HoursofWork LocalEthnicEmployer WorkPermitNeeded WorkExperience
Instrumented:  Training
                                                                                     
              _cons     3.954214   6.261831     0.63   0.528    -8.318749    16.22718
            Student     1.071653   1.659272     0.65   0.518    -2.180461    4.323767
     WorkExperience    -.2561144   .4709778    -0.54   0.587    -1.179214    .6669852
   WorkPermitNeeded    -.6466888   1.552073    -0.42   0.677    -3.688695    2.395318
LocalEthnicEmployer     1.121311    2.23444     0.50   0.616    -3.258111    5.500734
        HoursofWork    -.0117208   .0323417    -0.36   0.717    -.0751094    .0516678
           Training    -4.997434   8.218435    -0.61   0.543    -21.10527     11.1104
                                                                                     
        MinimumWage        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                     
                                                       Root MSE      =   2.074
                                                       R-squared     =       .
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.8286
                                                       Wald chi2(6)  =    2.84
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     193
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9998
                          =        0.36
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
          B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from regress
                       b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from ivregress
                                                                              
       _cons      3.954214     .2043038         3.74991        6.260357
     Student      1.071653     .1039829        .9676698        1.656942
WorkExperi~e     -.2561144     -.052523       -.2035914        .4657343
WorkPermit~d     -.6466888     .2598329       -.9065218        1.549994
LocalEthni~r      1.121311    -.2088642        1.330176        2.233318
 HoursofWork     -.0117208     .0068241       -.0185449        .0322732
    Training     -4.997434    -.0551375       -4.942297        8.218067
                                                                              
                minimumwag~v minimumwag~s    Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman minimumwageiv minimumwageols, constant
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Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Cases
a
 N Percent 
Selected Cases 
Included in Analysis 193 96.5 
Missing Cases 7 3.5 
Total 200 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 200 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number 
of cases. 
 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value 
Above Minimum Wage 0 
Minimum Wage 1 
 
 
Block 0: Beginning Block 
 
 
Classification Table
a,b
 
 Observed Predicted 
 
If respondent is in minimum wage 
or above minimum wage 
Percentage 
Correct 
 
Above Minimum 
Wage 
Minimum Wage 
Step 0 
If respondent is in 
minimum wage or 
above minimum wage 
Above Minimum 
Wage 
110 0 100.0 
Minimum Wage 83 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   57.0 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -.282 .145 3.752 1 .053 .755 
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Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 
Variables 
HoursofWork 7.674 1 .006 
LocalEthnicEmployer 19.963 1 .000 
WorkPermitNeeded 21.935 1 .000 
WorkExperience 1.467 1 .226 
Training 7.316 1 .007 
Student 4.274 1 .039 
Overall Statistics 43.761 6 .000 
 
 
Block 1: Method = Forward Stepwise (Conditional) 
 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 
Step 23.028 1 .000 
Block 23.028 1 .000 
Model 23.028 1 .000 
Step 2 
Step 13.163 1 .000 
Block 36.191 2 .000 
Model 36.191 2 .000 
Step 3 
Step 9.575 1 .002 
Block 45.766 3 .000 
Model 45.766 3 .000 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 240.737
a
 .112 .151 
2 227.574
a
 .171 .229 
3 217.999
a
 .211 .283 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 .000 0 . 
2 .494 2 .781 
3 18.897 8 .015 
255 
 
 
 
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 If respondent is in minimum wage 
or above minimum wage = Above 
Minimum Wage 
If respondent is in minimum wage 
or above minimum wage = 
Minimum Wage 
Total 
Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 
1 56 56.000 15 15.000 71 
2 54 54.000 68 68.000 122 
Step 2 
1 43 43.976 9 8.024 52 
2 13 12.024 6 6.976 19 
3 36 35.024 24 24.976 60 
4 18 18.976 44 43.024 62 
Step 3 
1 13 16.055 5 1.945 18 
2 24 20.803 1 4.197 25 
3 12 13.705 6 4.295 18 
4 13 13.730 7 6.270 20 
5 17 11.983 2 7.017 19 
6 9 10.099 10 8.901 19 
7 7 8.584 12 10.416 19 
8 6 7.406 13 11.594 19 
9 8 5.338 12 14.662 20 
10 1 2.298 15 13.702 16 
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Classification Table
a
 
 Observed Predicted 
 
If respondent is in 
minimum wage or 
above minimum wage 
Percentage 
Correct 
 
Above 
Minimum 
Wage 
Minimum 
Wage 
Step 1 
If respondent is in minimum 
wage or above minimum 
wage 
Above Minimum 
Wage 
56 54 50.9 
Minimum Wage 15 68 81.9 
Overall Percentage   64.2 
Step 2 
If respondent is in minimum 
wage or above minimum 
wage 
Above Minimum 
Wage 
92 18 83.6 
Minimum Wage 39 44 53.0 
Overall Percentage   70.5 
Step 3 
If respondent is in minimum 
wage or above minimum wage 
Above Minimum 
Wage 
87 23 79.1 
Minimum Wage 26 57 68.7 
Overall Percentage   74.6 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
WorkPermitNeeded 1.548 .343 20.346 1 .000 4.701 
Constant -1.317 .291 20.530 1 .000 .268 
Step 2
b
 
LocalEthnicEmployer -1.157 .323 12.836 1 .000 .315 
WorkPermitNeeded 1.363 .355 14.746 1 .000 3.908 
Constant -.544 .357 2.324 1 .127 .580 
Step 3
c
 
HoursofWork .032 .011 8.641 1 .003 1.033 
LocalEthnicEmployer -1.032 .333 9.578 1 .002 .356 
WorkPermitNeeded 1.606 .378 18.082 1 .000 4.982 
Constant -1.820 .569 10.245 1 .001 .162 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: WorkPermitNeeded. 
b. Variable(s) entered on step 2: LocalEthnicEmployer. 
c. Variable(s) entered on step 3: HoursofWork. 
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Model if Term Removed
a
 
Variable Model Log 
Likelihood 
Change in -2 
Log Likelihood 
df Sig. of the 
Change 
Step 1 WorkPermitNeeded -132.018 23.298 1 .000 
Step 2 
LocalEthnicEmployer -120.406 13.237 1 .000 
WorkPermitNeeded -121.919 16.264 1 .000 
Step 3 
HoursofWork -113.842 9.685 1 .002 
LocalEthnicEmployer -113.875 9.750 1 .002 
WorkPermitNeeded -119.366 20.732 1 .000 
a. Based on conditional parameter estimates 
 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 1 
Variables 
HoursofWork 12.326 1 .000 
LocalEthnicEmployer 13.272 1 .000 
WorkExperience .127 1 .722 
Training 4.704 1 .030 
Student .079 1 .778 
Overall Statistics 23.540 5 .000 
Step 2 
Variables 
HoursofWork 9.038 1 .003 
WorkExperience .335 1 .562 
Training 1.027 1 .311 
Student .000 1 .984 
Overall Statistics 11.208 4 .024 
Step 3 
Variables 
WorkExperience .621 1 .431 
Training .150 1 .698 
Student 1.465 1 .226 
Overall Statistics 2.276 3 .517 
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Appendix 7 
Endogeneity Test (Hausman Specification) and IV/2SLS Method 
 
Dependent Variable = Training 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b Minimum wage + Age + Gender + Minimum Wage sector + 
Student 
 
Dependent variable = Minimum Wage 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Age + b2 Gender + b3 Student + b4 Work Permit + b5 Same 
Ethnicity Employer 
 
Dependent Variable = Training 
ln(p/1-p) = 2.896965  - 1.599201 Minimum wage - 0.0131614 Age  - 0.4836988  
Gender - 0.4226353 Minimum Wage Sector + 0.830678 Student + 0.3598172   ̂ 
 
 
Dependent variable = Minimum Wage Sector 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Age + b2 Gender + b3 Student + b4 Work Permit + b5 Same 
Ethnicity Employer 
Dependent Variable = Training 
ln(p/1-p) = 3.424853 – 0.9832586 Minimum wage – 0.0148072 Age  - 0.4520194 
Gender - 1.315739 Minimum Wage Sector + 0.6479729 Student + 0.4624633   ̂ 
. 
                                                                                   
            _cons     2.896965   .9479612     3.06   0.002     1.038996    4.754935
            vhat1     .3598172   .2620166     1.37   0.170    -.1537259    .8733603
          Student      .830678    .469864     1.77   0.077    -.0902385    1.751594
MinimumWageSector    -.4226353   .5183398    -0.82   0.415    -1.438563     .593292
           Gender    -.4836988   .3338921    -1.45   0.147    -1.138115    .1707177
              Age    -.0131614   .0180227    -0.73   0.465    -.0484853    .0221626
      MinimumWage    -1.599201    .626919    -2.55   0.011     -2.82794   -.3704627
                                                                                   
         Training        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                  Robust
                                                                                   
Log pseudolikelihood = -107.33481                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0836
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0112
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =      16.51
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -107.33481  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -107.33481  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -107.33502  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -107.58832  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -117.12422  
. logit Training MinimumWage Age Gender  MinimumWageSector Student  vhat1, vce(robust)
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. 
                                                                                   
            _cons     3.424853   1.046295     3.27   0.001     1.374153    5.475552
            vhat2     .4624633   .2473034     1.87   0.061    -.0222425    .9471692
          Student     .6479729   .4598358     1.41   0.159    -.2532888    1.549235
MinimumWageSector    -1.315739   .6593833    -2.00   0.046    -2.608106   -.0233711
           Gender    -.4520194   .3349131    -1.35   0.177    -1.108437    .2043981
              Age    -.0148072   .0182524    -0.81   0.417    -.0505812    .0209667
      MinimumWage    -.9832586   .3627319    -2.71   0.007      -1.6942   -.2723171
                                                                                   
         Training        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                  Robust
                                                                                   
Log pseudolikelihood = -106.82579                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0879
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0104
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =      16.71
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -106.82579  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -106.82579  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -106.82618  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -107.10781  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -117.12422  
. logit Training MinimumWage Age Gender  MinimumWageSector Student  vhat2, vce(robust)
Instruments:   Age Gender Student WorkPermitNeeded SameEthnicEmployer
Instrumented:  MinimumWage MinimumWageSector
                                                                                   
            _cons     3.663945   7.161698     0.51   0.609    -10.37273    17.70062
          Student    -.1840793   1.331722    -0.14   0.890    -2.794207    2.426048
           Gender     .0441789   .4404108     0.10   0.920    -.8190104    .9073683
              Age    -.0037153   .0165401    -0.22   0.822    -.0361334    .0287027
MinimumWageSector    -4.231499   13.32903    -0.32   0.751    -30.35591    21.89292
      MinimumWage      1.43293   7.856918     0.18   0.855    -13.96635    16.83221
                                                                                   
         Training        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                   
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.6333
                                                       R-squared     =       .
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.7278
                                                       Wald chi2(5)  =    2.82
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     193
> oyer)
. ivregress 2sls Training Age Gender Student (MinimumWage MinimumWageSector = WorkPermitNeeded SameEthnicEmpl
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9627
                          =        1.45
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
          B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from regress
                       b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from ivregress
                                                                              
       _cons      3.663945     1.024832        2.639113        7.159667
     Student     -.1840793     .1350135       -.3190928        1.329354
      Gender      .0441789    -.1117612        .1559402         .435394
         Age     -.0037153    -.0016318       -.0020835        .0161379
MinimumWag~r     -4.231499    -.0815466       -4.149952        13.32876
 MinimumWage       1.43293     -.183326        1.616256        7.856635
                                                                              
                trainingiv~d trainingols     Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman trainingivmethod trainingols, constant
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Dependent Variable = Meals 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student 
 (Equation 5.2b) 
 
Dependent Variable = Minimum Wage 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Age + b2 Gender + b3 Student + b4 Work Permit + b5 Same 
Ethnicity Employer 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable = Meals 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student +   ̂ 
 
. predict vhat1, residuals
                                                                                    
             _cons    -2.478159   1.015781    -2.44   0.015    -4.469053   -.4872636
SameEthnicEmployer     1.094478   .4700451     2.33   0.020     .1732061    2.015749
  WorkPermitNeeded      1.67635   .4431659     3.78   0.000     .8077607    2.544939
           Student     .0162161   .3954769     0.04   0.967    -.7589044    .7913365
            Gender     .4097283   .3412618     1.20   0.230    -.2591326    1.078589
               Age     .0103048   .0210076     0.49   0.624    -.0308693    .0514789
                                                                                    
       MinimumWage        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                    
Log likelihood = -116.91807                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1135
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(5)      =      29.93
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -116.91807  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -116.91808  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -116.97779  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -131.8826  
. logit MinimumWage Age Gender Student WorkPermitNeeded SameEthnicEmployer
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Dependent variable = Minimum Wage Sector 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Age + b2 Gender + b3 Student + b4 Work Permit + b5 Same 
Ethnicity Employer  
 
  
 
Dependent Variable = Meals 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student +   ̂ 
  
                                                                                   
            _cons    -.8313137   .9513565    -0.87   0.382    -2.695938    1.033311
            vhat1    -.1666761   .2430975    -0.69   0.493    -.6431384    .3097862
          Student    -.0578933   .4128692    -0.14   0.888    -.8671022    .7513155
MinimumWageSector     .7867485   .5834787     1.35   0.178    -.3568487    1.930346
           Gender     .3566652   .3624698     0.98   0.325    -.3537626    1.067093
              Age     -.053837   .0195255    -2.76   0.006    -.0921062   -.0155677
      MinimumWage     1.825366    .569187     3.21   0.001     .7097801    2.940952
                                                                                   
            Meals        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                  Robust
                                                                                   
Log pseudolikelihood = -106.20217                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1703
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =      36.92
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -106.20217  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -106.20217  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood =  -106.2053  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -106.77962  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -127.99666  
. logit Meals MinimumWage Age Gender  MinimumWageSector Student  vhat1, vce(robust)
. predict vhat2, residuals
                                                                                    
             _cons    -.4614607   1.152008    -0.40   0.689    -2.719355    1.796434
SameEthnicEmployer      1.98615   1.053473     1.89   0.059    -.0786187    4.050918
  WorkPermitNeeded     1.566769   .5958737     2.63   0.009     .3988784     2.73466
           Student    -.9440398   .5971052    -1.58   0.114    -2.114345    .2262649
            Gender     .6243551   .4214954     1.48   0.139    -.2017607    1.450471
               Age      .011171   .0236287     0.47   0.636    -.0351404    .0574825
                                                                                    
 MinimumWageSector        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                    
Log likelihood = -83.714725                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0878
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0065
                                                  LR chi2(5)      =      16.11
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        195
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -83.714725  
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -83.714725  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -83.714774  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -83.732194  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -84.506962  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -91.769921  
. logit MinimumWageSector Age Gender Student   WorkPermitNeeded SameEthnicEmployer
262 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                   
            _cons    -1.548661   1.043843    -1.48   0.138    -3.594556    .4972346
            vhat2    -.4739238    .271636    -1.74   0.081     -1.00632    .0584729
          Student     .0765742   .4142563     0.18   0.853    -.7353532    .8885015
MinimumWageSector     1.668513   .6931128     2.41   0.016     .3100372    3.026989
           Gender     .2834931   .3652167     0.78   0.438    -.4323186    .9993048
              Age     -.049374   .0189889    -2.60   0.009    -.0865917   -.0121563
      MinimumWage     1.598322   .3512378     4.55   0.000     .9099084    2.286735
                                                                                   
            Meals        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                  Robust
                                                                                   
Log pseudolikelihood = -104.77152                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1815
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =      38.93
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -104.77152  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -104.77152  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -104.77446  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -105.42058  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -127.99666  
. . logit Meals MinimumWage Age Gender  MinimumWageSector Student  vhat2, vce(robust)
Instruments:   Age Gender Student WorkPermitNeeded SameEthnicEmployer
Instrumented:  MinimumWage MinimumWageSector
                                                                                   
            _cons    -.2513125   2.350205    -0.11   0.915    -4.857629    4.355004
          Student     .0546634   .4370221     0.13   0.900    -.8018841    .9112109
           Gender     .0225677   .1445266     0.16   0.876    -.2606992    .3058346
              Age    -.0080642   .0054279    -1.49   0.137    -.0187026    .0025742
MinimumWageSector     .9738318   4.374095     0.22   0.824    -7.599236      9.5469
      MinimumWage     .1041729    2.57835     0.04   0.968    -4.949301    5.157647
                                                                                   
            Meals        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                   
                                                       Root MSE      =  .53597
                                                       R-squared     =       .
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0026
                                                       Wald chi2(5)  =   18.26
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     193
> er)
. ivregress 2sls Meals Age Gender Student  (MinimumWage MinimumWageSector = WorkPermitNeeded SameEthnicEmploy
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9417
                          =        1.74
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
          B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from regress
                       b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from ivregress
                                                                              
       _cons     -.2513125     .3400751       -.5913877        2.344022
     Student      .0546634    -.0267158        .0813792        .4297696
      Gender      .0225677     .0628619       -.0402942        .1284702
         Age     -.0080642    -.0093589        .0012947        .0040434
MinimumWag~r      .9738318     .1376026        .8362291        4.373292
 MinimumWage      .1041729     .3351968       -.2310239        2.577491
                                                                              
                  mealsiv      mealsols      Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman mealsiv mealsols, constant
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 Dependent Variable = Accommodation/Housing 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student    
(Equation 5.2c) 
 
Dependent Variable = Minimum Wage 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Age + b2 Gender + b3 Student + b4 Work Permit + b5 Same 
Ethnicity Employer 
 
Dependent Variable = Accommodation/Housing 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student +   ̂ 
 
 
Dependent variable = Minimum Wage Sector 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Age + b2 Gender + b3 Student + b4 Work Permit + b5 Same 
Ethnicity Employer  
 
Dependent Variable = Accommodation/Housing 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student +   ̂ 
 
                                                                                        
                 _cons    -3.507677    2.25141    -1.56   0.119    -7.920359     .905005
                 vhat1     .1345472   .3862705     0.35   0.728     -.622529    .8916235
               Student    -1.016721   .6626728    -1.53   0.125    -2.315536    .2820939
     MinimumWageSector     1.036334   1.023305     1.01   0.311    -.9693061    3.041975
                Gender     .8200697    .485189     1.69   0.091    -.1308832    1.771023
                   Age    -.0351574   .0301078    -1.17   0.243    -.0941675    .0238527
           MinimumWage     .7605446   .9979069     0.76   0.446    -1.195317    2.716406
                                                                                        
AccommodationorHousing        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                       Robust
                                                                                        
Log pseudolikelihood = -54.219749                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0938
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0383
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =      13.32
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
Iteration 5:   log pseudolikelihood = -54.219749  
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -54.219749  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -54.219774  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -54.229085  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -54.897044  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -59.834969  
. logit AccommodationorHousing MinimumWage Age Gender  MinimumWageSector Student  vhat1, vce(robust)
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 Dependent Variable = Holiday Pay 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student       
(Equation 5.2d) 
 
Dependent Variable = Minimum Wage 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Age + b2 Gender + b3 Student + b4 Work Permit + b5 Same 
Ethnicity Employer 
 
Dependent Variable = Holiday Pay 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student +   ̂ 
 
                                                                                        
                 _cons      -3.2971   2.290269    -1.44   0.150    -7.785945    1.191745
                 vhat2     .2085877   .4967759     0.42   0.675    -.7650752    1.182251
               Student    -1.102448    .700489    -1.57   0.116    -2.475381     .270485
     MinimumWageSector     .6817445   1.384483     0.49   0.622    -2.031793    3.395282
                Gender     .8423006   .4864155     1.73   0.083    -.1110563    1.795657
                   Age    -.0363384   .0288309    -1.26   0.208     -.092846    .0201692
           MinimumWage     .9976812   .5643144     1.77   0.077    -.1083546    2.103717
                                                                                        
AccommodationorHousing        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                       Robust
                                                                                        
Log pseudolikelihood = -54.168279                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0947
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0759
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =      11.43
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
Iteration 5:   log pseudolikelihood = -54.168279  
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -54.168279  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -54.168308  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -54.178674  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -54.858932  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -59.834969  
. logit AccommodationorHousing MinimumWage Age Gender  MinimumWageSector Student  vhat2, vce (robust)
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Dependent variable = Minimum Wage Sector 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Age + b2 Gender + b3 Student + b4 Work Permit + b5 Same 
Ethnicity Employer  
 
Dependent Variable = Holiday Pay 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student +   ̂ 
 
 
 
            _cons     .8748574   .8666266     1.01   0.313    -.8236995    2.573414
            vhat1     .7665629   .2774104     2.76   0.006     .2228485    1.310277
          Student    -.1120429    .383625    -0.29   0.770    -.8639342    .6398483
MinimumWageSector    -.3818422   .4542027    -0.84   0.401    -1.272063    .5083788
           Gender     .7027962   .3318341     2.12   0.034     .0524133    1.353179
              Age    -.0047963   .0175597    -0.27   0.785    -.0392127    .0296201
      MinimumWage    -2.088262   .5783689    -3.61   0.000    -3.221844   -.9546802
                                                                                   
       Holidaypay        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                  Robust
                                                                                   
Log pseudolikelihood = -117.29275                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0964
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0018
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =      21.00
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -117.29275  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -117.29275  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -117.29279  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -117.39273  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -129.80973  
. . logit Holidaypay MinimumWage Age Gender  MinimumWageSector Student  vhat1, vce (robust)
                                                                                   
            _cons    -.0594102   .8696911    -0.07   0.946    -1.763973    1.645153
            vhat2    -.1303105    .219568    -0.59   0.553    -.5606559     .300035
          Student    -.2162348   .3872114    -0.56   0.577    -.9751552    .5426857
MinimumWageSector    -.1691139   .5379249    -0.31   0.753    -1.223427    .8851995
           Gender      .572622   .3294179     1.74   0.082    -.0730252    1.218269
              Age     .0065765   .0180233     0.36   0.715    -.0287485    .0419015
      MinimumWage    -.7610966    .324491    -2.35   0.019    -1.397087   -.1251059
                                                                                   
       Holidaypay        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                  Robust
                                                                                   
Log pseudolikelihood = -122.26682                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0581
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0270
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =      14.25
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -122.26682  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -122.26683  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -122.30629  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -129.80973  
. . logit Holidaypay MinimumWage Age Gender  MinimumWageSector Student  vhat2, vce (robust)
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 Dependent Variable = Paid Sick Leave 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student 
 (Equation 5.2e) 
 
Dependent Variable = Minimum Wage 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Age + b2 Gender + b3 Student + b4 Work Permit + b5 Same 
Ethnicity Employer 
 
Dependent Variable = Paid Sick Leave 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student +   ̂ 
Instruments:   Age Gender Student WorkPermitNeeded SameEthnicEmployer
Instrumented:  MinimumWage MinimumWageSector
                                                                                   
            _cons     3.715613   8.650442     0.43   0.668    -13.23894    20.67017
          Student    -.4486942   1.608555    -0.28   0.780    -3.601404    2.704016
           Gender     .3049782   .5319616     0.57   0.566    -.7376474    1.347604
              Age    -.0010368   .0199784    -0.05   0.959    -.0401938    .0381202
MinimumWageSector    -5.116855   16.09981    -0.32   0.751     -36.6719    26.43819
      MinimumWage     1.870178   9.490181     0.20   0.844    -16.73023    20.47059
                                                                                   
       Holidaypay        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                   
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.9728
                                                       R-squared     =       .
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.8149
                                                       Wald chi2(5)  =    2.24
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     193
> ployer)
. ivregress 2sls Holidaypay Age Gender Student (MinimumWage MinimumWageSector = WorkPermitNeeded SameEthnicEm
. 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9738
                          =        1.26
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
          B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from regress
                       b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from ivregress
                                                                              
       _cons      3.715613     .4872771        3.228336        8.648458
     Student     -.4486942    -.0731263       -.3755679        1.606243
      Gender      .3049782     .1490136        .1559645         .527067
         Age     -.0010368     .0012947       -.0023314        .0195865
MinimumWag~r     -5.116855    -.0581557       -5.058699        16.09955
 MinimumWage      1.870178    -.1841506        2.054329        9.489905
                                                                              
                holidaypayiv holidaypay~s    Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman holidaypayiv holidaypayols, constant
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Dependent variable = Minimum Wage Sector 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Age + b2 Gender + b3 Student + b4 Work Permit + b5 Same 
Ethnicity Employer  
 
Dependent Variable = Paid Sick Leave 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student +   ̂ 
 
                                                                                   
            _cons    -.1448061   .8713492    -0.17   0.868    -1.852619    1.563007
            vhat1     .5636524   .2470213     2.28   0.023     .0794995    1.047805
          Student     -.195951   .4300302    -0.46   0.649    -1.038795    .6468926
MinimumWageSector     .0820181   .4515841     0.18   0.856    -.8030705    .9671067
           Gender      .096765   .3449908     0.28   0.779    -.5794046    .7729346
              Age    -.0030915   .0170014    -0.18   0.856    -.0364136    .0302305
      MinimumWage    -1.749654   .6047139    -2.89   0.004    -2.934871   -.5644361
                                                                                   
    PaidSickLeave        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                  Robust
                                                                                   
Log pseudolikelihood = -113.06037                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0549
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0901
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =      10.95
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -113.06037  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -113.06037  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -113.06047  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -113.15567  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood =  -119.6221  
. logit PaidSickLeave MinimumWage Age Gender MinimumWageSector Student vhat1, vce(robust)
                                                                                   
            _cons    -.2895399    .934143    -0.31   0.757    -2.120427    1.541347
            vhat2     .1931546   .2233121     0.86   0.387     -.244529    .6308383
          Student     -.332578   .4286088    -0.78   0.438    -1.172636    .5074798
MinimumWageSector     -.267023    .634789    -0.42   0.674    -1.511187    .9771407
           Gender     .0655377   .3442723     0.19   0.849    -.6092236    .7402991
              Age     .0003835   .0173248     0.02   0.982    -.0335725    .0343395
      MinimumWage    -.7769697   .3691766    -2.10   0.035    -1.500543   -.0533969
                                                                                   
    PaidSickLeave        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                  Robust
                                                                                   
Log pseudolikelihood = -115.72825                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0326
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.2418
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =       7.95
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -115.72825  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -115.72826  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -115.76115  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood =  -119.6221  
. logit PaidSickLeave MinimumWage Age Gender MinimumWageSector Student vhat2, vce(robust)
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 Dependent Variable = Health/Life Insurance 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student     
(Equation 5.2f) 
 
The reduced-form regression: 
Dependent Variable = Minimum Wage 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Age + b2 Gender + b3 Student + b4 Work Permit + b5 Same 
Ethnicity Employer 
 
Dependent Variable = Health/Life Insurance 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student +   ̂ 
Instruments:   Age Gender Student WorkPermitNeeded SameEthnicEmployer
Instrumented:  MinimumWage MinimumWageSector
                                                                                   
            _cons     4.283766    12.0873     0.35   0.723    -19.40691    27.97444
          Student    -.6722645   2.247641    -0.30   0.765     -5.07756    3.733032
           Gender     .2118872   .7433123     0.29   0.776    -1.244978    1.668753
              Age     .0020841    .027916     0.07   0.940    -.0526301    .0567984
MinimumWageSector    -6.833881   22.49634    -0.30   0.761    -50.92589    37.25813
      MinimumWage      3.37122   13.26067     0.25   0.799    -22.61922    29.36166
                                                                                   
    PaidSickLeave        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                   
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.7566
                                                       R-squared     =       .
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.9945
                                                       Wald chi2(5)  =    0.43
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     193
> cEmployer)
. ivregress 2sls PaidSickLeave Age Gender Student (MinimumWage MinimumWageSector = WorkPermitNeeded SameEthni
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9996
                          =        0.27
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
          B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from regress
                       b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from ivregress
                                                                              
       _cons      4.283766     .3217904        3.961975        12.08599
     Student     -.6722645    -.0683381       -.6039264         2.24611
      Gender      .2118872     .0195211        .1923661        .7400778
         Age      .0020841     .0007618        .0013224        .0276577
MinimumWag~r     -6.833881     .0271404       -6.861021        22.49617
 MinimumWage       3.37122    -.1534965        3.524716        13.26049
                                                                              
                paidsickle~v paidsickle~s    Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman paidsickleaveiv paidsickleaveols, constant
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. The reduced-form regression: 
Dependent variable = Minimum Wage Sector 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Age + b2 Gender + b3 Student + b4 Work Permit + b5 Same 
Ethnicity Employer  
 
Dependent Variable = Health/Life Insurance 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student +   ̂ 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                     
              _cons    -.3029012   1.453953    -0.21   0.835    -3.152597    2.546794
              vhat1    -.2062598   .4197317    -0.49   0.623    -1.028919    .6163993
            Student    -.7102163   .7344098    -0.97   0.334    -2.149633    .7292004
  MinimumWageSector    -1.096699   .6181453    -1.77   0.076    -2.308242    .1148435
             Gender    -.7320636   .5545605    -1.32   0.187    -1.818982     .354855
                Age     .0048236   .0277333     0.17   0.862    -.0495326    .0591798
        MinimumWage    -.1634231   1.085282    -0.15   0.880    -2.290537    1.963691
                                                                                     
HealthLifeInsurance        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                    Robust
                                                                                     
Log pseudolikelihood = -59.169948                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0793
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.1197
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =      10.12
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -59.169948  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -59.169948  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -59.171685  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood =  -60.04326  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -64.265115  
. logit HealthLifeInsurance MinimumWage Age Gender MinimumWageSector Student vhat1, vce(robust)
                                                                                     
              _cons    -.1422189   1.354589    -0.10   0.916    -2.797164    2.512726
              vhat2     .0387505   .3572629     0.11   0.914     -.661472     .738973
            Student    -.6394698   .7035556    -0.91   0.363    -2.018414    .7394739
  MinimumWageSector    -1.141886   .8195917    -1.39   0.164    -2.748257    .4644841
             Gender    -.6882444    .575374    -1.20   0.232    -1.815957    .4394678
                Age     .0035577   .0269696     0.13   0.895    -.0493018    .0564172
        MinimumWage    -.5182346   .6197542    -0.84   0.403    -1.732931    .6964612
                                                                                     
HealthLifeInsurance        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                    Robust
                                                                                     
Log pseudolikelihood = -59.317299                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0770
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.1010
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =      10.62
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -59.317299  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -59.317299  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -59.318997  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -60.174158  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -64.265115  
. logit HealthLifeInsurance MinimumWage Age Gender MinimumWageSector Student  vhat2, vce(robust)
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 Dependent Variable = Pension Scheme 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student       
(Equation 5.2g) 
The reduced-form regression: 
Dependent Variable = Minimum Wage 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Age + b2 Gender + b3 Student + b4 Work Permit + b5 Same 
Ethnicity Employer 
 
Dependent Variable = Pension Scheme 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student +   ̂ 
 
Dependent variable = Minimum Wage Sector 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Age + b2 Gender + b3 Student + b4 Work Permit + b5 Same 
Ethnicity Employer  
 
Dependent Variable = Pension Scheme 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student +   ̂ 
. 
                                                                                   
            _cons    -.7909677   1.377446    -0.57   0.566    -3.490711    1.908776
            vhat1     .4582301   .3444803     1.33   0.183     -.216939    1.133399
          Student    -.9208661   .8409441    -1.10   0.273    -2.569086     .727354
MinimumWageSector     -.581006   .5496885    -1.06   0.291    -1.658376    .4963636
           Gender    -.4592412   .5273213    -0.87   0.384    -1.492772    .5742895
              Age     .0122958   .0258974     0.47   0.635    -.0384622    .0630537
      MinimumWage    -2.367783   1.042123    -2.27   0.023    -4.410306   -.3252597
                                                                                   
    PensionScheme        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                  Robust
                                                                                   
Log pseudolikelihood = -50.194999                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1275
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0217
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =      14.82
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
Iteration 5:   log pseudolikelihood = -50.194999  
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -50.194999  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -50.195086  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -50.220181  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -51.525093  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -57.529396  
. . logit PensionScheme MinimumWage Age Gender MinimumWageSector Student vhat1, vce(robust)
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 Dependent Variable = Bonus 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student        
(Equation 5.2i) 
 
To test for endogeneity between minimum wage and bonus, the reduced-form regression: 
Dependent Variable = Minimum Wage 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Age + b2 Gender + b3 Student + b4 Work Permit + b5 Same 
Ethnicity Employer 
 
Dependent Variable = Bonus 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student +   ̂  
. 
                                                                                   
            _cons    -1.012594   1.432187    -0.71   0.480    -3.819629    1.794441
            vhat2    -.0316252   .3615072    -0.09   0.930    -.7401662    .6769158
          Student    -1.047262   .8249828    -1.27   0.204    -2.664198    .5696751
MinimumWageSector      -.52914   .7640547    -0.69   0.489     -2.02666    .9683798
           Gender    -.5339536   .5331381    -1.00   0.317    -1.578885    .5109779
              Age     .0129854   .0260599     0.50   0.618    -.0380911    .0640619
      MinimumWage     -1.56494   .8444573    -1.85   0.064    -3.220046    .0901657
                                                                                   
    PensionScheme        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                  Robust
                                                                                   
Log pseudolikelihood = -50.945351                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1144
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0436
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =      12.97
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
Iteration 5:   log pseudolikelihood = -50.945351  
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -50.945351  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -50.945398  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -50.963692  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -52.123147  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -57.529396  
. logit PensionScheme MinimumWage Age Gender MinimumWageSector Student  vhat2, vce (robust)
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To test whether there is endogeneity between minimum wage sector and bonus, the 
reduced-form regression: 
Dependent Variable = Minimum Wage Sector 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Age + b2 Gender + b3 Student + b4 Work Permit + b5 Same 
Ethnicity Employer  
 
Dependent Variable = Bonus 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student +   ̂ 
 
 
. 
                                                                                   
            _cons     .1532569   .7921357     0.19   0.847    -1.399301    1.705814
            vhat1     .5129437   .2250799     2.28   0.023     .0717952    .9540922
          Student    -.3837107   .3879711    -0.99   0.323     -1.14412    .3766986
MinimumWageSector     .1372503   .4151014     0.33   0.741    -.6763335    .9508342
           Gender     .0909301   .3246013     0.28   0.779    -.5452767    .7271369
              Age    -.0199798   .0171569    -1.16   0.244    -.0536067    .0136471
      MinimumWage    -.5043869   .5394775    -0.93   0.350    -1.561743    .5529696
                                                                                   
          Bonuses        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                  Robust
                                                                                   
Log pseudolikelihood =  -122.0306                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0346
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.1776
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =       8.93
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood =  -122.0306  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood =  -122.0306  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -122.04829  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -126.40586  
. logit Bonuses MinimumWage Age Gender MinimumWageSector Student  vhat1, vce(robust)
. 
                                                                                   
            _cons    -.1637288   .8961726    -0.18   0.855    -1.920195    1.592737
            vhat2     .0812311   .2257272     0.36   0.719    -.3611861    .5236482
          Student    -.4995829   .3908032    -1.28   0.201    -1.265543    .2663773
MinimumWageSector    -.0287277   .5683722    -0.05   0.960    -1.142717    1.085261
           Gender     .0572592   .3201538     0.18   0.858    -.5702307    .6847491
              Age    -.0146372   .0178097    -0.82   0.411    -.0495435    .0202691
      MinimumWage     .3539762   .3211085     1.10   0.270     -.275385    .9833374
                                                                                   
          Bonuses        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                   
Log likelihood = -124.72471                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0133
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.7622
                                                  LR chi2(6)      =       3.36
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        193
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -124.72471  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -124.72471  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -124.72823  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -126.40586  
. logit Bonuses MinimumWage Age Gender MinimumWageSector Student  vhat2
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Instruments:   Age Gender Student WorkPermitNeeded SameEthnicEmployer
Instrumented:  MinimumWage MinimumWageSector
                                                                                   
            _cons     3.060752    8.50427     0.36   0.719    -13.60731    19.72881
          Student    -.5409455   1.581374    -0.34   0.732    -3.640382    2.558491
           Gender     .1461562   .5229727     0.28   0.780    -.8788515    1.171164
              Age    -.0014609   .0196408    -0.07   0.941    -.0399563    .0370344
MinimumWageSector    -4.664403   15.82776    -0.29   0.768    -35.68624    26.35744
      MinimumWage     2.600811   9.329819     0.28   0.780     -15.6853    20.88692
                                                                                   
          Bonuses        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                   
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.9394
                                                       R-squared     =       .
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.9990
                                                       Wald chi2(5)  =    0.21
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     193
> yer)
. ivregress 2sls Bonuses Age Gender Student (MinimumWage MinimumWageSector = WorkPermitNeeded SameEthnicEmplo
. 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9999
                          =        0.18
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
          B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from regress
                       b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from ivregress
                                                                              
       _cons      3.060752     .4205821         2.64017        8.502212
     Student     -.5409455    -.1349003       -.4060452        1.578976
      Gender      .1461562      .013942        .1322142         .517896
         Age     -.0014609    -.0033175        .0018565        .0192342
MinimumWag~r     -4.664403     .0394769        -4.70388        15.82749
 MinimumWage      2.600811     .0887348        2.512076        9.329533
                                                                              
                  bonusiv      bonusols      Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman bonusiv bonusols, constant
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Appendix 8 
Output of Equation 5.2a to Equation 5.2p 
 
Dependent Variable = Training 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b Minimum wage + Age + Gender + Minimum Wage sector + 
Student  
 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Cases
a
 N Percent 
Selected Cases 
Included in Analysis 198 99.0 
Missing Cases 2 1.0 
Total 200 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 200 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number 
of cases. 
 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value 
No 0 
Yes 1 
 
 
Block 0: Beginning Block 
 
 
Classification Table
a,b
 
 Observed Predicted 
 If respondent receives training Percentage 
Correct  No Yes 
Step 0 
If respondent receives 
training 
No 0 58 .0 
Yes 0 140 100.0 
Overall Percentage   70.7 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
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Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant .881 .156 31.845 1 .000 2.414 
 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 
Variables 
MinimumWage 7.178 1 .007 
Age 1.837 1 .175 
Gender 5.458 1 .019 
MinimumWageSector 3.757 1 .053 
Student 4.992 1 .025 
Overall Statistics 18.404 5 .002 
 
 
Block 1: Method = Forward Stepwise (Conditional) 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 
Step 7.157 1 .007 
Block 7.157 1 .007 
Model 7.157 1 .007 
Step 2 
Step 7.666 1 .006 
Block 14.822 2 .001 
Model 14.822 2 .001 
 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 232.326
a
 .036 .051 
2 224.660
a
 .072 .103 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 .000 0 . 
2 .871 2 .647 
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Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 If respondent receives training = 
No 
If respondent receives training = 
Yes 
Total 
Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 
1 34 34.000 53 53.000 87 
2 24 24.000 87 87.000 111 
Step 2 
1 27 25.876 27 28.124 54 
2 20 21.124 64 62.876 84 
3 7 8.124 26 24.876 33 
4 4 2.876 23 24.124 27 
 
 
Classification Table
a
 
 Observed Predicted 
 If respondent receives training Percentage 
Correct  No Yes 
Step 1 
If respondent receives 
training 
No 0 58 .0 
Yes 0 140 100.0 
Overall Percentage   70.7 
Step 2 
If respondent receives 
training 
No 0 58 .0 
Yes 0 140 100.0 
Overall Percentage   70.7 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
MinimumWage -.844 .318 7.021 1 .008 .430 
Constant 1.288 .231 31.199 1 .000 3.625 
Step 2
b
 
MinimumWage -1.008 .332 9.223 1 .002 .365 
Student 1.036 .395 6.890 1 .009 2.818 
Constant 1.091 .240 20.711 1 .000 2.977 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: MinimumWage. 
b. Variable(s) entered on step 2: Student. 
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Model if Term Removed
a
 
Variable Model Log 
Likelihood 
Change in -2 
Log Likelihood 
df Sig. of the 
Change 
Step 1 MinimumWage -119.767 7.209 1 .007 
Step 2 
MinimumWage -117.145 9.630 1 .002 
Student -116.203 7.746 1 .005 
a. Based on conditional parameter estimates 
 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 1 
Variables 
Age 3.585 1 .058 
Gender 5.917 1 .015 
MinimumWageSector 1.815 1 .178 
Student 7.174 1 .007 
Overall Statistics 11.680 4 .020 
Step 2 
Variables 
Age .516 1 .473 
Gender 3.296 1 .069 
MinimumWageSector 1.245 1 .265 
Overall Statistics 4.528 3 .210 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable = Meals 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student 
 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Cases
a
 N Percent 
Selected Cases 
Included in Analysis 198 99.0 
Missing Cases 2 1.0 
Total 200 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 200 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number 
of cases. 
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Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value 
No 0 
Yes 1 
 
 
Classification Table
a,b
 
 Observed Predicted 
 If respondent receives meals Percentage 
Correct  No Yes 
Step 0 
If respondent receives meals 
No 123 0 100.0 
Yes 75 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   62.1 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -.495 .147 11.402 1 .001 .610 
 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 
Variables 
MinimumWage 31.606 1 .000 
Age 10.076 1 .002 
Gender .123 1 .726 
MinimumWageSector 9.075 1 .003 
Student 1.855 1 .173 
Overall Statistics 40.291 5 .000 
 
 
Block 1: Method = Forward Stepwise (Conditional) 
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Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 
Step 32.197 1 .000 
Block 32.197 1 .000 
Model 32.197 1 .000 
Step 2 
Step 6.835 1 .009 
Block 39.032 2 .000 
Model 39.032 2 .000 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 230.536
a
 .150 .204 
2 223.701
a
 .179 .244 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 .000 0 . 
2 6.190 8 .626 
 
 
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 If respondent receives meals = No If respondent receives meals = 
Yes 
Total 
Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 
1 88 88.000 23 23.000 111 
2 35 35.000 52 52.000 87 
Step 2 
1 21 18.865 0 2.135 21 
2 16 17.816 5 3.184 21 
3 15 15.740 5 4.260 20 
4 14 12.726 3 4.274 17 
5 16 16.666 7 6.334 23 
6 12 12.764 8 7.236 20 
7 7 9.114 13 10.886 20 
8 7 6.864 11 11.136 18 
9 8 6.523 11 12.477 19 
10 7 5.924 12 13.076 19 
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Classification Table
a
 
 Observed Predicted 
 If respondent receives meals Percentage 
Correct  No Yes 
Step 1 
If respondent receives meals 
No 88 35 71.5 
Yes 23 52 69.3 
Overall Percentage   70.7 
Step 2 
If respondent receives meals 
No 94 29 76.4 
Yes 28 47 62.7 
Overall Percentage   71.2 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
MinimumWage 1.738 .320 29.419 1 .000 5.684 
Constant -1.342 .234 32.831 1 .000 .261 
Step 2
b
 
MinimumWage 1.663 .326 26.049 1 .000 5.277 
Age -.046 .019 6.221 1 .013 .955 
Constant .144 .617 .054 1 .815 1.155 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: MinimumWage. 
b. Variable(s) entered on step 2: Age. 
 
 
Model if Term Removed
a
 
Variable Model Log 
Likelihood 
Change in -2 
Log Likelihood 
df Sig. of the 
Change 
Step 1 MinimumWage -131.522 32.507 1 .000 
Step 2 
MinimumWage -126.091 28.480 1 .000 
Age -115.308 6.915 1 .009 
a. Based on conditional parameter estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
281 
 
 
 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 1 
Variables 
Age 6.466 1 .011 
Gender .247 1 .619 
MinimumWageSector 3.207 1 .073 
Student .341 1 .559 
Overall Statistics 11.109 4 .025 
Step 2 
Variables 
Gender 1.597 1 .206 
MinimumWageSector 3.467 1 .063 
Student .578 1 .447 
Overall Statistics 5.115 3 .164 
 
 
Dependent Variable = Accommodation/Housing 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student 
 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Cases
a
 N Percent 
Selected Cases 
Included in Analysis 198 99.0 
Missing Cases 2 1.0 
Total 200 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 200 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number 
of cases. 
 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value 
No 0 
Yes 1 
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Block 0: Beginning Block 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -2.243 .241 86.413 1 .000 .106 
 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 
Variables 
MinimumWage 5.114 1 .024 
Age .014 1 .906 
Gender 3.699 1 .054 
MinimumWageSector 2.492 1 .114 
Student 2.096 1 .148 
Overall Statistics 12.114 5 .033 
 
 
Block 1: Method = Forward Stepwise (Conditional) 
 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 
Step 5.120 1 .024 
Block 5.120 1 .024 
Model 5.120 1 .024 
Step 2 
Step 3.930 1 .047 
Block 9.051 2 .011 
Model 9.051 2 .011 
 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 120.061
a
 .026 .054 
2 116.130
a
 .045 .095 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
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Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 .000 0 . 
2 4.447 2 .108 
 
 
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 If respondent receives 
housing/accommodation = No 
If respondent receives 
housing/accommodation = Yes 
Total 
Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 
1 105 105.000 6 6.000 111 
2 74 74.000 13 13.000 87 
Step 2 
1 59 60.954 4 2.046 63 
2 46 44.046 2 3.954 48 
3 48 46.046 3 4.954 51 
4 26 27.954 10 8.046 36 
 
 
Classification Table
a
 
 Observed Predicted 
 
If respondent receives 
housing/accommodation 
Percentage 
Correct 
 No Yes 
Step 1 
If respondent receives 
housing/accommodation 
No 179 0 100.0 
Yes 19 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   90.4 
Step 2 
If respondent receives 
housing/accommodation 
No 179 0 100.0 
Yes 19 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   90.4 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
MinimumWage 1.123 .516 4.731 1 .030 3.074 
Constant -2.862 .420 46.496 1 .000 .057 
Step 2
b
 
MinimumWage 1.165 .522 4.978 1 .026 3.206 
Gender .984 .507 3.764 1 .052 2.675 
Constant -4.378 .936 21.879 1 .000 .013 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: MinimumWage. 
b. Variable(s) entered on step 2: Gender. 
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Model if Term Removed
a
 
Variable Model Log 
Likelihood 
Change in -2 
Log Likelihood 
df Sig. of the 
Change 
Step 1 MinimumWage -62.725 5.388 1 .020 
Step 2 
MinimumWage -60.904 5.677 1 .017 
Gender -60.101 4.072 1 .044 
a. Based on conditional parameter estimates 
 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 1 
Variables 
Age .076 1 .782 
Gender 3.978 1 .046 
MinimumWageSector 1.334 1 .248 
Student 3.151 1 .076 
Overall Statistics 7.376 4 .117 
Step 2 
Variables 
Age .090 1 .764 
MinimumWageSector 1.208 1 .272 
Student 1.885 1 .170 
Overall Statistics 3.744 3 .290 
 
 
Dependent Variable = Holiday Pay 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student    
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Cases
a
 N Percent 
Selected Cases 
Included in Analysis 198 99.0 
Missing Cases 2 1.0 
Total 200 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 200 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number 
of cases. 
 
285 
 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value 
No 0 
Yes 1 
 
 
Block 0: Beginning Block 
 
 
Classification Table
a,b
 
 Observed Predicted 
 
If respondent receives holiday 
paid 
Percentage 
Correct 
 No Yes 
Step 0 
If respondent receives 
holiday paid 
No 0 81 .0 
Yes 0 117 100.0 
Overall Percentage   59.1 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant .368 .145 6.472 1 .011 1.444 
 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 
Variables 
MinimumWage 9.190 1 .002 
Age 3.238 1 .072 
Gender 5.983 1 .014 
MinimumWageSector 1.353 1 .245 
Student 4.121 1 .042 
Overall Statistics 16.461 5 .006 
 
 
Block 1: Method = Forward Stepwise (Conditional) 
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Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 
Step 9.214 1 .002 
Block 9.214 1 .002 
Model 9.214 1 .002 
Step 2 
Step 6.068 1 .014 
Block 15.283 2 .000 
Model 15.283 2 .000 
 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 258.690
a
 .045 .061 
2 252.622
b
 .074 .100 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
b. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 .000 0 . 
2 .482 2 .786 
 
 
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 If respondent receives holiday 
paid = No 
If respondent receives holiday 
paid = Yes 
Total 
Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 
1 46 46.000 41 41.000 87 
2 35 35.000 76 76.000 111 
Step 2 
1 32 30.876 19 20.124 51 
2 14 15.124 22 20.876 36 
3 23 24.124 40 38.876 63 
4 12 10.876 36 37.124 48 
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Classification Table
a
 
 Observed Predicted 
 
If respondent receives holiday 
paid 
Percentage 
Correct 
 No Yes 
Step 1 
If respondent receives 
holiday paid 
No 46 35 56.8 
Yes 41 76 65.0 
Overall Percentage   61.6 
Step 2 
If respondent receives 
holiday paid 
No 32 49 39.5 
Yes 19 98 83.8 
Overall Percentage   65.7 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
Minimum Wage -.890 .296 9.025 1 .003 .410 
Constant .775 .204 14.408 1 .000 2.171 
Step 2
b
 
Minimum Wage -.905 .302 9.010 1 .003 .404 
Gender .750 .309 5.899 1 .015 2.118 
Constant -.273 .469 .340 1 .560 .761 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: MinimumWage. 
b. Variable(s) entered on step 2: Gender. 
 
 
Model if Term Removed
a
 
Variable Model Log 
Likelihood 
Change in -2 
Log Likelihood 
df Sig. of the 
Change 
Step 1 MinimumWage -133.958 9.225 1 .002 
Step 2 
MinimumWage -130.933 9.245 1 .002 
Gender -129.354 6.086 1 .014 
a. Based on conditional parameter estimates 
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Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 1 
Variables 
Age 1.852 1 .174 
Gender 5.991 1 .014 
MinimumWageSector .144 1 .704 
Student 2.668 1 .102 
Overall Statistics 7.603 4 .107 
Step 2 
Variables 
Age .618 1 .432 
MinimumWageSector .314 1 .575 
Student 1.094 1 .295 
Overall Statistics 1.606 3 .658 
 
 
Dependent Variable = Paid Sick Leave 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Cases
a
 N Percent 
Selected Cases 
Included in Analysis 198 99.0 
Missing Cases 2 1.0 
Total 200 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 200 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number 
of cases. 
 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value 
No 0 
Yes 1 
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Block 0: Beginning Block 
 
 
Classification Table
a,b
 
 Observed Predicted 
 
If respondent receives sick leave 
paid 
Percentage 
Correct 
 No Yes 
Step 0 
If respondent receives sick 
leave paid 
No 137 0 100.0 
Yes 61 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   69.2 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -.809 .154 27.631 1 .000 .445 
 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 
Variables 
MinimumWage 5.856 1 .016 
Age 1.300 1 .254 
Gender .436 1 .509 
MinimumWageSector .056 1 .812 
Student 2.256 1 .133 
Overall Statistics 7.440 5 .190 
 
 
Block 1: Method = Forward Stepwise (Conditional) 
 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 
Step 5.981 1 .014 
Block 5.981 1 .014 
Model 5.981 1 .014 
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Model Summary 
Step -2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 238.571
a
 .030 .042 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 .000 0 . 
 
 
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 If respondent receives sick leave 
paid = No 
If respondent receives sick leave 
paid = Yes 
Total 
Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 
1 68 68.000 19 19.000 87 
2 69 69.000 42 42.000 111 
 
 
Classification Table
a
 
 Observed Predicted 
 
If respondent receives sick leave 
paid 
Percentage 
Correct 
 No Yes 
Step 1 
If respondent receives sick 
leave paid 
No 137 0 100.0 
Yes 61 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   69.2 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
MinimumWage -.779 .325 5.739 1 .017 .459 
Constant -.496 .196 6.434 1 .011 .609 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: MinimumWage. 
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Model if Term Removed
a
 
Variable Model Log 
Likelihood 
Change in -2 
Log Likelihood 
df Sig. of the 
Change 
Step 1 MinimumWage -122.296 6.020 1 .014 
a. Based on conditional parameter estimates 
 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 1 
Variables 
Age .562 1 .453 
Gender .390 1 .532 
MinimumWageSector .174 1 .676 
Student 1.411 1 .235 
Overall Statistics 1.642 4 .801 
 
 
Dependent Variable = Health/Life Insurance 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Cases
a
 N Percent 
Selected Cases 
Included in Analysis 198 99.0 
Missing Cases 2 1.0 
Total 200 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 200 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number 
of cases. 
 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value 
No 0 
Yes 1 
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Block 0: Beginning Block 
 
 
Classification Table
a,b
 
 Observed Predicted 
 
If respondent receives health or 
life insurance 
Percentage 
Correct 
 No Yes 
Step 0 
If respondent receives 
health or life insurance 
No 178 0 100.0 
Yes 20 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   89.9 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -2.186 .236 85.922 1 .000 .112 
 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 
Variables 
MinimumWage 3.240 1 .072 
Age .671 1 .413 
Gender 1.406 1 .236 
MinimumWageSector 6.651 1 .010 
Student 1.118 1 .290 
Overall Statistics 10.899 5 .053 
 
 
Block 1: Method = Forward Stepwise (Conditional) 
 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 
Step 5.577 1 .018 
Block 5.577 1 .018 
Model 5.577 1 .018 
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Model Summary 
Step -2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 124.032
a
 .028 .058 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 .000 0 . 
 
 
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 If respondent receives health or 
life insurance = No 
If respondent receives health or 
life insurance = Yes 
Total 
Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 
1 149 149.000 12 12.000 161 
2 29 29.000 8 8.000 37 
 
 
Classification Table
a
 
 Observed Predicted 
 
If respondent receives health or 
life insurance 
Percentage 
Correct 
 No Yes 
Step 1 
If respondent receives 
health or life insurance 
No 178 0 100.0 
Yes 20 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   89.9 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
MinimumWageSector -1.231 .500 6.075 1 .014 .292 
Constant -1.288 .399 10.400 1 .001 .276 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: MinimumWageSector. 
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Model if Term Removed
a
 
Variable Model Log 
Likelihood 
Change in -2 
Log Likelihood 
df Sig. of the 
Change 
Step 1 MinimumWageSector -64.919 5.807 1 .016 
a. Based on conditional parameter estimates 
 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 1 
Variables 
MinimumWage 1.502 1 .220 
Age .548 1 .459 
Gender 1.061 1 .303 
Student 1.438 1 .231 
Overall Statistics 4.148 4 .386 
 
 
Dependent Variable = Pension Scheme 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student    
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Cases
a
 N Percent 
Selected Cases 
Included in Analysis 198 99.0 
Missing Cases 2 1.0 
Total 200 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 200 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number 
of cases. 
 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value 
No 0 
Yes 1 
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Block 0: Beginning Block 
 
 
Classification Table
a,b
 
 Observed Predicted 
 
If respondent receives pension 
scheme 
Percentage 
Correct 
 No Yes 
Step 0 
If respondent receives 
pension scheme 
No 181 0 100.0 
Yes 17 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   91.4 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -2.365 .254 86.942 1 .000 .094 
 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 
Variables 
MinimumWage 7.815 1 .005 
Age 2.589 1 .108 
Gender .387 1 .534 
MinimumWageSector 3.375 1 .066 
Student 3.026 1 .082 
Overall Statistics 12.683 5 .027 
 
 
Block 1: Method = Forward Stepwise (Conditional) 
 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 
Step 9.005 1 .003 
Block 9.005 1 .003 
Model 9.005 1 .003 
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Model Summary 
Step -2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 106.964
a
 .044 .100 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 .000 0 . 
 
 
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 If respondent receives pension 
scheme = No 
If respondent receives pension 
scheme = Yes 
Total 
Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 
1 85 85.000 2 2.000 87 
2 96 96.000 15 15.000 111 
 
 
Classification Table
a
 
 Observed Predicted 
 
If respondent receives pension 
scheme 
Percentage 
Correct 
 No Yes 
Step 1 
If respondent receives 
pension scheme 
No 181 0 100.0 
Yes 17 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   91.4 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
MinimumWage -1.893 .767 6.087 1 .014 .151 
Constant -1.856 .278 44.703 1 .000 .156 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: MinimumWage. 
 
 
Model if Term Removed
a
 
297 
 
Variable Model Log 
Likelihood 
Change in -2 
Log Likelihood 
df Sig. of the 
Change 
Step 1 MinimumWage -58.554 10.144 1 .001 
a. Based on conditional parameter estimates 
 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 1 
Variables 
Age 1.234 1 .267 
Gender .472 1 .492 
Minimum Wage Sector 1.023 1 .312 
Student 2.035 1 .154 
Overall Statistics 4.503 4 .342 
 
 
Dependent Variable = Bonus 
ln(p/1-p) = a + b1 Minimum wage + b2 Age + b3 Gender +b4 Minimum Wage 
sector + b5 Student 
 
 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES Bonuses 
  /METHOD=FSTEP(COND) MinimumWage Age Gender MinimumWageSector Student 
  /PRINT=GOODFIT 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(0.05) POUT(0.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(0.5). 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Cases
a
 N Percent 
Selected Cases 
Included in Analysis 198 99.0 
Missing Cases 2 1.0 
Total 200 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 200 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number 
of cases. 
 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value 
No 0 
Yes 1 
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Block 0: Beginning Block 
 
 
Classification Table
a,b
 
 Observed Predicted 
 If respondent receives bonuses Percentage 
Correct  No Yes 
Step 0 
If respondent receives 
bonuses 
No 126 0 100.0 
Yes 72 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   63.6 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -.560 .148 14.349 1 .000 .571 
 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 
Variables 
MinimumWage 1.687 1 .194 
Age .075 1 .785 
Gender .189 1 .664 
MinimumWageSector .865 1 .352 
Student 1.507 1 .220 
Overall Statistics 4.671 5 .457 
 
 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES Bonuses 
  /METHOD=ENTER MinimumWage Age Gender MinimumWageSector Student 
  /PRINT=GOODFIT 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(0.05) POUT(0.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(0.5). 
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Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Cases
a
 N Percent 
Selected Cases 
Included in Analysis 198 99.0 
Missing Cases 2 1.0 
Total 200 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 200 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number 
of cases. 
 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value 
No 0 
Yes 1 
 
 
Block 0: Beginning Block 
 
 
Classification Table
a,b
 
 Observed Predicted 
 If respondent receives bonuses Percentage 
Correct  No Yes 
Step 0 
If respondent receives 
bonuses 
No 126 0 100.0 
Yes 72 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   63.6 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -.560 .148 14.349 1 .000 .571 
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Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 
Variables 
MinimumWage 1.687 1 .194 
Age .075 1 .785 
Gender .189 1 .664 
MinimumWageSector .865 1 .352 
Student 1.507 1 .220 
Overall Statistics 4.671 5 .457 
 
 
Block 1: Method = Enter 
 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 
Step 4.727 5 .450 
Block 4.727 5 .450 
Model 4.727 5 .450 
 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 254.843
a
 .024 .032 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 14.333 8 .073 
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Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 If respondent receives bonuses = 
No 
If respondent receives bonuses = 
Yes 
Total 
Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 
1 15 15.174 5 4.826 20 
2 13 14.377 7 5.623 20 
3 17 13.588 3 6.412 20 
4 16 14.548 6 7.452 22 
5 9 13.053 11 6.947 20 
6 14 13.387 7 7.613 21 
7 14 12.839 7 8.161 21 
8 9 11.334 11 8.666 20 
9 8 10.592 12 9.408 20 
10 11 7.109 3 6.891 14 
 
 
 
Classification Table
a
 
 Observed Predicted 
 If respondent receives bonuses Percentage 
Correct  No Yes 
Step 1 
If respondent receives 
bonuses 
No 124 2 98.4 
Yes 71 1 1.4 
Overall Percentage   63.1 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
Minimum Wage .385 .317 1.475 1 .225 1.470 
Age -.015 .018 .688 1 .407 .986 
Gender .064 .316 .041 1 .839 1.066 
Minimum Wage Sector .187 .414 .203 1 .652 1.205 
Student -.597 .384 2.409 1 .121 .551 
Constant -.337 .814 .171 1 .679 .714 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Minimum Wage, Age, Gender, Minimum  Wage Sector, Student. 
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 Yes 30 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   84.8 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
  
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
Minimum Wage -.636 .437 2.117 1 .146 .529 
Age .032 .024 1.765 1 .184 1.033 
Gender -1.023 .487 4.418 1 .036 .359 
Minimum Wage Sector 1.773 .795 4.968 1 .026 5.887 
Student .598 .524 1.302 1 .254 1.818 
Constant -2.874 1.284 5.011 1 .025 .056 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Minimum Wage, Age, Gender, Minimum Wage Sector, Student. 
 
  
 
 
